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The Fit Between Changes to the Global Corruption Regime and
Indigenous Perceptions of Corruption in Kazakhstan
Abstract
The study of corruption by both scholars and policymakers has undergone a startling transformation in the
last decade. What once underwent almost no scholarly examination now inspires dozens of articles and
books.' What once was not even mentioned in international financial institutions is now a centerpiece of
reform efforts.2 What once played virtually no role in legal theory now represents-in the form of an
overwhelming international consensus that transnational bribery should be criminalized and that other legal
reforms should be undertaken-a dramatic change in the international legal regime.
The focussing of theoretical attention on corruption and the change in international policymakers' attitudes
have not been accompanied by a similar surge in the empirical study of corruption. 4 The lack of empirical
research, particularly into attitudes and perceptions toward corruption, is unfortunate for at least three
reasons. First, legal scholars and policymakers must have an empirical understanding in order to effectuate the
changes to law and policy demanded by the change in the international regime.5 Second, as a theoretical
matter-particularly with respect to theoretical explanations of international regime changes-an understanding
of other attitudes and perceptions is necessary to deal with issues of imperialism, economic efficiency and
allocation, and institutional choice.6 Third, and most interesting, the anecdotal but very persistent notion that
corruption is embraced and accepted by some cultures -that it is a normal way of doing business in some
places -cries out for empirical testing.
This Article reports on and analyzes the results of a survey conducted in the Republic of Kazakhstan, a former
republic of the Soviet Union located in Central Asia. Much of the survey asked questions regarding attitudes
towards and perceptions of corruption. For those who are interested in non-Western attitudes toward
corruption, Kazakhstan represents an excellent source of information. Kazakhstan is culturally distinct from
the West and from Asia, a distinction amplified by Central Asia's physical isolation. Kazakhstani ideas of
government and other institutions differ markedly from those in the West. Central Asia as a whole has been
physically and politically isolated from the West for several generations.
Rather than simply asking Kazakhstani respondents whether they embrace corruption or whether corruption
is part of the inherent Kazakhstani culture,8 the questions in this survey can be analyzed in four different
ways: absolute evaluations of the amount of corruption, relative evaluations of changes in the amounts of
corruption, the public salience or importance of corruption, and support for anticorruption regimes.9 These
four means of analyzing the responses indicate that corruption is overwheliningly condemned in Kazakhstan
and that the vast majority of Kazakhstani support anticorruption reforms. These findings are particularly
robust because they cut across ethnic, gender, income, education, and settlement lines; even when
respondents are sorted according to these characteristics the rejection of corruption is still overwhelming.
These findings have obvious importance to those engaged in the study or implementation of the new global
anticorruption regime. The findings lend little support to theories that explain regime change in terms of
dictates by hegemons. The findings indicate broad support for anticorruption measures in Kazakhstan and
even indicate specific measures that might be undertaken. Before discussing the specific findings, however, it is
necessary first to discuss the general nature of corruption.
This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/lgst_papers/13
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The study of corruption by both scholars and policymakers has
undergone a startling transformation in the last decade. What once
underwent almost no scholarly examination now inspires dozens
of articles and books.' What once was not even mentioned in in-
ternational financial institutions is now a centerpiece of reform ef-
forts.2 What once played virtually no role in legal theory now rep-
' See Arvind K. Jain, Preface to ECONOMICS OF CORRUPTION, at vii, vii (Arvind
K. Jain ed., 1998).
The industry for the study of corruption went into a long decline after
Kautilya [an Indian scholar who wrote 2,500 years ago] .... Fortunately,
there now appears to have been a sea change in the attitude[s] ... to-
ward[ ] corruption. The number of articles and books being devoted to
this subject has grown exponentially in the 1990s.
Id.
2 See James Wolfensohn, Plenary Address at the 9th International Anti-
Corruption Conference 1-3 (Oct. 10, 1999), at http://www.transparency.org/iacc
/9th.iacc/papers/dayl/plenary/dlpl jwolfensohn.html (President of the World
Bank referring both to the transformation of corruption from the unspoken "c
[22:4
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resents-in the form of an overwhelming international consensus
that transnational bribery should be criminalized and that other le-
gal reforms should be undertaken-a dramatic change in the inter-
national legal regime.3
The focussing of theoretical attention on corruption and the
change in international policymakers' attitudes have not been ac-
companied by a similar surge in the empirical study of corruption. 4
The lack of empirical research, particularly into attitudes and per-
ceptions toward corruption, is unfortunate for at least three rea-
sons. First, legal scholars and policymakers must have an empiri-
cal understanding in order to effectuate the changes to law and
policy demanded by the change in the international regime.5 Sec-
ond, as a theoretical matter-particularly with respect to theoreti-
cal explanations of international regime changes-an understand-
ing of other attitudes and perceptions is necessary to deal with
issues of imperialism, economic efficiency and allocation, and in-
stitutional choice.6 Third, and most interesting, the anecdotal but
word" to a subject of scrutiny, and to the fact that "so far as our institution is con-
cerned, there is nothing more important than the issue of corruption"); see also in-
fra notes 81-83 and accompanying text (discussing the actions of the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund with respect to corruption). As Susan Rose-
Ackerman points out, "[t]he study of corruption forces scholars and policy makers
to focus on the tension between self-seeking behavior and public values. Those
worried about the development failures common throughout the world must con-
front the problem of corruption and the weak and arbitrary state structures that
feed it." SUSAN ROSE-AcKERMAN, CORRUTI1N AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES,
CONSEQUENCES, AND REFORM, at xi (1999).
3 See David Kennedy, The International Anti-Corruption Campaign, 14 CoN'N. J.
INT'L L. 455,455 (1999) (noting that opposition to corruption seems to unite inter-
national commentators); see also infra notes 76-95 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the changes to the international regime).
4 See Edgardo Buscaglia & Maria Dakolias, An Analysis of the Causes of Corrup-
tion in the Judiciary, 30 LAW & POI'Y INT'L Bus. 95, 96, 99 (Supp. 1999) (explaining
the need for empirical study of the causes of corruption and noting that no such
empirical work exists); Kennedy, supra note 3, at 464 (stating that "to engage in
detailed examination of various legal regimes and rules" would be terrific); John
K.M. Ohnesorge, "Ratdh"eting Up tie Anti-Corruption Drive: Could a Look at Recent
History Cure a Case of Theory-Determinism?, 14 CoNN. J. INT'L L 467, 467 (1999)
(criticizing the lack of empirical historical research on corruption); Steven R.
Salbu, Battling Global Corruption in the New Millennium, 31 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS.
47,77 (1999) (calling for empirical study of corruption).
5 See infra notes 57-117 and accompanying text (discussing the need for an
empirical understanding of attitudes and perceptions of corruption).
6 Three different theories explaining the international regime change, each of
which creates demands for empirical understanding of perceptions and attitudes
toward corruption, are discussed infra notes 96-116.
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very persistent notion that corruption is embraced and accepted by
some cultures -that it is a normal way of doing business in some
places -cries out for empirical testing.7
This Article reports on and analyzes the results of a survey
conducted in the Republic of Kazakhstan, a former republic of the
Soviet Union located in Central Asia. Much of the survey asked
questions regarding attitudes towards and perceptions of corrup-
tion. For those who are interested in non-Western attitudes toward
corruption, Kazakhstan represents an excellent source of informa-
tion. Kazakhstan is culturally distinct from the West and from
Asia, a distinction amplified by Central Asia's physical isolation.
Kazakhstani ideas of government and other institutions differ
markedly from those in the West. Central Asia as a whole has been
physically and politically isolated from the West for several gen-
erations.
Rather than simply asking Kazakhstani respondents whether
they embrace corruption or whether corruption is part of the in-
herent Kazakhstani culture,8 the questions in this survey can be
analyzed in four different ways: absolute evaluations of the
amount of corruption, relative evaluations of changes in the
amounts of corruption, the public salience or importance of cor-
ruption, and support for anticorruption regimes.9 These four
7 See David Hess & Thomas W. Dunfee, Fighting Corruption: A Principled Ap-
proach: The C2 Principles (Combating Corruption), 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 593, 611-16
(2000) (discussing the anecdotal but persistent belief that corruption is ethically
justified). A few scholars have made similar arguments. See H. Lowell Brown,
The Extraterritorial Reach of the U.S. Government's Campaign Against International
Bribery, 22 HASTNGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 407, 473 n.248 (1999) (suggesting that
corruption is a way of life in some cultures); Kim Lane Scheppele, The Inevitable
Corruption of Transition, 14 CONN. J. INT'L L. 509, 520 (1999) (stating that in the for-
mer Soviet Union people have solid values but those values are different with re-
spect to corruption than those in the West). The Author of this Article has been
told by several high-level government officials, including officials in Kazakhstan,
that corruption is part of their culture. One high-level Kazakhstani official in par-
ticular, praised changes to the foreign investment code of his country because, in
his opinion, it made more clear to foreign investors who they should bribe. He
too stated that bribery is an accepted part of Kazakhstani culture.
8 Daniel Jun draws an important distinction between a practice that occurs in
a culture and a practice that is accepted in a culture when he notes that "bribery
has become a cultural ritual [in Korea] only in the sense that it is a prevalent prac-
tice, but not in the sense that it is a morally accepted practice." Daniel Y. Jun,
Bribery Among the Korean Elite: Putting an End to a Cultural Ritual and Restoring
Honor, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1071,1085 (1996).
9 This four-pronged scheme of analysis is suggested and used by Robert
Mattes in his own work in South Africa. Robert Mattes & Cherrel Africa, Corrup-
[22:4
4
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, Vol. 22, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol22/iss4/3
INTERNATIONAL CORRUPTION
means of analyzing the responses indicate that corruption is over-
wheliningly condemned in Kazakhstan and that the vast majority
of Kazakhstani support anticorruption reforms. These findings are
particularly robust because they cut across ethnic, gender, income,
education, and settlement lines; even when respondents are sorted
according to these characteristics the rejection of corruption is still
overwhelming.
These findings have obvious importance to those engaged in
the study or implementation of the new global anticorruption re-
gime. The findings lend little support to theories that explain re-
gime change in terms of dictates by hegemons. The findings indi-
cate broad support for anticorruption measures in Kazakhstan and
even indicate specific measures that might be undertaken. Before
discussing the specific findings, however, it is necessary first to
discuss the general nature of corruption.
1. THE NATURE OF CORRUPTION
1.1. Corruption and Briben
The predominant conception of corruption in Westem 0 litera-
ture is reflected in a definition crafted thirty years ago by Joseph
Nye, which can be paraphrased as follows: corruption involves the
misuse of authority or a position of authority for some self-
tion - The Attitudinal Component: Tracking Public Perceptions of Official Corruption in
South Africa, 1995-1998, at 1-4 (Oct. 12, 1999), at http://wwv.transparency.org
/iacc/9thjiacc/papers/day2/-wsl/d2slcafricarmattes.html.
10 This is not meant to imply that other cultures do not share this conception
of corruption. Frend Ginwalla, then Speaker of the South African Parliament,
takes umbrage at those who argue that African culture embraces different atti-
tudes toward corruption than Western culture. See Anver Versi, On Corruption
and Corrupters, Am Bus., Nov. 1996, at 7, 7 (quoting Dr. FrenE Ginwalla: "attrib-
uting corruption to our [African] cultures is both arrogant and racist, as well as
convenient and self-serving"). From Asia, Daniel Jun argues that "Korean people
share the same moral standards as the Western culture regarding bribery. They
are equally capable of distinguishing between what is intended to be gratuitous
and what is intended to wrongfully influence another person." Jun, supra note 8,
at 1084-85; see also JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBES 703 (1984) ("[It is often the West-
erner with ethnocentric prejudice who supposes that a modem Asian or African
society does not regard the act of bribery as shameful in the way Westerners re-
gard it"). The reference in this Article to a Western conception of corruption re-
flects only a willingness to explore the possibility that certain behaviors con-
demned in Western literature are accepted in other cultures.
2001]
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interested purpose." This definition of corruption obviously en-
compasses a variety of different behaviors. Corrupt behavior in-
cludes bribery, theft and misappropriation, and nepotism. 12 Cor-
ruption can occur in both the public sector and the private sector.13
The study described in this Article examines public sector corrup-
tion rather than private sector corruption, even though corruption
in the private sector presents real and significant issues.14 The
study focuses on public corruption for two reasons: first, intema-
11 Joseph Nye defines corruption as "behavior which deviates from the for-
mal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family,
private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of
certain types of private-regarding influence." J. S. Nye, Corruption and Political
Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, 61 AM. POL. Scl. REV. 417, 419 (1967); see
Thomas F. Burke, The Concept of Corruption in Campaign Finance Law, 14 CoNST.
COMMENT. 127, 129 n.9 (1997) (citing Nye's definition); Claire Moore Dickerson,
Political Corruption: Free-Flowing Opportunism, 14 CONN. J. INT'L L. 393, 396 (1999)
(same); cf Saladin Al-Jurf, Citizens, National Governments, and International Finan-
cial Institutions: Changing Conceptions of Development in the 1990s, 9 TRANSNAT'L L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 193,196 (1999) (stating that the World Bank's definition of cor-
ruption is "[t]he abuse of public office for private gain"); David H. Bayley, The Ef-
fects of Corruption in a Developing Nation, 19 W. POL. Q. 719,720 (1966) (Corruption
is the "misuse of authority as a result of considerations of personal gain, which
need not be monetary."); Philip B. Heymann, Democracy and Corruption, 20
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 323, 325 (1996) (describing "[clorruption, as secretly receiving
private benefits to affect a decision that is supposed to be made in the interests of
others and uninfluenced by private gain .... .).
Vito Tanzi offers a more specific definition; he defines corruption as "the in-
tentional non-compliance with the arm's-length principle aimed at deriving some
advantage for oneself or for related individuals from this behavior." Vito Tanzi,
Corruption: Arm's-Length Relationships and Markets, in THE ECONOMICS OF
ORGANIZED CRIME 161,167 (Gianluca Fiorentini & Sam Peltzman eds., 1995). John
Ohnesorge correctly criticizes this definition as both too dependent on an unreal-
istic perfect market model and as Western-centric in its orientation. Ohnesorge,
supra note 4, at 468-69 (discussing and criticizing Tanzi's definition). To this list of
criticisms might be added the fact that Tanzi's definition only deals with eco-
nomic decisions by officials and not the myriad other ways in which governments
interact with persons.
12 See SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 4
(1978) (discussing a variety of corrupt behaviors).
13 See Heymann, supra note 11, at 325 (noting that corruption "is certainly not
a problem solely of democracies").
14 See generally James P. Wesberry, Jr., International Financial Institutions Face
the Corruption Eruption: If the IFIs Put Their Muscle and Money Where Their Mouth Is,
the Corruption Eruption May Be Capped, 18 Nw. J. INTL'L L. & Bus. 498, 508 (1998)
(describing private sector corruption); Francois Vincke, The State and the Civil Soci-
ety in the Fight Against Corruption: The Business Community's Attitude Towards Cor-
ruption. Special Focus on Private-to-Private Corruption (Sept. 1997), at
http://www.oecd.org/daf/nocorruption/pdf/vincke.pdf (discussing at length
private sector corruption).
[22:4
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tional regimes as well as most scholarly discourse focus primarily
on public rather than private corruption,15 and second, including
questions about private corruption in the survey might have con-
fused respondents and caused them to give less reliable re-
sponses.j 6
Of the different forms of corruption, bribery receives the most
attention in Western literature. Susan Rose-Ackerman, one of the
most respected Western thinkers with respect to corruption, flatly
states "I shall always keep bribery in the analytical foreground." 17
Bribery also receives the most attention as a problem in the com-
mercial relationships involving the West.18 Transnational bribery
15 Many argue that this disparate attention is justified by the fact that public
sector corruption is far more harmful than private sector corruption. See C. Edw.in
Baker, The Media That Citizens Need, 147 U. PA. L REv. 317,325 (1993) (stating that
"the danger created by the potential of private evil arguably does not compare to
that created by governments"); John C. Coffee, Jr., Modern Mail Fraud The Restora-
tion of the Public/Private Distinction, 35 Ai. CRIM. L. REv. 427,463 (1993) ("The ab-
sence of exit or other forms of loss protection (i.e., diversification, insurance, etc.)
provides some justification for less tolerance for public corruption relative to pri-
vate corruption. Also, ugly as this truth is, sometimes private corruption maxi-
mizes value for shareholders .... "). It must be noted that not all regulatory re-
gimes distinguish between the two types or focus only on public sector
corruption. See, e.g., David A. Gantz, Globalizing Sanctions Against Foreign Bnuery:
The Emergence of a New International Legal Consensus, 18 Nw. J. INT'L L & Bus. 457,
473 (1998) (stating that the Council of the European Union has discussed a pro-
posal to criminalize transnational private sector corruption); Eugene Kheng-Boon
Tan, Law and Values in Governance: T7w Singapore Way, 30 HONG KO G L.J. 91,111
(2000) (stating that "the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau ... investigates
and aims to prevent corruption in the public and private sectors in Singapore').
16 See ROBERT A. PETERSON, CONSTRUCTING EFEcnvE QUESnoMNAIRES 18-19
(2000) (discussing research that suggests respondents must be able to understand
the literal and pragmatic meaning of a question or they will not provide a mean-
ingful answer); ROGER ToURANGFAU ET AL, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SuRVEY RESFONsE
61 (2000) (stressing the importance of keeping survey questions simple).
17 ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 12, at 4; see V.T. Le Vine, Book Review, 37
CHOICE: CURRENT REV. FOR ACAD. LIBRS. 1166 (2000) (reviewing Sus.mN ROSE-
ACKERMAN, CORRUPnON AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND REFORM
(1999)) (lauding the book and Susan Rose-Ackerman); Stephen Williams, Book
Reviews, AFR. Bus., Jan. 2000, at 40 (same); see also Bruce E. Cain, Moralism and Re-
alism in Campaign Finance Reform, 1995 U. CI. LEGAL F. 111, 113 ("Bribery defined
in the traditional sense... is the paradigmatic instance of political corruption.");
Dickerson, supra note 11, at 396 (arguing that other forms of corruption can be re-
duced to bribery).
18 Graham Wood, Ethics at the Purchasing/Sales Interface: An International Per-
spective, INT'L MARKEING REV., No. 4,1995, at 7,16 ("Bribery is seen being as the
most significant problem, particularly, though not exclusively, in trade between
North and South.").
2001]
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is the focal point of the bulk of legal literature and of the interna-
tional regimes.' 9
A bribe is a transaction that occurs in an extralegal setting.20 In
this transaction the bribe giver transfers a benefit-consisting of
anything of value to the bribe taker -to the bribe taker as quid pro
quo for preferential treatment by the bribe taker.21 The preferential
treatment constitutes the abuse or misuse of power identified as
central to corruption by Joseph Nye.22
Using these definitions, one can draw distinctions between be-
haviors that are corrupt and behaviors that are not.23 Giving a
government official a holiday gift, even if given more in hopes of
creating goodwill than out of a genuine affection, is not corrupt be-
19 As described infra notes 81-92 and accompanying text, those regimes in-
clude treaties and regulations promulgated by the Organization of American
States, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the
European Community as well as policy change in the World Bank and the Inter-
national Monetary Fund. Activities by nongovernmental entities such as the In-
ternational Chamber of Commerce and Transparency International also contribute
to the changes in the global regime.
20 See Bryan W. Husted, Honor Among Thieves: A Transaction-Cost Interpretation
of Corruption in Third World Countries, 4 Bus. ETHics Q. 17, 18-19 (1994) (describing
corruption in transaction terms).
21 See James Lindgren, The Elusive Distinction Between Bribery and Extortion:
From the Common Law to the Hobbs Act, 35 UCLA L. REv. 815, 823 (1988) (noting
that a bribe is given in exchange for preferential treatment); Frank J. Sorauf, Poli-
tics, Experience and the First Amendment: The Case of American Campaign Finance, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1348, 1350 (1994) ("quid pro quo" is a "vital element of any defi-
nition of bribery"); Vito Tanzi, Corruption, Governmental Activities, and Markets,
FIN. & DEV., Dec. 1995, at 24, 24 ("IThe benefit derived must be seen as a direct
quid pro quo for the specific act of 'corruption."'). "A gift of nominal value...
generally lacks the element of a quid pro quo" and thus does not constitute a
bribe. DON ZARIN, DOING BusINESS UNDER THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACr 6-
19 (1995).
22 This simple definition of bribery comports with most statutory definitions
of the crime of bribery. See Lindgren, supra note 21, at 823 (looking at statutory
definitions); James Lindgren, The Theory, History, and Practice of the Bribery-
Extortion Distinction, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1695, 1725 (1993) (looking at statutory
definitions and concluding that the "central kind of bribery" is "takings to pervert
official decisionmaking).
23 Obviously, in practice it is sometimes difficult to draw these distinctions.
See NOONAN, supra note 10, at 698 (stating that "borderline cases exist"); Lindgren,
supra note 22, at 1707 (noting the difficulty in practice of distinguishing bribes
from other conferrals). The difficulty presented by some factual situations, how-
ever, does not detract from the conceptual distinction. See NOONAN, supra note 10,
at 698 ("The difficulty of the judgment does not destroy the moral nature of the
concept being employed.); Lindgren, supra note 22, at 1707 (noting that the prac-
tical difficulty is not a refutation of the distinctions).
[22:4
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cause there is no quid pro quo for misuse of office. 4 Tipping a
waiter after a meal is not a bribe because there is no expectation;
one will be served-albeit begrudgingly-if one does not pay a
tip.25 On the other hand, providing an official's son with a scholar-
24 In her excellent discussion of the social degradation that occurs when so-
cial science commodifies all human interaction, Margaret Jane Radin lambastes
the idea that all gifts are given for ulterior purposes. Margaret Jane Radin, Mar-
ket-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1907 (1987) ("A better view of person-
hood should conceive of gifts not as disguised sales, but rather as expressions of
the interrelationships between the self and others."). Nonetheless, it is possible
that some gifts are given with a variety of motives. See Steven R. Salbu, Extralerri-
torial Restriction of Bribery: A Premature Evocation of t1w Normative Global Village, 24
YALE J. INT'L L. 223, 234-40 (1999) (noting that gifts may be given for more than
one reason, including the desire to create goodwill). Indeed, in order to avoid the
appearance of impropriety, many statutes simply prohibit the receipt of gifts. See
Beth Nolan, Public Interest, Private Income: Coiflicts and Control Limits on the Outside
Income of Government Officials, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 57, 114-16 (1992) (discussing
statutory restrictions on gifts). Nonetheless, courts presented with the task of dis-
tinguishing between gifts and bribes are quite capable of doing so. See United
States v. Dozier, 672 F.2d 531, 537 (5th Cir. 1982) (distinguishing between gifts,
which may represent "vague expectation of future benefits," and bribes, given "in
return for some act of official grace"); United States v. Johnson, 621 F.2d 1073,
1076 (10th Cir. 1980) (stating that a gift must be offered with something more spe-
cific than a "generalized hope or expectation of ultimate benefit" in order to be
considered a bribe) (citation omitted).
25 See RosE-AcKRMAN, supra note 2, at 92-96 (discussing the distinction be-
tween bribes, gifts, tips, and price); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social
Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 943,952 (1995) (noting that although the distinctions of
whom to tip and whom not to tip are complex, "these distinctions seem com-
pletely obvious" to persons living in the United States). The U.S. custom of tip-
ping has not always been accepted as morally innocent, earlier in the last century
social commentators decried it as demeaning and even corrosive of democratic
institutions. See WILUAM SCOTT, THE ITCHING PAU: A STUDY OF THE HABIT OF
TIPPING IN AiMERICA 38 (1916) ("Every tip given in the United States is a blow at
our experiment in democracy. The custom announces to the world that at heart
we are aristocratic."); VIVIANA A. ZEUZER, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY 96
(1994) (noting that in the early 1900s tipping was "denounced as socially de-
meaning"). With respect to public officeholders, some argue that any tip given to
a public official-even a librarian-constitutes a bribe. Kelly Kunsch, Tip Jars at
the Law Library Reference Desk, 86 LAW LIBR. J. 369,371 (1994) (noting the argument
that a tip to a public officeholder constitutes bribery). Many statutes forbid public
officeholders from receiving tips. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 7353(a) (1994) (prohibiting
the solicitation or acceptance of gifts by federal employees). Moreover, bribe giv-
ers sometime characterize their payment as a "tip" for services rendered rather
than as a bribe. See Nolan, supra note 24, at 115 (observing the many names by
which transfers are made but arguing that it is "how a transfer functions" that is
important rather than the name). Nonetheless, courts are able to distinguish be-
tween tips to public officeholders and bribes and do not always find the former to
be objectionable. See, e.g., United States v. McNeive, 536 F.2d 1245,1251 (8th Cir.
1976) (holding that an officeholder who received tips that did not interfere with
his discretionary duties fell outside the reach of the mail fraud statutes); sce also
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ship with the understanding that the official will award a contract
to the giver is bribery and is corrupt.26
Voluminous literature outlines the damage done by corruption,
and those discussions will not be repeated here. Briefly, the lit-
erature indicates that public corruption distorts economic decisions
(which, in statist countries, can distort the entire economy),27 im-
pedes transnational commercial relationships,28 degrades bureau-
NOONAN, supra note 10, at 698 ("[G]ifts, tips, contributions, and bribes to office-
holders.., can be masked as one another; but the masks are removable.").
26 Such was the case in the award of the 2002 Winter Olympic Games to Salt
Lake City in the United States. Revelations about these improper transactions
have lead to criminal and internal investigations and to a change in the institu-
tional culture of the Olympic Committee. See Mary K. FitzGerald, The Court of Ar-
bitration for Sport: Dealing With Doping and Due Process During the Olympics, 7
SPORTS LAW. J. 213, 214 (2000) (describing the investigation into the Winter 2002
Olympics bribery scandal and its aftermath); Matthew Shabat, Comment, SEC
Regulation of Attorneys Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Decisions on Effi-
ciency and Their Role in International Anti-Bribery Efforts, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L.
987, 1023 (1999) (same).
27 Bribery alters economic decision-making in market economies. Rather
than purchasing a good or service based on the price, quality and fit of that good
or service, the purchase is based on the size of the bribe. See Mark B. Bader & Bill
Shaw, Amendment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
627, 627 (1983). Manufacturers and providers have little incentive to produce high
quality, low cost goods and services and instead are rewarded when they divert
money from production to the payment of bribes. M. Shahid Alam, Anatomy of
Corruption: An Approach to the Political Economy of Underdevelopment, 48 AM. J.
ECON. & Soc. 441, 448-52 (1989); see also Stanley Sporkin, The Worldwide Banning of
Schmiergeld: A Look at the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act on its Twentieth Birthday, 18
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 269, 280 (1998) (describing possibilities of low quality con-
struction due to corruption). Endemic bribery also distorts economies by divert-
ing large amounts of money. See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Corruption,
108 Q.J. ECON. 599, 611-15 (1993) (stating that corruption is more distortionary
than heavy taxation because of the added imperative of secrecy); SHANG-JIN WI,
WHY IS CORRUPTION SO MUCH MORE TAXING THAN TAX? ARBITRARINESS (ILLS 1-2
(NBER, Working Paper No. W6255, Nov. 1997) (finding empirically that corrup-
tion severely distorts economies).
28 Corruption impedes transnational commercial relationships in at least two
ways. First, rather than opening up markets, bribery is more often used to ex-
clude competitors and create monopolies. See Frederick M. Abbott, Foundation-
Building for Western Hemispheric Integration, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 900, 914
(1996-1997) ("Governmental corruption and non-transparency are likely to benefit
inefficient local operators over efficient multinational operators."); Franklin A.
Gevurtz, Commercial Bribery and the Sherman Act: The Case for Per Se Illegality, 42 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 365, 390-91 (1987) (noting the inefficiencies created when firms
bribe to create monopolies); Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust's Protected Classes, 88
MICH. L. REv. 1, 16 (1989) (providing examples of how bribes are used to obtain or
retain monopolies). The Slaughterhouse Cases familiar to every student of consti-
tutional law resulted from bribes paid in New Orleans to secure a monopoly in
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cratic systems, 9 and severely corrodes social structures.3 A thin
strand of literature continues to argue that corruption can, in some
slaughterhouses. 83 US. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872); see Mark Tushnet, Conservative Con-
stitutional Theory, 59 TUL L. REv. 910, 922 (1985) (describing the bribery that took
place in the Slaughterhouse Cases). The creation of monopolies is exacerbated by
the fact that government officials will only accept bribes, and therefore allow en-
try, to those whom they trust See Alam, supra note 27, at 449 (stating that bribe-
taking officials limit entry to those whom they trust). The second way that cor-
ruption impedes transnational relationships is by creating environments in which
foreign businesspeople simply do not want to work. The most well known em-
pirical work demonstrating this effect is that of Paolo Mauro, which found a
"negative association between corruption and investment, as well as growth,
[that] is significant in both a statistical and an economic sense." Paolo Mauro,
Corruption and Growth, 110 Q.J. EcoN. 681, 705 (1995); see also Paolo Mauro, The Ef-
fects of Corruption on Growth, Investment, and Governnent Expenditure: A Cross Coun-
try Analysis, in CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 83, 91 (Kimberly Ann
Elliott ed., 1996) (finding that a measurable decrease in corruption in a country
would increase its investment to gross domestic product ratio by almost 4% and
the annual growth of its gross domestic product per capita by almost half a per-
cent). Edgardo Campos and others find that while the negative effect is lessened
if a corrupt government is predictable, there is still a negative effecL J. Edgardo
Campos et al., The Impact of Corruption on Investment: Predictability Matters, 27
WORLD DEv. 1059,1065 (1999).
29 Capable and honest persons tend to avoid corrupt bureaucracies. See
Omotunde E.G. Johnson, An Economic Analysis of Corrupt Government, Wirith Special
Application to Less Developed Countries, 28 KYKLOS: INT'L REV. FOR Sor. ScI. 47, 57
(1975) (observing that capable and honest persons avoid government work for
moral reasons when corruption is pervasive); Tanzi, supra note 21, at 26 (observ-
ing that people will seek jobs that pay good bribes rather than jobs for which they
are qualified); Francisco E. Thoumi, Some Implications of the Growth of the Under-
ground Economy in Columbia, 29 J. INTL STUD. & WORLD AFF. 35, 44 (1987) (stating
that over time an honest individual in a corrupt system adapts and becomes more
dishonest). Resources will be diverted to hide illicit activity. Sce MS. Alam, A
Theory of Limits on Corruption and Some Applications, 48 KIYKLOS: INt'L REV. FOR
Soc. ScI. 419, 431 (1995) (noting that resources are diverted and wasted to hide
illicit activities). Bureaucrats hold back information and resources in order to ex-
tract larger bribes for each. See Alam, supra note 27, at 449 (stating that "bribery
may impose costs because of the official's efforts to maximize the offer of bribes
by creating false uncertainties"). In his classic empirical study of corruption in the
Irrigation Department of a State in southern India, Robert Wade observed each of
these effects of bribery. See Robert Wade, Irrigation Reform in Conditions of Populist
Anarchy: An Indian Case, 14 J. DEv. ECON. 285 (1934); Robert Wade, The System of
Administrative and Political Corruption: Canal Irrigation in South India, 18 J. DEv.
STUD. 287, 287, 291 (1982). Wade also found that senior officials raised further
money by selling government posts to junior officials, thus perpetuating the entry
into bureaucratic service of dishonest and incapable persons. Robert Wade, T7
Market for Public Office: Why te Indian State Is Not Better at Development, 13 WORLD
DEv. 467,474-80 (1985) (describing the sale of offices in a south Indian state).
30 Susan Rose-Ackerman summarizes the social affects of corruption: "Cor-
ruption undermines the legitimacy of governments, especially democracies ....
Citizens may come to believe that the government is simply for sale to the highest
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circumstances, be economically beneficial,31 although this literature
is usually criticized for analyzing corruption statically rather than
dynamically or for not taking into account all of the damage done
by corruption.32 The most plausible argument in favor of corrup-
bidder. Corruption undermines claims that the government is substituting demo-
cratic values for decisions based on ability to pay. It can lead to coups by un-
democratic leaders." Susan Rose-Ackerman, The Political Economy of Corruption, in
CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 28, at 31, 44; see also Nancy
Zucker Boswell, Combatting Corruption: Focus on Latin America, 3 Sw. J. L. & TRADE
AM. 179, 184 (1996) ("Perhaps the greatest casualty of... corruption has been the
erosion of public trust in public institutions and leaders, the foundation of democ-
racy.'); A.W. Cragg, Business, Globalization, and the Logic and Ethics of Corruption, 53
INT'LJ. 643, 654 (1998) (noting that respect for law and legal institutions is a "casu-
alty" of bribery); Herbert H. Werlin, The Consequences of Corruption: The Ghanaian
Experience, 88 POL. SCI. Q. 71, 79 (1973) ("The effect of corruption is to generate an
atmosphere of distrust which pervades all levels of administration.").
31 See Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Corruption - A General Review With an Emphasis on
the Role of the World Bank, 15 DICK. J. INr'L L. 451, 454 (1997) (describing pro-
corruption arguments in the literature, including capital formation, predictability
in government relationships, and "efficient" escape from burdensome regula-
tions). Ironically, Claire Dickerson has suggested that the Author of this Article
has also argued that facilitation payments can be desirable. Dickerson, supra note
11, at 397 n.17. That, of course, is not true, and the passage that Dickerson refers
to merely points out that some officials ask for bribes to perform the task that they
are supposed to perform (which is sometimes referred to as an "according-to-
rule" benefit to the bribe giver), as opposed to officials who ask for bribes to per-
form tasks they are not supposed to undertake (which is sometimes referred to as
an "against-rule-benefit). See Philip M. Nichols, Outlawing Transnational Bribery
Through the World Trade Organization, 28 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 305, 315-16 (1996)
(citing Philip Oldenburg, Middlemen in Third-World Corruption: Implications of an
Indian Case, 39 WORLD POL. 508 (1987)).
32 See Buscaglia & Dakolias, supra note 4, at 112 (noting that "present corrup-
tion decreases future productivity, thereby reducing dynamic efficiency'); Salbu,
supra note 4, at 49 ("The once-popular 'functionalist' view of bribery, under which
corruption purportedly yields benefits of allocative efficiency and optimal capital
formation, retains little favor among today's academics."); Shihata, supra note 31,
at 454-55 (noting the consensus among scholars that the long term damage done
by corruption far outweighs any immediate benefits). Salim Rashid provides an
example of how static and dynamic analyses of corruption might lead to different
conclusions regarding corruption's benefits and harms. Salim Rashid, Public Utili-
ties in Egalitarian LDC's: The Role of Bribery in Achieving Pareto Efficiency, 34
KYKLOS: INT'L REV. FOR SOC. ScI. 448, 448-55 (1981). Rashid studied bribes to ob-
tain telephone service in India; his original premise was that the bribes would
help to differentiate customers in a system that otherwise was completely egali-
tarian, and thus bribes would allow for Pareto optimalization. Id. Rashid found
that while this may at first have been the case, over time bureaucrats came to ex-
pect bribes and also created inefficiencies in order to extract more and larger
bribes; rather than contributing to Pareto optimality bribery degraded the system.
Id.
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tion is that under conditions of authoritarian repression, internal
corruption can facilitate the creation of channels through which
goods and services reach ordinary people.33
1.2. The Extent of Corruption and Briben
The extent of corruption is impossible to gauge with precision.
Those who act corruptly rarely open their activities to public scru-
tiny, and those who make corrupt payments are equally reticent to
expose themselves.34
The literature on corruption is not unanimous as to whether the
amount of corruption worldwide is increasing. Moiss Naim's
characterization of a "corruption eruption," in which the weak-
nesses of postcolonial institutions combined with the freedoms
brought on by more recent democratization has unleashed a tor-
Some people suggest that examples of corrupt but economically successful
countries in Asia undermine the argument made concerning the economic dam-
age caused by corruption. See, e.g., Ohnesorge, supra note 4, at 471 (noting that
Northeast Asia has had high economic growth while the bureaucracy also had
growing levels of corruption). Others counter that corruption has seriously dam-
aged the political and economic stability of several of those countries. $ce Joseph
Onek, Remarks at Roundtable on Global Corruption, in 31 LAw & POL'Y INT'L BUs.
205, 205 (1999) (noting that corruption played a major role in the banking crisis of
Indonesia).
33 See Ohnesorge, supra note 4, at 473 (noting that in repressive politics, cor-
ruption opens the door for desired consumer goods); Scheppele, supra note 7, at
515-18 (describing in detail how people adapted to the Soviet system with behav-
iors that would be considered corrupt in other systems); Paul B. Stephan, Ration-
ality and Corruption in the Post-Socialist World, 14 CONN. J. INT'L L 533, 533 (1999)
(describing adaption to corruption as a survival skill in the Soviet system).
34 George Moody-Stuart points out that in addition to the difficulties of
measuring an activity that is intentionally hidden, scholars are dissuaded from
vigorously exploring discrete cases of corruption because of the risk of libel suits.
GEORGE MOODY-STUART, TRANsPARENcY INTERNATIONAL, THE GOOD BUsINESS
GUIDE TO BRIBERY: GRAND CORRUPTION IN THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT 1-3 (1994).
Shahid Alam disagrees, suggesting that "conventional tools of research" would
yield valuable measurements of levels of corruption-for example by using inter-
views with retired customs officials. Alam, supra note 27, at 443. In a previous
article, the Author of this Article noted that twenty-six countries, accounting in
the aggregate for over twenty percent of the world's transnational trade, were
considered to be at least as corrupt as they were not corrupt. See Philip M. Nich-
ols, Corruption in the World Trade Organization: Discerning te Limits of the World
Trade Organization's Authority, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 711, 776-77 (1996).
More recently, in 1997, using an extremely rough estimate that five percent of for-
eign investment and trade actually constitutes bribes, the World Bank has calcu-
lated that the dollar value of corruption is US. $80 billion per year. Hess & Dun-
fee, supra note 7, at 596.
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rent of both corrupt activity and awareness of corrupt activity,35
exemplifies the dominant stream of literature.36 George Moody-
Stuart, who himself has decades of experience in business and
policymaking, states that "the incidence of grand corruption has
increased tremendously during the last decade. What used to con-
cern a relatively small number of people working in a relatively
small number of countries has now become a major South-wide
problem."37
While there is not unanimity on the matter of whether or not
corruption is increasing, there is no meaningful strand of literature
that argues that corruption is negligible in the world. Corruption
is a significant phenomenon throughout the world. Indeed, the
sheer frequency of corruption could be one source of the persistent
claim that corruption is acceptable in some cultures.
1.3. General Objections to the Hypothesis that Corruption is
Acceptable
This paper, among other things, empirically tests that hypothe-
sis, that the widespread phenomenon of corruption is acceptable in
some cultures. While widespread, this hypothesis faces several
general objections. First, every country in the world prohibits at
least the bribery of its own officials.m Kazakhstan, the country in
35 Mois6s Naim, The Corruption Eruption, 11 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 245 (1995).
36 See Konyin Ajayi, On the Trail of a Spectre - Destabilisation of Developing and
Transitional Economies: A Case Study of Corruption in Nigeria, 15 Dicc. J. INT'L L. 545,
545 (1997) (noting the recent "astronomical" increase in the level of corruption);
Maria Dakolias & Kim Thachuk, Attacking Corruption in the Judiciary: A Critical
Process in Judicial Reform, 18 Wis. INT'L L.J. 353, 357 (2000) (referring to Naim's ob-
servations regarding a corruption eruption); Gantz, supra note 15, at 463 (noting
that globally corruption has become "disturbingly common"); Shihata, supra note
31, at 461 (referring to the eruption of corruption); Wesberry, supra note 14, at 499-
500 & n.1 (noting that over the last fifty years corruption has become "pervasive").
37 MOODY-STUART, supra note 34, at 2. Moody-Stuart concludes that by "gen-
eral consensus, there has been a tremendous deterioration in the last ten years,
with grand corruption becoming the general rule, rather than the exception, in
major government-influenced contracts in the South." Id. at 2.
38 Farrz F. HEIMANN, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, SHOULD FOREIGN BRIBERY
BE A CRIME 2 (1994). Even the most ancient laws proscribe bribery. The Code of
Hammurabi (Babylon 2200 B.C.) and the Edict of Harmab (Egypt 1200 B.C.), for
example, made the taking of bribes illegal. See THE CODE OF HAMMURABI § 4 (Rob-
ert F. Harper trans., 1904) ("If a man (in a case) bear witness for grain or money
(as a bribe), he shall himself bear the penalty imposed in that case."); JAMES HENRY
BREASTED, A HISTORY OF EGYPT: FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE PERSIAN CONQUEST
405-06 (2nd ed. 1919) (describing the Edict of Harmab). Judge Noonan, in his
[22:4
14
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, Vol. 22, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol22/iss4/3
INTERNATIONAL CORRUPTION
which the survey discussed in this Article was conducted, has laws
criminalizing the acceptance and payment of bribes. 9
The existence of a law, however, is not proof of a norm.40 Al-
though there is a dynamic relationship between law and morality,
the two are not necessarily coincident.41 In the United States, for
example, morals laws prohibit most forms of sexual contact. 42
These laws are given almost no notice in U.S. practice and cul-
ture.43 The general objection that corruption is illegal in every
comprehensive intellectual history of the concept of bribery, argues that the Edict
of Horemheb "is the first law with a secular penalty for a form of bribe-taking."
NOONAN, supra note 10, at 11. He believes that interpretations of the Code of
Hammurabi that seem to indicate a concern for bribery are actually reflections of
the interpreters' Western bias. Id. at 10. Nonetheless, non-Western scholars have
interpreted the Code in a similar manner. See, e.g., SHAuKAT Ai, ComRuPrzo.N: A
THIRD WORLD PERSPECTIVE 2-3 (1985) (arguing that several sections of the Code of
Hammurabi dealt obliquely with corruption). In either case, laws prohibiting
bribery are very old.
39 See The Criminal Code of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic of 1959, art.
147 (uly 22, 1959, amended June 12,1986); Decree No. 9 of the Plenum of the Su-
preme Court of the Republic of Kaz., "On the Practice of the Application by
Courts of the Legislation on Responsibility for Corruption" (Dec. 22,1993).
40 See Dickerson, supra note 11, at 394 (stating that the existence of an anti-
corruption law is not proof of a norm against corruption).
41 Lynn Sharp Paine argues this point in her characterization of the relation-
ship between law and ethics as "dynamic and interrelated" rather than as either
correspondent or separate from one another. Lynn Sharp Paine, Law, Ethics and
Managerial Judgment, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. EDUC. 153, 165 (1994). Paine suggests that
"[in truth, the relationship between [law and ethics] is in flux: the prescriptions of
law and the prescriptions of ethics... coincide to different degrees at different
times and in different societies." Id. Paine goes on to suggest that ethics generally
leads to changes in the law. See id. (suggesting that "what is legally permissible
but ethically questionable today may be legally restricted or prohibited tomor-
row'; id. at 167 (stating that "1]aw is most often a lagging indicator of social eth-
ics"). The converse often, however, is equally true: the Author of this Article, for
example, observed how changes in law lead to changes in business practices in
Kazakhstan. See Philip M. Nichols, The Viability of Transplaned Lao: Kazaklstani
Reception of a Transplanted Foreign Investment Code, 18 U. PA. J. L'WL ECON. L 1235
(1997). Whether law leads or follows changes in social norms, it clearly is not al-
ways coincident with them.
42 See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 260-61 & n.44 (1992) (discussing
prohibitions of all forms of sexual contact between unmarried persons); Yao
Apasu-Gbotsu et al., Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy In the Context of
Homosexual Activity, 40 U. MMI L REV. 521, 524-25 & n.9 (1986) (discussing pro-
hibitions of many common forms of sexual contact between all persons including
married, consenting adults).
43 ALBERT D. KLASsEN Er AL, SEX AND MORALITY IN THE U.S.: AN E.M0PIRICAL
ENQUIRY UNDER THE AusPicEs OF THE KINSEY INSTITUTE (Hubert J. O'Gorman ed.,
1989) (reporting that the vast majority of persons in the United States engage in
the proscribed behaviors).
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country, therefore, certainly is not insurmountable by those who
claim that corruption is acceptable in some cultures.
The proposition that corruption is acceptable in some cultures
also faces the general objection that corruption is condemned and
proscribed by each of the major religious and moral schools of
thought. Buddhism, Christianity, Confucianism, Hinduism, Islam,
Judaism, Sikhism, and Taoism each proscribe corruption.44 Islam,
which is by a slight margin the predominant religion in Ka-
zakhstan,45 has an especially harsh attitude toward corruption:
Islam as a religious doctrine has waged a constant war
against all forms of corruption .... According to Islam,
corruption is a sin for which there is no atonement. The
Quran in unmistakable terms has pointed out that all those
who indulge in corruption will be subjected to eternal
chastisement. Corruption is an immoral activity which de-
serves universal condemnation. 46
Christianity, the second largest religion in Kazakhstan, also
condemns corruption, although less harshly. 47
Again, this general objection is not insurmountable by those
who claim that corruption is accepted in particular cultures. In the
first place, religion can be integrated into the fabric of a society in
44 See Nichols, supra note 31, at 321-22 (citing primary sources from each of
the major religions condemning corruption).
45 The Central Intelligence Agency Factbook estimates that 47% of the popula-
tion is nominally Muslim, and 46% of the population is Christian. Central Intelli-
gence Agency, The World Factbook 2000, available at http://www.odci.gov/cia
/publications/factbook/geos/kz.html#People (last modified Oct. 27,2000).
46 ALI, supra note 38, at 49; see QUR'AN, Sura 2:184 ("Consume not your prop-
erty amongst you in vanity, and do not dangle it before the judges that ye may in
guilt consume a part of the wealth of the people, knowingly."); QUR'AN, Sura 28:77
("Allah loveth not those who cause corruption.").
47 Exodus 23:8 ("And you shall take no bribe, for a bribe blinds the offi-
cials..."); Ecclesiastes 7:7 ("[A]nd a bribe corrupts the mind.); see David Neff,
When Economists Pray, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Apr. 9, 1990, at 13 (quoting Oxford
Declaration on Christian Faith and Economics, that "Corruption . . . so under-
mines society that there is a virtual breakdown of legitimate order."). Judaism,
which has a measurable presence in Kazakhstan, also condemns corruption. See
Deuteronomy 16:19 ("[A]nd you shall not take a bribe."); 1 StFER HAHINUCH, THE
BOOK OF EDUCATION 325 (1978) ("Among the laws of the precept, there is what our
Sages of blessed memory said, that both the one who gives and the one who ac-
cepts [the bribe] violate a negative precept ..... ).
[22:4
16
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, Vol. 22, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol22/iss4/3
INTERNATIONAL CORRUPTION
varying degreesA4 Indeed, Islam is not deeply integrated in Ka-
zakhstan. 49 In the second place, religious proscriptions do not
seem to preclude corruption. Saudi Arabia, for example, is a Mus-
lim theocracy in which people identify closely with IslamP yet
corruption constitutes an endemic problem in Saudi Arabia.'
4 Patrick Primeaux, speaking of religious identification in the West, suggests
that the West's concentration on commerce has marginalized faith. See Patrick
Primeaux, Connecting: Trust and Faith for Religion and Business, in PERSPECnIVES IN
Busmnass ETics 220, 222 (Laura Pincus Hartman ed., 1998) (stating that faith
"does not fit the criteria of cost-benefit analysis, and when pursued from this
utilitarian frame of reference, that faith is reduced and minimized"). Primeaux
refers to Joseph Campbell's architectural metaphor of the marginalizing of faith.
"You can tell what's informing a society by what the tallest building is. When you
approach a medieval town, the cathedral is the tallest thing in the place. When
you approach an eighteenth-century town, it is the political palace that's the tall-
est thing in the place. And when you approach a modem city, the tallest places
are the office buildings, the centers of economic life." JosEPH CAMPBELL, THE
PowER OF MYTH 95-96 (Betty Sue Flowers ed., 1988).
Although both Primeaux and Campbell discuss the West, each of their obser-
vations illustrates a more generalizable point that religion can be integrated into
the fabric of a society in varying degrees. Similarly, individual persons incorpo-
rate religion into their own identities in varying degrees if at all. See Michael E.
Nielsen, Operationalizing Religious Orientation: Iron Rods and Compasses, 129 J.
PsYcHoL. 485, 492 (1995) (finding that different people in a study had different
ideas on the role of faith in dealing with existential questions and attempting to
explain the differences according to other orientations); Jeffrey L. Sanders, Relig-
ious Ego Identity and Its Relationship to Faith Maturity, 132 J. PSYCHOL 653, 657-5S
(1998) (finding different levels of identification with religion among college stu-
dents).
49 In 1993 Patrick Johnstone's worldwide database indicated that 32.6% of the
population of Kazakhstan was in fact not religious at all, and that even though
40% of the population was nominally Muslim, only 5% were practicing Muslims.
PATRICK JOHNsONE, OPERATION WORLD (1993); see also Edward Allworth, Te New
Central Asians, in CENTRAL ASIA: 130 YEARs OF RussiAN DOMINANcE, A HiSTOCAL
OVERvIEw 527,562 (Edward Allworth ed., 3d ed. 1994) (noting that Islam was not
strongly embraced in the northern part of Central Asia). The Head of Adminis-
trative Law Department, Higher Law School "Adilet," in Almaty, Kazakhstan,
states that "lilt is necessary to note that Kazakhstan has never been a country af-
fected by particularly strong religious sentiments or powerful religious forces."
Roman Podoprigora, Religion in Kazak-lstan: A General View, 1999 BYU L REV. 531,
581 (1999).
50 See Joseph Nevo, Religion and National Identity in Saudi Arabia, MIDDLE E.
STUD., July 1998, at 34, 35 (describing Saudi Arabia as the most theocratic of the
Arab states and stating that "religion (primarily the Wahhabi version of Sunni Is-
lam) has played a prominent role not only in moulding the individual's private
and collective identities but also in consolidating his national values"); A. Michael
Tarazi, Saudi Arabia's New Basic Laws: The Struggle for Participatory Islamic Gouern-
ment, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 258,264 (1993) (noting that the Basic Law of Saudi Arabia
"affirms the Shari'a as the fundamental law of Saudi Arabia and stresses the rela-
tionship between political rule and religious belief"). It should be noted that
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A third general objection to the claim that corruption is accept-
able in some cultures is the presumption of a universal efficiency
norm. Thomas Donaldson and Thomas Dunfee, the two leading
scholars in the field of international business ethics, suggest the
existence of a universal norm for the efficient allocation and distri-
bution of necessary social resources.5 2 Donaldson and Dunfee go
while Saudi Arabia's Basic Law emphasizes the centrality of Islam, it also places a
great deal of power in the hands of the Monarch. See Tarazi, supra, at 264 (noting
that "[t]he Basic Law has been severely criticized as giving the King unbridled
power"); see also Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Universal Versus Islamic Human Rights: A
Clash of Cultures or a Clash With a Construct?, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 307, 354 (1994)
(describing the Basic Law's statement that the government has not supplanted Is-
lam as a "pretense"). Nonetheless, religion clearly is more integrated into society
and identity in Saudi Arabia than it is in the West.
51 See Said Aburish, Good Luck and Allah Bless, INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, July-
Aug. 1996, at 84, 84-87 (including serious corruption as one of the major social
problems in Saudi Arabia); Oliver A. Houck, With Charity For All, 93 YALE L.J.
1415,1509-10 (1984) (discussing corruption in Saudi Arabia).
52 See THOMAS DONALDSON & THOMAS W. DUNFEE, TIES THAT BIND: A SOCIAL
CoNTRAcrs APPROACH TO BUSINESS ETHics 117-38 (1999). Tom Dunfee continues
this line of analysis in Thomas W. Dunfee et al., Social Contracts and Marketing
Ethics, 63 J. MARKETING 14 (1999). Donaldson and Dunfee utilize a distributive
rather than economic definition of efficiency: they consider an action or policy ef-
ficient "when it contributes toward the provision of necessary social goods suffi-
cient to sustain the least well-off members of society at a level of reasonable possi-
bility concerning liberty, health, food, housing, education, and just treatment."
DONALDSON & DUNFEE, supra, at 119 (emphasis omitted). Necessary social goods
include fairness and aggregate welfare. Id. at 121.
Dunfee and Donaldson offer efficiency as a hypernorm that fits into their In-
tegrative Social Contract theory of business ethics. Integrative Social Contract
theory unites two distinct types of social contracts. See Thomas Donaldson &
Thomas W. Dunfee, Toward a Unified Conception of Business Ethics: Integrative Social
Contracts Theory, 19 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 252, 254 (1994) [hereinafter Unified Concep-
tion] (explaining the unification). The first is a hypothetical macrosocial contract
among all of the members of a given society, the contents of which are all of the
economic rules to which all of the members would agree. See Thomas Donaldson
& Thomas W. Dunfee, Integrative Social Contracts Theory: A Communitarian Conccp-
tion of Economic Ethics, 11 ECON. & PHIL. 85, 93 (1995) [hereinafter Conmunitarian
Conception] (explaining the hypothetical macrosocial contract). Obviously, this
will not be a large number of rules. Therefore, within the hypothetical macrosocial
contract there is a great deal of moral free space. See Unified Conception, supra, at
260-62 (discussing moral free space). Within that moral free space, economic
communities are free to enter into the second type of social contract: empirical
contracts that provide more detailed rules concerning ethical behavior in eco-
nomic life. See Communitarian Conception, supra, at 93-95 (discussing empirical mi-
crosocial contracts that exist in the moral free space). These microsocial contracts
are bound by only two things. One limit is a requirement that individual mem-
bers have consented to the contract. Communitarian Conception, supra, at 98. Con-
sent can be indicated by, among other means, not taking advantage of an oppor-
tunity to exit. See id. at 99-100. The other limit is formed by hypernorms, which
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on to point out that bribery violates this universal norm and there-
fore should not be accepted in any society. The observation that
bribery violates an efficiency norm is echoed, albeit with less so-
phistication, in legal scholarship.5 4
This objection also is not insurmountable. In the first place, the
existence of such a universal norm is certainly debatable: human
history suggests that inefficiency is at least if not more normal than
efficiency.55 Moreover, as Donaldson and Dunfee themselves point
out, the existence of a universal efficiency norm would not pre-
dude the existence of isolated local norms that accept corruption.55
The three general objections to the suggestion that corruption is
acceptable in some cultures are daunting but not insurmountable.
Given the significance of corruption as a policy issue in the world,
therefore, the hypothesis that corruption is acceptable in some so-
cieties must be given dose empirical scrutiny.
are "principles so fundamental to human existence that they serve as a guide in
evaluating lower level moral norms." Unified Conception, supra, at 265. Because
"[h]ypernorms are defined as norms so fundamental to human existence that they
will be reflected in a convergence of religious, political, and philosophical
thought Hypernorms thus represent core or fundamental values common to
many cultures." Thomas W. Dunfee, 7te Role of Ethics in International Business, in
BusINEsS ETHIcs: JAPAN AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, 63, 69 (Thomas W. Dunfee &
Yukimasa Nagayasu eds., 1993).
53 See DONALDSON & DUNFEE, supra note 52, at 228-29.
54 See Dickerson, supra note 11, at 396-401 (arguing that corruption is ineffi-
cient and therefore that it violates a norm and thus should be curtailed). The in-
ternational financial institutions also use efficiency arguments to undergird their
approaches to corruption. See Chantal Thomas, Does t1w "Good Governance Policy"
of the International Financial Institutions Privilege Markets at t1w Expense of Democ-
racy?, 14 CONN. J. INT'L L. 551, 552 (1999) (noting that international financial insti-
tutions emphasize efficiency as both a means and goal of eliminating corruption).
Balakrishnan Rajagopal finds this emphasis by scholars and institutions troubling,
as it may marginalize other important values. Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Comtplion,
Legitimacy and Human Rights: The Dialectic of 1he Relationship, 14 CoNN. J. INT'L L
495,497 n.9 (1999) ("[The corruption discourse remains in an uneasy relationship
with its sibling, the human rights discourse. This is partly because the corruption
discourse is largely concerned with the promotion of an efficient and humane free
market, even if it is achieved at the cost of some human rights.").
-5 David Landes has written an entire book illustrating the commonness of
inefficiency. DAVID S. LANDES, THE WEALTH AND POVERTY OF NATIONS: WHY ARE
SOME SO RICH AND OTHERS SO POOR? (1998). Mancur Olson's final book also pro-
vides ample illustration that inefficiency is more normal than efficiency. MANCUR
OLSON, POWER AND PROSPERMY: OUTGROWING COMMuNisr AND CAPrrAusr
DiCrATORSHIPS (2000); see also Mancur Olson, Jr., Big Bills Left on t1w Sidewalk: Mvy
Some Nations are Rich, and Others Poor, 10 J. EcON. rPRsP. 3,3-24 (Spring 1996) (dis-
cussing inefficient social institutions in many countries around the world).
56 DONALDSON & DUNFEE, supra note 52, at 230.
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2. THE NEED FOR AN UNDERSTANDING OF
INDIGENOUS ATTITUDES TOWARD CORRUPTION
Indeed, the claim that corruption is accepted in some cultures
cries out for empirical validation. As mentioned in the Introduc-
tion, however, that is but the third reason for empirical analysis.
There are at least two other reasons for deep concern by legal
scholars about actual indigenous attitudes toward corruption. The
first is that corruption is an embedded component of the structure
of many transition economies, 7 and, therefore, must be taken into
account by any person effectuating legal changes in those coun-
tries.5s The second is that the global legal environment is in the
process of taking a much more aggressive position with respect to
corruption, inducing concerns of moral and legal imperialism and
theoretical legitimacy.59
2.1. Corruption as a Structural Component That Must be Taken Into
Account
The extent of corruption, as has been discussed, cannot be
measured with accuracy.60 Nonetheless, the consensus in the lit-
erature discussing emerging and transition economies is that cor-
ruption is or can be deeply embedded within many of those coun-
tries.61 Kim Scheppele suggests that corruption is inevitable when
57 For a theoretical approach to transition economies, see, for example, Philip
M. Nichols, A Legal Theory of Emerging Economies, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 229 (1999).
58 For pragmatic or prescriptive treatments of transition economies, see, for
example, Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate
Law, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1911 (1996); see also Richard T. De George, "Sullivan-Type"
Principles for U.S. Multinationals in Emerging Economies, 18 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L.
1193 (1997) (prescribing ethical rules for companies investing in Russia and per-
haps other transition economies); Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticom-
mons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 622 (1998)
(prescribing methods of dealing with unclear property ownership in Russia); Ann
Seidman & Robert B. Seidman, Drafting Legislation for Development: Lessons from a
Chinese Project, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1996) (prescribing antitrust legislation in
emerging economies).
59 See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 458 (warning that echoes of colonialism and
imperialism might blunt anticorruption efforts).
60 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
61 See Robert Williams, The New Politics of Corruption, 20 THIRD WORLD Q. 487,
487 (1999) (stating, in the introduction to a special series on corruption in devel-
oping countries, that political corruption has become a prominent element in de-
veloping countries during the 1990s); see also Ting Gong, Forms and Characteristics
of China's Corruption in the 1990s: Change With Continuity, 30 COMMUNIST & POST-
COMMUNIST STUD. 277, 277-90 (1997) (noting that corruption in China merely
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a country moves from an authoritarian system in which corruption
was the only reliable means of obtaining basic goods to a market
oriented system.62 Patrick Glynn, Stephen Kobrin, and Moisds
Naim suggest that "systemic political change has weakened or de-
stroyed social, political, and legal institutions, opening the way to
new abuses."63 Others suggest that the process of privatization it-
self facilitates corruption.64
changes form when the economy moves from controlled to market orientation);
John Mukum Mbaku, Bureaucratic Corruption and Policy Reform in Africa, 19 J. Sccy,
Poi- & EcoN. STUD. 149, 149-50 (1994) (suggesting that economic regulation and
state ownership in African countries has led to systemic corruption and prevented
economic development); Hilton Root, Corruption in China: Has It Become Systemic?,
36 ASIAN SURV. 741, 741-43 (1996) (stating that the present relationship-based trade
in China has effected system-wide corruption).
Transition economies are countries in transition from nonmarket (usually so-
cialist) orientation to market orientation. They form a subset of emerging econo-
mies, which are countries whose commercial institutions are changing from a re-
lational orientation, which limits relationships to those with the requisite status
and preexisting relationships, to a formal orientation, which allow relationships to
be created and enforced among strangers. These and other appellations allow for
more precise discussion than the broadly inclusive term "developing countries."
See Nichols, supra note 57, at 235 n.22 & 278-86 (discussing these definitions).
62 Scheppele, supra note 7, at 520. Steven Cheung, although making the
questionable assumption that all persons are individually oriented self-
maximizers, intelligently cautions that while corruption can offset some of the
problems in authoritarian systems it can also become institutionalized and pre-
vent any further economic growth, even if the country moves from an authoritar-
ian to a market system. Steven N. S. Cheung, A Simplistic General Equilibrium The-
ory of Corruption, CONTEMP. EcON. POL'Y, July 1996, at1, 1-4.
63 Patrick Glynn et al., The Globalization of Corruption, in Co.-u~mO, AND THE
GLOBAL ECoNoMY, supra note 28, at 7, 8. These scholars, who are each members of
the World Economic Forum's Davos Group, acknowledge that there is a greater
awareness and exposure of corruption, but also state that actual levels of corrup-
tion in emerging and transition economies have increased. Id.
64 See Michelle Celarier, Privatization: A Case Study in Corruption, 50 J. INr'L
AF. 531, 531-34 (1997) (stating that privatization has fueled widespread graft and
corruption in a number of countries including Russia, India, and Mexico); Daniel
Kaufmann & Paul Siegelbaum, Privatization and Corruption in Transition Economics,
50 J. INT'L AFF. 419 (1997) (stating that although the degree of corruption in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe is probably less than would have occurred without any
privatization at all, certain privatization techniques, such as management-
employee buyouts and spontaneous privatization, foster corruption). With re-
spect to Kazakhstan, corruption has certainly been a facet of the privatization
program. See Philip M. Nichols, Creating a Market Along the Silk Road: A Compiri-
son of Privatization Techniques in Central Asia, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L & PoL 299,312-
20 (1997) (discussing allegations of corruption in association with privatization in
Kazakhstan). In conversations with people in Kazakhstan, the relationship be-
tween privatization and corruption has frequently been mentioned to the Author.
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While not all emerging or transition economies experience cor-
ruption, the possibility that corruption is embedded in the struc-
ture of most transition and emerging economies is of great conse-
quence to legal scholars and practitioners. An enormous number
of Western advisors assist in the creation of legal regimes in
emerging and transition economies. Jacques deLisle, in his critical
treatment of only the United States, lists over a dozen agencies and
other entities providing technical legal advice.65 The collapses of
so many authoritarian governments around the world66 have left a
void into which Western advisors are being called.67 Often, techni-
65 See Jacques deLisle, Lex Americana?: United States Legal Assistance, American
Legal Models, and Legal Change in the Post-Communist World and Beyond, 20 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 179,184 (1999).
Federal government agencies and large private foundations have estab-
lished substantial programs to extend legal assistance and offer legal ad-
vice abroad. They have been joined in this effort by countless U.S. insti-
tutions and individuals who have undertaken broadly similar but
smaller scale projects, and by Americans who have participated in other
modes of offering advice and spreading U.S. legal ideas and ideals.
Id.
The institutions that deLisle mentions include the U.S. Agency for Interna-
tional Development, the Support for Eastern European Democracy Act, the Free-
dom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support
Act, the U.S. Information Agency, the U.S. Department of State, the Administra-
tive Conference of the United States, the National Endowment for Democracy, the
Committee on International Judicial Relations of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, the Commercial Law Development Program, the Central and East-
ern European Law Initiative of the American Bar Association, the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, the Federal Bar Association's Democracy Development Initiative, the
Ford Foundation, and the Soros Foundation. Id. at 185-91. Universities also pro-
vide significant amounts of legal technical advice. Id. at 199. Less institutional
entities that provide a significant amount of technical legal advice include major
accounting firms, local bar associations, private voluntary organizations, and in-
dividual experts. Id. at 196. While recounting such a list may seem heavy-
handed, deLisle makes mention of a directory of entities providing technical legal
assistance that is 200 pages in length. Id. at 184 n.3 (citing A.E. DICK HOWARD,
DEMOCRACY'S DAWN: A DIRECTORY OF AMERICAN INITIATIVES ON
CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND THE RULE OF LAW IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN
EUROPE (1991)). Similar lists could be drafted for European-based entities.
66 See generally JEANNE J. KIRKPATRICK, THE WHITHERING AWAY OF THE
TOTALITARIAN STATE... AND OTHER SURPRISES (1991) (describing and discussing
the collapse of authoritarian regimes around the world).
67 See John Linarelli, Anglo-American Jurisprudence and Latin America, 20
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 50, 52 n.15 (1996) (discussing the squadrons of technical legal
advisors sent to Latin America as Latin America democratized). For a discussion
of technical legal aid provided to Kazakhstan, see Jim Cashel & Christopher Ked-
zie, Kazakhstan: Programs and Prospects, CENT. ASIA MONITOR, No.2 1993, at 5, 5-8.
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cal advisors are asked to create entire legal systems and just as of-
ten they are asked to effectively transplant legal systems from
more stable and legalistic countries.63
The provision of technical legal advice and particularly the
transplant of law require awareness of the indigenous culture, in-
cluding perceptions of issues related to the laws in question.69 This
statement, of course, is not uncontested: Alan Watson argues con-
vincingly that legal transplants are viable and constitute the most
important source of change in legal systems.70 He points to the re-
ception of Roman law throughout Western Europe as evidence of
his proposition that law may be influenced without regard to in-
digenous perceptions and attitudes. 1 Most legal scholars, how-
ever, argue that sensitivity to other perspectives is critical to suc-
cessful structuring of legal regimes and transplants from more
developed systems72 Rather than looking to the successful trans-
6s See Gianmaria Ajani, By Chance and Prestige: Legal Transplants in Russia and
Eastern Europe, 43 AM. J. COMsP. L. 93 (199).
69 Indeed, deLisle's primary criticism of the technical legal advice provided
through U.S. entities is the ethnocentrism and lack of cultural sensitivity evi-
denced by that advice. See deLisle, supra note 65, at 180. A similar criticism has
been made of technical legal advice provided to Kazakhstan. c Barnabas John-
son, The Role of the United States in the Erosion and Collapse of Constitutional Garrn-
ance in Kazakstan, CENT. ASIA MoNTrOR, No. 6 1995, at 14 (arguing that aid to Ka-
zakhstan is U.S.-centric and does not take Kazakhstan's considerations into
account). The same criticisms are leveled colloquially against aid provided by
other countries. A very colorful account of cultural insensitivity is found in Matt
Bivens, Aboard the Gravy Train: In Kazakhstan, the farce that is U.S. foreign aid,
HARPER'S MAG., Aug. 1997, at 69 (providing criticisms of a former National Media
Coordinator for the U.S. Agency for International Development in Kazakhstan).
The Author of this Article's personal observations would tend to be far less harsh
than either of these authors, and the Author of this Article notes the personal
commitment evidenced by and real hardships endured by dozens of technical le-
gal advisors in Central Asia.
70 See Alan Watson, Aspects of Reception of Law, 44 Ahi. J. Comp. L 335, 335
(1995) ("In most places at most times borrowing is the most fruitful source of legal
change."). Watson speaks of borrowing from both internal (from one branch of
law to another branch within the same legal system) and external (from one polity
to another) sources. Id.
71 See Alan Watson, Legal Transplants and Law Reform, 92 LAW Q. REV. 79, 80-
82 (1976) (using late nineteenth century Japan to show that modem legal rules
"may be successfully transplanted to a country with very different traditions").
72 See, e.g., Ross Cranston, The Transplant of Commercial Law; Security Law in Sri
Lanka, 19 CANADIAN Bus. L.J. 296, 298 (1991) (stating that without correspondence
to the host society a transplanted law will not "survive as a living, working in-
strument'); Liana Fiol-Matta, Civil Law and Common Law in tte Legal Method of
Puerto Rico: Anomalies and Contradictions in Legal Discourse, 24 CAP. U. L REV. 153,
206 (1995) (stating that successful legal transplants depend on selecting laws that
23
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plantation of Roman law fifteen hundred years ago,73 these theo-
rists look instead to the failure of the most recent large-scale at-
tempt to create viable legal regimes throughout the world -the law
and development movement of the 1960s.74 Most retrospectives of
the movement, including those by leading figures in the move-
ment, suggest that it failed due to ethnocentricity and a failure to
consider other perspectives.75
are culturally compatible); Tamar Frankel, Foreword to A Recipe for Effecting Institu-
tional Changes to Achieve Privatization, 13 B.U. INT'L L.J. 295, 295-305 (1995) (stating
that without cultural similarity a transplant most likely will fail to take roots);
Ronald St. J. MacDonald, Book Review, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 192, 197 (1992) (stating
that cultural similarity is very important to successful transplant of law); Ugo
Mattei, Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World's Legal Systems, 45
AM. J. COmp. L. 5, 7 (1997) (noting that a transplant when cultures differ is often
really "legal imperialism" and stating that such transplants are usually rejected);
Edward A. Mearns, Emerging Trends in International Constitutionalism: A Compara-
tive Approach, 28 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 1, 1 (1996) ("Most scholars now know that
legal institutions cannot simply be 'transplanted.' Nations, like living organs,
have mechanisms that reject the transplanting of foreign law into their legal sys-
tems."); William T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States:
The Limits of Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1325, 1327 (1993) (noting that law that works well in one environment is not
likely to work well in a different environment, and noting particularly that a law
that is ideologically different will not be supported in the host environment);
James F. Smith, Confronting Differences in the United States and Mexican Legal Sys-
tems in the Era of NAFTA, 1 U.S.-MFx. L.J. 85,92 (1993) (arguing that a transplant to
a different culture is "destined to fail').
73 A success that Otto Kahn-Freund, Watson's antagonist in their seminal de-
bate on the viability of transplants in the 1970s, would probably attribute to "un
grand hazard"-a great coincidence. 0. Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of
Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REV. 1, 6 (1974) (citing CHARLES DE MONTESQUIEU, DE
L'ESPRIT DES LoIs, bk. I, ch. 3 (1750) ("Les lois politiques et civiles de chaque nation
. .. doivent 8tre tellement propres au peuple pour lequel elles sont faites, que c'est
un tr6s grand hasard si celles d'une nation peuvent convenir A une autre.")). Wat-
son responds that "Montesquieu badly -very badly -underestimated the amount
of successful borrowing which had been going on, and was going on, in his day."
Watson, supra note 71, at 80; see Eric Stein, Uses, Misuses - and Nonuses of Compara-
tive Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 198 (1977) (summarizing the debate between Otto
Kahn-Freund and Watson).
74 See John Henry Merryman, Comparative Law and Social Change: On the Ori-
gins, Style, Decline & Revival of the Law and Development Movement, 25 AM. J. COMP.
L. 457, 457-58 n.4 (1977) (discussing the beginning of the law and development
movement in the 1960s); Brian Z. Tamanaha, Book Review, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 473
(1995) (discussing the history of the law and development movement); David M.
Trubek, Back to the Future: The Short, Happy Life of the Law and Society Movement, 18
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 4 (1990) (discussing the law and development movement).
73 See Maria Dakolias, A Strategy for Judicial Reform: The Experience in Latin
America, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 167, 229-30 (1995) (arguing that the law and develop-
ment movement failed because it tried to transplant legal codes from developed
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Corruption is deeply embedded in many of the regimes in
which legal scholars and practitioners are or will be called upon to
provide technical legal advice and may in fact play an instrumental
role in determining whether new legal systems will function prop-
erly. It is critical, therefore, that those who will influence the de-
velopment of law have some understanding of the attitudes of per-
sons in other cultures toward corruption.
2.2. Clanges in the Global Legal Regime
2.2.1. Regime Clanges
The last decade has seen a tremendous change in legal regimes
regarding corruption. Not surprisingly, the activity of policymak-
ers has been reflected in the writings of legal scholars; a great
number of expository articles describe the various regimes that
have emerged and it is to these articles that readers should turn for
descriptive accounts of each regime. These regimes have emerged
at the global, regional, and local level and are propounded by both
governmental and nongovernmental entities.76
At the global level, the United Nations adopted in 1996 a Dec-
laration Against Corruption and Bribery in International Commer-
cial Transactions, which calls upon members of the United Nations
to criminalize transnational bribery?7 The International Chamber
countries into Latin America without taking into account culture and extant legal
systems); Trubek, supra note 74, at 37 (noting that the law and development
movement attempted to transplant law from the West to developing countries
with little regard for the cultures of Africa, Asia, or Latin America); David M.
Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis
in Law and Development Studies in the United States, Wis. L REv. 1062,1030 (1974)
(arguing that the law and development movement failed because it was ethno-
centric); Jane Kaufman Winn, How to Make Poor Countries Rich and Hao to Enridz
Our Poor, 77 IowA L. REV. 899, 922 (1992) (arguing that the law and development
movement failed because the U.S. system was resisted by local cultures). David
Trubek and Marc Galanter were intellectual leaders in the law and development
movement
76 See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 455 (noting that opposition to corruption
seems to unite international commentators).
77 United Nations Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in International
Commercial Transactions, G.A. Res. 51/191, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Annex, Agenda
Item 12, para. 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/191 (1997). In 1998, the United Nations
again called upon members to implement the provisions of the Declaration. Ac-
tion Against Corruption and Bribery in Intenzational Commercial Transactions, G.A.
Res. 53/176, U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess., 91st plen. mtg, para. 4, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/53/176 para. 4 (1999). These resolutions follow a 1976 resolution con-
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of Congress, a nongovernmental organization with nearly global
reach,78 issued the Rules of Conduct in 1996 to Combat Extortion
and Bribery in International Business Transactions.79 Perhaps the
most important global actor is the nongovernmental group Trans-
parency International, which has, since 1995, succeeded in making
corruption a highly visible issue without making it an overly po-
litical issue.80
Important changes at the global level have been facilitated in
less direct ways by financial institutions and by the World Trade
Organization. The President of the World Bank, for example, has
stated that no issue is more important to his organization than cor-
demning transnational bribery and requesting unilateral and multilateral action
against bribery. Measures Against Corrupt Practices of Trarisnational and Other
Corporations, Their Intermediaries and Others Involved, G.A. Res. 3514, U.N.
GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, at 69, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1976).
78 See W. LAURENCE CRAIG Er AL., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
ARBITRATION 25 (2d ed. 1990) (describing the Chamber as a nongovernmental "as-
sociation of internationally-oriented enterprises and their national organizations"
that works to "promote international commerce worldwide"); Boris Kozolchyk,
The Immunization of Fraudulently Procured Letter of Credit Acceptances: All Services
Exportacao, Importacao Comercio, S.A. v. Banco Bamerindus Do Brazil, S.A. and First
Commercial v. Gotham Originals, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 369, 380 n.32 (1992) ("Many in-
struments sent for international collection are made subject to the International
Chamber of Commerce Rules."). The Chamber was founded in 1919 and has over
7,000 members. CRAIG, supra, at 25.
79 The Rules of Conduct to Combat Extortion and Bribery in International
Business Transactions can be found in Extortion and Bribery in International Busi-
ness Transactions, Ad Hoc Committee on Extortion and Bribery in International
Business Transactions, ICC Doc. No. 193/15 (Mar. 26, 1996). The Rules of Con-
duct to Combat Extortion and Bribery in International Business Transactions pro-
hibit the offer or acceptance of any bribe or kickback, require companies to control
payments by their agents, and require recordkeeping sufficient to prevent the
hiding of illicit payments or of secret funds. Rules of Conduct to Combat Extor-
tion and Bribery in International Business Transactions arts. 1 ("No one may, di-
rectly or indirectly, demand or accept a bribe."), 2 ("No enterprise may, directly or
indirectly, offer or give a bribe and any demands for such a bribe must be re-
jected.'), & 4 (imposing financial recording and auditing requirements on enter-
prises).
8D See Alejandro Posadas, Combating Corruption Under International Law, 10
DUKE J. CoMP. & INTL L. 345,404-05 (2000) (describing Transparency International
and stating that its creation is "[o]ne of the most promising developments" in an-
ticorruption efforts); see also Brown, supra note 7, at 479-80 (describing Transpar-
ency International). Transparency International is best known for its annual Cor-
ruption Perception Index and more recently for the Bribe Payers Index.
Transparency International also supports chapters dedicated to eliminating cor-
ruption in individual countries, supports research into corruption, and has pro-
moted a commitment for companies to sign called "The Integrity Pact." See Po-
sadas, supra, at 405-07 (describing the activities of Transparency International).
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ruptionP and the Bank has published procurement guidelines,
banned bribe-giving contractors from further work on Bank-
funded projects, and canceled loans to bribe-soliciting countries.P
The International Monetary Fund instructs its advisors to take a
proactive role in dealing with corruption and will take action, in-
cluding withdrawal of Fund support, in the event of corruptions
The World Trade Organization has established a Working Group
on Transparency in Government Procurement.P4
81 Wolfensohn, supra note 2, at 1.
82 See Helmut Sohmen, Critical Importance of Controlling Corrption, 33 INT'L
LAW. 863, 865 (1999) (discussing activity of the World Bank). Section 1.15 of the
Guidelines for Procurement Under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits states that any firm
that offers or gives a bribe will be ineligible for bank financed contracts; at least
fifty-three firms have been declared ineligible. See World Bank Listing of Ineligi-
ble Firms Fraud and Corruption, available at http://www.worldbankorg
/html/opr/procure/debarr.html (last updated July 9, 2001) (providing a current
list of ineligible firms). Section 1.25 of the Guidelines for the Selection and Employ-
ment of Consultants under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits states that any consultant
that offers or gives a bribe may be ineligible for future Bank-funded work; at least
one consultant firm has received a letter initiating that process. See id. (providing
a current list of consultants under investigation).
83 See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, GOOD G VERNANCE: THE IMF's ROLE
2-8 (1997) (describing its more proactive role and stating that the Fund will not
support corrupt governments); see also Sohmen, supra note 82, at 866 (stating that
the Fund now limits its involvement in countries where corruption negatively af-
fects domestic economic growth). Section 1.2.2 of the Fund's Code of Good Practices
on Fiscal Transparency states that "[tiaxes, duties, fees, and charges should have an
explicit legal basis," while section 1.2.3 states "[e]thical standards of behavior for
public servants should be clear and well publicized." International Monetary
Fund, Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency, available at http://wv.w.imf.org
/external/np/fad/trans/code.htm (last visited Nov. 2,2001). The code, in section
4.21 also suggests that "[a] national audit body or equivalent organization, which
is independent of the executive, should provide timely reports for the legislature
and public on the financial integrity of government accounts." Id. Chantal Tho-
mas provides an excellent discussion of the anticorruption actitivies of the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Thomas, supra note 54, at 552-56. She
also points out that the international financial institutions concentrate on corrup-
tion in the financing of projects rather than general political corruption. Id. at 560.
64 See Report of the Ministerial Meeting, WT/MIN[96]/DEC, at 7 (Nov. 19,
1996) (declaration of the Ministerial Conference creating the Working Group on
Transparency in Government Procurement). Posadas acknowledges the impor-
tance of the World Trade Organization's actions, but suggests that "the scope is
still limited and many questions remain in the area." Posadas, supra note 80, at
404. That the World Trade Organization could do even this, however, is surpris-
ing, given the insistence by some members that corruption is not an appropriate
issue for the Organization. See Nichols, supra note 31, at 364-77 (discussing objec-
tions made by developing countries and emerging and mature economies). See
generally Philip M. Nichols, Corruption in tire World Trade Organization: Discerning
the Limits of the World Trade Organization's Authority, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L & POL
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At the regional level, in 1996, the Organization of American
States promulgated a treaty that requires its members to take cer-
tain actions with respect to transnational bribery, including the
criminalization of bribery of foreign officials.85 The treaty also re-
quires signatories to cooperate with one another in the prosecution
of corrupt officials and bribe givers. 86 The European Union has
also agreed upon a treaty that requires its members to criminalize
711 (1996) (exploring the authority of the World Trade Organization to deal with
the issue of corruption). The ambivalence of the members is reflected in a report
of the working group, which states that the working group is a product of the
membership's commitment to combating corruption and bribery, but also reports
the view of some members that the goal of fighting corruption and bribery should
not be mentioned explicitly in any agreement that the working group produces.
See Report to the General Council, WT/WGTGP/3, at 36-37 (Oct. 12, 1999). The
Working Group is considering a Draft Text for an Agreement on Transparency in
Government Procurement, which is a consolidation of four different drafts circu-
lated by Hungary, South Korea, Singapore and the United States. See The WTO's
Contribution to Transparency in Government Procurement: Communication from
Hungary, Korea, Singapore and the United States, WT/GC/W/385
WT/WGTGP/W/27, at 3-9 (Nov. 9,1999) (transmitting the draft text).
85 Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, 35 LL.M.
724, art. 5; see Lucinda A. Low et al., The Inter-American Convention Against Corrup-
tion: A Comparison With the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 38 VA. J.
INT'L L. 243, 247-49 (1998) (discussing the requirement); Rex J. Zedalis, Internation-
alizing Prohibitions on Foreign Corrupt Practices: The OAS Convention and the OECD
Revised Recommendation, 31 J. WORLD TRADE, Dec. 1997, 45, 55 (1997) (discussing
the treaty).
86 The treaty requires signatories to allow extradition of bribe givers and
bribe-taking officials and contains a pledge that signatories will not invoke bank
secrecy laws to impede investigations into corruption. Inter-American Conven-
tion Against Corruption, supra note 85, art XIII (extradition), art. XVI (bank se-
crecy). The provision with respect to extradition is particularly important in Latin
America, which has a very strong tradition of providing asylum to government
officials from other countries. See Ranee K. L. Panjabi, Terror at the Emperor's
Birthday Party: An Analysis of the Hostage-Taking Incident at the Japanese Embassy in
Lima, Peru, 16 DIcK. J. INT'L L. 1, 64 (1997) (noting that the idea of asylum is most
strongly advocated in Latin America). The prohibition on the use of bank secrecy
laws to thwart investigations is also "potentially very important." Low, supra
note 85, at 254. The treaty also requires signatories to make it a crime for a gov-
ernment official to possess or acquire assets that the official "cannot reasonably
explain in relation to his lawful earnings during the performance of his func-
tions." Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, supra note 85, art. IX.
The Convention has been signed by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile,
Columbia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guyana, Haiti,
Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname,
United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Low, supra note 85, at 245.
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transnational bribery. 7 This treaty, however, only requires mem-
bers to criminalize bribery involving officials of other European
Union countries.88
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
does not represent a geographic region but instead represents
countries with high levels of wealth and well-developed market
institutions.8 9 In 1997, the Organization promulgated a treaty re-
quiring member countries to criminalize transnational bribery.9
Signatories are also required to assist one another in the investiga-
tion of bribery and to allow extradition of bribe givers.91 Because
of the changes that this treaty has precipitated at the local level it is
considered perhaps the most significant event to date in the evolu-
tion of the global regime change with respect to corruption, and it
87 Convention Drawn Up on The Basis of Article K.3(2)(c) of the Treaty on
European Union on the Fight Against Corruption Involving Officials of the Euro-
pean Communities or Officials of Member States of the European Union, 1997 O.J.
(C 195), 37 I.L.M. 15 (1997); see Gantz, supra note 15, at 472-73 (discussing the
European Union's convention).
83 Gantz, supra note 15, at472-73.
89 The twenty-one members are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Ayesha Qayyum, New Anti-
Bribery Treaty Analyzed, IN'L CoM. LMG., Mar. 1998, at 27. Five other countries-
Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, and the Slovak Republic-signed the treaty un-
der discussion. Id.
90 OECD, Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.LM. 1 (1993), art. 1.1
[hereinafter OECD Convention]. Penalties for transnational bribes must be pro-
portionate to the penalties for domestic bribery. See id. art. 3.1. Germany's im-
plementing legislation provides perhaps the most vigorous example of this re-
quirement See Gesetz zu dem Obereinkommen fiber die Bekimpfung der
Bestechung ausldndischer Amstr~ger im internationalen Gesch'iftsverkher [Act on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transac-
tions] (Intemationalenbestechunggesetz), v. 10.9.1998 (BGBI. II S.2327), art. 3, § 1
(stating that the bribery of foreign and domestic public officials will be treated
equally under German law and making the bribery of foreign officials illegal by
simply incorporating such behavior into the existing laws concerning bribery).
Similarly, Norway implemented the Convention by adding a paragraph to its ex-
isting code that says "[tihe term public servant in the first paragraph also includes
foreign public servants and servants of public international organizations." Nor.
Penal Code, ch. 12, para. 128.
91 See OECD Convention, supra note 90, art. 9 (mutual legal assistance), art. 10
(extradition); see also Dominic Bencivenga, Anti-Bribery Pact: 34 Nations Agree to
Prosecute Business Payqffs, N.Y. .J, Jan. 15,1998, at 5 (characterizing these provi-
sions as "critical").
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certainly evidences a significant change in the global legal cul-
ture.92
There has been significant activity at the domestic level. At the
national level, at least twenty-four countries have to date passed
legislation criminalizing transnational bribery.93 Cities and other
92 See Barbara Crutchfield George et al., The 1998 OECD Convention: An Impe-
tus for Worldwide Changes in Attitudes Toward Corruption in Business Transactions, 37
Am. Bus. L.J. 485,485 (2000) (stating that the Convention "provides an impetus for
worldwide changes" and "heralds the beginning of a new era"). Paul Stephan, it
should be noted, takes issue with the Convention both for what he perceives to be
its imperialism and out of pragmatic concerns. Stephan, supra note 33, at 540.
Frank Anechiarico also criticizes approaches such as that of the Convention as
panoptic, relying on more rules, more surveillance, and more prosecution. See
Frank Anechiarico, End-Runs and Hairy Eyeballs: The Costs of Corruption Control in
Market Democracies, 14 CONN. J. INT'L L. 379, 383-86 (1999) (discussing what he
characterizes as a panoptic vision of corruption control in New York City).
93 Those countries are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bul-
garia, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxenbourg, Mexico,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States. See
OECD, Anti-Corruption Division, Implementation of OECD Convention on Combat-
ing Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, available
at http://wwwl.oecd.org/daf/nocorruption/annex2.htm (last visited Nov. 2,
2001). The United States amended the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act so that it
would comply with the requirements of the OECD Convention. Act to Amend
the Securities Act of 1934 and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, S. 2375,
105th Cong. (1998). The laws adopted by other countries are extremely varied in
their approaches to corruption. Some, such as the Canadian law, describe a be-
havior and prohibit its citizens to engage in that behavior anyplace in the world.
The Canadian law reads:
Every Person commits an offence who, in order to obtain or retain an ad-
vantage in the cause of business, directly or indirectly gives, offers or
agrees to give or offer a loan, reward, advantage or benefit of any kind to
a foreign public official or to any person for the benefit of a foreign pub-
lic official (a) as consideration for an act or omission by the official in
connection with the performance of the official's duties or functions; or
(b) to induce the foreign official to use his or her position to influence
any acts or decisions of the foreign state or public international organi-
zation for which the official performs duties or functions.
Corruption of Foreign Officials Act, 1998, S-21,1st sess., 36th parl., 46 & 47 Eliz. II,
c.34 (Can.).
Others make reference to local law and prohibit their citizens from engaging
in behavior that violates local laws. Hungarian and Icelandic law provide exam-
ples of such legislation. Hungarian law punishes an actor who "gives or promises
the favour so that the foreign official person violates his official duty, exceeds his
competence or otherwise abuses his official position." Biintet6 T6rv6nkbnyv
[BTK] [Penal Code] tit. VII, § 258/B(2) (Hung.). Icelandic law, similarly, prose-
cutes an act that would be punishable according to Icelandic law "and provided it
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subnational polities are also actively developing anticorruption re-
gimes. 4 Companies have, in increasing numbers, adopted corpo-
rate codes dealing with corrupt transactions by employees and
agents.9 3
2.2.2. Theories of the Change
Three theories have been offered to explain the change in cor-
ruption regimes.9 6 The first, and simplest, very much reflects the
positivist school that dominated international legal theory until the
last decade:97 that the hegemon United States "bullied" the rest of
the world into adopting legislation similar to its Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act.9 This explanation fits nicely into realism theory but
empirically fails to satisfy. The Organization of American States'
treaty, for example, is considered the result of efforts by Latin
America;99 the European Union does not get "bullied" by the
was also punishable under the laws of that state." GENERAL PENAL CODE [GPC],
Law No. 19/1940, § 5(2) (Ice.). Hungarian legislation is also unusual in that it ex-
tends Hungarian jurisdiction to foreign officials who accept or solicit bribes.
Criminal Code Title VII section 258/C. For a discussion of the benefits and disad-
vantages of the various types of legislation, see Philip M. Nichols, The Myth of
Anti-Bribery Laws as Transnational Intrusion, 33 CoRNELL INT'L lJ. 627, 641-45(2000).
94 See, e.g., Goh Kun, A Systematic Approach to Anti-Corruption: The Case of the
Seoul Metropolitan Government 2-4 (Oct. 14, 1999) (describing the program of the
City of Seoul, South Korea), available at http://www.transparency.org/iacc
/9thiacc/papers/day4/plenary/d4pLkgoh.html. Unfortunately, efforts at the
subnational level have not yet received critical legal evaluation, although some
scholars, such as Balakrishnan Rajagopal, argue that anticorruption efforts must
be local. Rajagopal, supra note 54, at 507.
93 See John Brademas & Fritz Heimann, Tackling Intermational Cornption: No
Longer Taboo, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 17,21-22 (predicting that companies
operating under the new antibribery laws will adopt codes of conduct); Harvey L
Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal Liability: A
Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEo. LJ. 1559 (1990) (discussing the
use of corporate codes to facilitate compliance with laws criminalizing transna-
tional bribery).
96 Frank Anechiarico's interesting discussion of the evolution of anticorrup-
tion activities, which examines anticorruption activities in New York City, is a
history rather than a theory. See Anechiarico, supra note 92, at 380-87.
97 See David Kennedy & Chris Tennant, New Approaches to International Law: A
Bibliography, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 417, 418 (1994) (noting the dominance of positiv-
ism but also noting new theories of international law).
93 See Steven R. Salbu, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as a Threat to Global
Harmony, 20 MxciH. J. INT'L L. 419,441 (1999) (making this argument).
99 See Bruce Zagaris & Shaila Lakhani Ohri, The Emergence of an International
Enforcement Regime on Transnational Corruption in the Americas, 30 1 & POI.y INfTL
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United States over commercial issues, which would include the
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development's
treaty;100 and Transparency International was founded by a Ger-
man national who left the World Bank, because he was not satis-
fied with that organization's efforts. 01
Nonetheless, the possibility-however small-that the realist
theory is correct creates a need for an empirical understanding of
local attitudes toward corruption. The imposition of a global anti-
corruption regime by a hegemon on a culture that embraces and
accepts corruption could constitute a form of moral imperialism. 0 2
Bus. 53, 65 (1999) (stating that Venezuelan President Rafael Caldera promoted the
treaty for years following the failure of major banks in Venezuela because of cor-
ruption); Charles A. Cerami, Nations Plan Ambitious Campaign to Curb Graft, WASH.
TIMES, Feb. 5, 1996, at 14 (stating that Venezuela assumed the lead role in per-
suading Latin American countries to adopt the treaty); see also A GLOBAL FORUM
ON FIGHTING CORRUPTION: FINAL CONFERENCE REPORT 19 (1999) (statement of Jorge
Fernando Quiroga Ramirez, Vice President of Bolivia, that "it [is] important that
countries not tolerate abroad what they would not tolerate at home"); id. (state-
ment of Carlos Rukhauf, Vice President of Argentina, supporting the OECD Con-
vention); id. at 22 (statement of Jaime David Fernandez Mirabel, Vice President of
the Dominican Republic, "call[ing] on all Western Hemisphere countries that had
not done so to ratify the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption"); id. at
35 (statement of Luis Alfonso Davila, President of the Congress of Venezuela,
stating that the fight against corruption requires the will of neighboring coun-
tries).
100 The European Union is considered the most powerful of the "quad coun-
tries," the four countries that are considered the most powerful within the World
Trade Organization. See Philip M. Nichols, Forgotten Linkages - Historical Institu-
tionalism and Sociological Institutionalism and Analysis of the World Trade Organiza-
tion, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L EcoN. L. 461, 492 (1998) (discussing the quad countries); see
also Zagaris & Ohri, supra note 99, at 76 (stating that much of the leadership for
implementation of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development's
treaty came from the European Union). Indeed, the arguments of many U.S. poli-
cymakers that anticorruption efforts make U.S. products more competitive seems
very unlikely to persuade the United States' European trading partners. See
Philip M. Nichols, Corruption in Asia, in PROCEEDINGS: CONFERENCE ON ANTi-
CORRUPTION IN ASIA: FOSTERING INTEGRITY IN BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT 29-30
Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Apr. 19,
2000) (noting both the argument and its unpersuasiveness).
101 Peter Eigen, Founder and Chair of Transparency International, Remarks at
the Conference on Legal and Ethical Issues in Emerging Economies, University of
Pennsylvania (May 1997) (on file with author); see Brown, supra note 7, at 480
(stating that Transparency International was instrumental in obtaining support for
the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development's treaty).
102 See Rajagopal, supra note 54, at 496 (stating that the anticorruption move-
ment is "elitist, statist, and Eurocentric"); Steven R. Salbu, Bribenj in the Global
Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L.
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Both legal scholars and policymakers should be aware of this pos-
sibility. 03
A second explanation for the change in the global regime is that
the dialogue on corruption has metamorphasized from a moral
discourse to an economic discourse.104 This transformation has al-
lowed the discourse to sidestep awkward issues of moral relativ-
ism and moral imperialism and positions it instead within the fic-
titious neutrality of economics. In many ways this argument fits
into the more recently vibrant regime theory of international law. 0
While this theory does explain much of the observable devel-
opment of the corruption discourse, it remains troubling for two
reasons. First, the theory does not explain the connection between
individuals and the changes in the regimes-how the issue of cor-
ruption was transformed in the minds of scholars, policyrakers,
and the hundreds of thousands of persons whose lives it touches' cs
Second, the theory marginalizes noneconomic impetuses for the
change in the international legal environment and thus possibly
does not fully explain why those regimes have changed. 0 7
If this theory is correct, however, and if corruption is now
treated as an economic issue rather than as a moral or social issue,
REv. 229,239 (1997) (arguing that "efforts to control bribery in other nations con-
stitute moral imperialism").
103 Of course, the fact that an action might be labeled as moral imperialism
does not necessarily mean that the action should not be taken. Imposing a global
antislavery regime on a culture that embraces slavery might be considered mor-
ally imperialistic but would be a good thing to do. Similarly, a country that im-
poses global accounting standards on its companies when they do business out-
side of its borders might be acting in a legally imperialistic manner but few would
object. The possibility of moral imperialism must be examined seriously, but Ann
Scales' admonition is noted. See Ann Scales, Feminist Legal Method: Not So Scary, 2
UCLA Wo, EN's LJ. 1, 9-10 (1992) ("The air is too thick these days with charges of
... moral imperialism .... Though each of these charges has a legitimate place,
more often their invocation keeps the discussion from digging deeper.).
104 Padideh Ala'i, The Legacy of Geographical Morality and Colonialism: A His-
torical Assessment of the Current Crusade Against Corruption, 33 VAND. J. TRNA T'L
L. 877, 906 (2000).
105 See W. Michael Reisman, Book Review, 85 AM. J. INt'L L 205, 206 (1991)
(describing regime theory as "the current rage in the United States").
106 See Ann-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Rela-
tions Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205,225-26 (1993) (criticizing regime
theory for its failure to account for the relationship between the individual and
the state).
107 Cf. Rajagopal, supra note 54, at 496 (condemning the economic focus of the
anticorruption movement); Thomas, supra note 54, at 560 (expressing concern over
the economic focus of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund).
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then there is still a need for an understanding of indigenous atti-
tudes toward corruption. At the basic level, to the extent that a
culture embraces and accepts corruption, then concerns regarding
moral, legal, and now economic imperialism are still valid. 08 At a
more refined level, if the focus of the anticorruption movement
must be economic, then it will have to at some point choose among
a "multitude of different economically efficient states."'109 The val-
ues and attitudes of a culture are a critical factor in determining
which economic outcome to seek.10
A final explanation for the change in the global regime is ex-
emplified by Mark Pieth. He suggests that, just as the United
States' Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was a reaction to revelations
of large amounts of domestic and foreign bribery while the United
States was still questioning the meaning of the collapse of the
Nixon presidency,"' so too are the changes in European regimes
attributable to endemic corruption scandals and the proximity of
108 See supra note 102 and accompanying text (discussing moral and legal im-
perialism); see also Salbu, supra note 98, at 442 (stating that as the global anticor-
ruption regime changes, "nations are now likely to resent U.S. economic imperi-
alism. The resentment will be exacerbated when nations fear that their culture is
at risk of being supplanted by U.S. culture.'). The emphasis on the United States
is, of course, misplaced, as the regime change is both global and the product of
many actors and cultures other than the United States. Nonetheless, if one gener-
alizes the concern, then as a theoretical matter it is possible that, if there were a
culture that embraced and accepted corruption, the global regime change could be
perceived as a form of economic imperialism.
109 Barbara White, Coase and the Courts: Economics for the Common Man, 72
IOWA L. REV. 577,603 n.103 (1987); see Richard A. Westin, Mhen One-Eyed Account-
ants are Kings: A Primer on Microeconomics, Income Taxes and the Shibboleth of Effi-
ciency, 69 MINN. L. REv. 1099, 1106 (1985) ("Economists do not define 'optimal' as
the unique best, its Latin root notwithstanding. Instead, they mean one of an infi-
nite number of 'best' allocations.'). Classical economic theory, of course, should
be applied with caution in transition economies. See Aviezer Tucker, Book Re-
view, Beyond Economistic Absolutism: The Post-communist Transition From a Socio-
logical Perspective, 23 J. Soc., POL. & ECON. STUD. 349 (1998) (noting that Western
economists studying transition in former communist countries are realizing the
limitations of classical economic theories when applied to such countries).
110 See Francis M. Bator, The Simple Analytics of Welfare Maximization, 47 AM.
ECON. REv. 22, 56 (1957) ("Allocation and distribution interact in countless ways
with the politics and sociology of a society . . . 'everything depends on every-
thing."'); White, supra note 109, at 607 ("[Ihe economically efficient state reached
results in large part from the value choices that society makes with respect to the
initial endowments.").
111 Alejandro Posadas provides a nicely detailed explanation of the connec-
tion between the United States' Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the collapse of
the Nixon administration. Posadas, supra note 80, at 348-59.
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the damage done in Eastern and Central Europe by corruption. 2
Indeed, Europe and much of the world have been deeply shaken
by corruption scandals in the last decade.113 This explanation for
the change in the global regime does not fit comfortably into any of
the more commonly used legal theories, but it does resonate with
some sociological schools of thought. Historical institutionalism,
for example, emphasizes the importance of the path taken in the
development of regimesj"4 Pathways are marked by critical junc-
tures-such as major corruption scandals-that present opportu-
nities for new paths."15 The paths that are possible and that are vi-
able are dependent both on antecedent conditions and on the
nature of the critical juncture" 6
The theory that a series of corruption scandals and a growing
sense of concern and outrage resulted in the change to the global
regime also calls for an understanding of other views regarding
112 Mark Pieth, International Efforts to Combat Corruption, in THE FOREIG
CoRRUPT PRAcricES Acr: How To COMPLY UNDER THE NEv AMENDMENTS AND THE
OECD CONVENTION E-1, E-1 (ABA-CLE ed., 1999); see Bradesman & Heimann, su-
pra note 95, at 17 (attributing the OECD Convention to a convergence of political
and economic pressures).
113 See A GLOBAL FORUM ON FIGHTING CORRUPTION: FINAL REPORT 117 (1999)
(statement of Guy de Vel, Director of Legal Affairs of the Council of Europe, that
"[in the 1990's, countries in all parts of Europe and the world were shaken by
huge corruption scandals').
114 See Seymour Martin Lipset & Stein Rokkan, Cleavage Stchres, Party Sys-
tems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction, in PARTY S-STMS AND VOTER
AUGNENTS: CROSs-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 1, 37 (Seymour M. Lipset & Stein
Rokkan eds., 1967) (discussing the importance of paths); scc also Maxwell L
Stearns, Standing and Social Choice: Historical Evidence, 144 U. PA. L REV. 309 (1995)
(using path dependency to analyze standing).
11s See RuTH BERINS COLLIER & DAVID COLLIER, SHAPING THE POLITICAL AREN.A:
CRmCAL JUNCTURES, THE LABOR MOVEMNT, AND REGIME DYNAM.Ics IN LATIN
AmEICA 29-30 (1991) (describing critical junctures). "A critical juncture may be
defined as a period of significant change, which typically occurs in distinct ways
in different countries... and which is hypothesized to produce distinct legacies."
Id. at 29.
116 As Stephen Krasner explains when describing the school of historical in-
stitutionalism:
Historical developments are path dependent;, once certain choices are
made, they constrain future possibilities. The range of options available
to policymakers at any given point in time is a function of institutional
capabilities that were put in place in [sic] at some earlier period, possibly
in response to very different environmental pressures.
Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspcctive, 21 CON.P. POL STUD.
66, 67 (1988); see JAMES GLICK, CHAOS 8 (1937) (emphasizing the "sensitive de-
pendence on initial conditions" of changes in regimes).
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corruption. On the one hand, the legitimacy of the change may
depend on actual outrage in the countries in which behaviors are
targeted. On the other hand, if attitudes toward corruption are
markedly different, then either the range of choices for new paths
is limited or those attitudes themselves have to be changed (again
raising questions of imperialism).117
2.3. The Need to Understand Other Attitudes
An understanding of indigenous attitudes toward corruption is
critical for both the creation and understanding of regimes. Those
who will be asked to create the new rules dealing with corrupt ac-
tivities must understand indigenous attitudes toward corruption,
because indigenous attitudes almost certainly will play a role in
determining the viability of the local regimes that emerge in the
immediate future. Those who analyze the global regime change
through theoretical prisms -whether that prism is realism, regime,
or sociological theories -must also understand indigenous atti-
tudes toward corruption, either out of concerns of moral imperial-
ism, economic efficiency and allocation, or institutional choice and
viability. Finally, the assertion that some cultures embrace corrup-
tion should be tested when possible. In each of these cases, Ka-
zakhstan presents unusual opportunities for understanding in-
digenous attitudes.
3. KAZAKHSTAN
Given the goal of finding attitudes and perceptions that differ
from those in the West, and given the general objections to the hy-
pothesis that corruption is acceptable in some countries, the most
fruitful empirical work is likely to be conducted in a culture that is
likely to accept corruption. A country chosen for empirical study
should have, therefore, at least two characteristics. First, the coun-
try should be culturally separate from the West. This is not be-
cause the West is morally superior in any way to other cultures
117 Some scholar/advocates have no hesitation in endorsing fundamental
cultural changes in order to combat corruption. Edgardo Buscaglia and Maria
Dakolias, for example, flatly state that "[i]t is essential to change the culture where
roles and relationships prevail over rules and regulations." Buscaglia & Dakolias,
supra note 4, at 96. While many countries have undertaken this type of change
somewhat voluntarily, the significance of such a change-particularly if forced-
cannot be overstated. See Nichols, supra note 57, at 278-98 (discussing institutional
change in many countries).
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and thus less likely to accept corruption, nor is it because corrup-
tion does not occur in the West-it occurs, in alarming levels.
Rather, it is because data, anecdotes, and impression already indi-
cate that corruption is not accepted in Western culture.
Second, there should be a nontrivial amount of corruption in
the selected country and preferably corruption in which the popu-
lation at large participates to some degree. Finland, for example,
would be a meaningless place to look for subtle or different atti-
tudes toward corruption because little corruption seems to occur
there.18
Kazakhstan satisfies both of these requirements -it is culturally
distinct from the West, and corruption occurs with some regular-
ity.
3.1. The Culture and Laws of Kazaklistan
3.1.1. The Historical Context of Kazaldzstan
The relevance of pre-Soviet Kazakh culture engenders some
debate."19 Some argue that the Soviets so thoroughly eradicated
the extant Kazakh culture that only the Soviet and post-Soviet pe-
riods have any bearing on modem Kazakh identity. Most, how-
ever, argue that pre-Soviet culture influences modem Kazakh
identity and distinguishes it from European culture.m Moreover,
Kazakhstan has undertaken a conscious effort to rebuild its society
on the basis of traditional Kazakh culture.12'
11s In the Year 2001 Corruption Perceptions Index released by Transparency
International, Finland is given a score of 9.9 out of 10, which indicates that per-
sons inside and outside of Finland perceive there to be virtually no corruption in
Finland. See Transparency International, Te Year 2001 Corruption Perceptions In-
dex, at http://wvwv.transparency.org/documents/cp/2001/cpi201.html (ast
updated June 27,2001).
119 See SmiRiN AKINER, THE FoRMAION OF KAZAKH IDENTrTY: FROM I TRIBE TO
NATION-STATE 1-4 (1995).
120 See id. at 52-53 (discussing cultural survivals, including the method of so-
cial interaction); GREGORY GLEASON, THE CENTRAL ASIAN STATEs: DiscOVEING
INDEPENDENCE 35 (Alexander J. Motyl ed., 1997) (noting that the past lives in the
present in Central Asia). Gleason in particular suggests that "the influence of
modernizing Europe gave new impulse to earlier Central Asian traditions. As
European political and economic concepts were introduced in a much-
reinterpreted Russian form, the intellectuals of Central Asia responded not by
adopting these new ideas but by rehabilitating their own ideas." Id.
121 See Karen Odgaard & Jens Simonsen, Th New Kazak Elite, in
CONTEM1PORARY KAZAKS: CULTURAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTrVES 17, 22 (Ingvar Svan-
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Kazakhstan-or any part of Central Asia in general'22-cannot
be discussed without mention of geography. 123 Central Asia, of
which Kazakhstan is physically the largest country,24 is dominated
by geography: to the south and east are the highest mountain
ranges in the world, to the south and west are some of the most
arid deserts in the world, to the north are immense steppes and
beyond those the forests and tundra of Siberia. 25 Kazakhstan itself
is bordered by high mountains, arid deserts, Siberian forests, and
the Caspian Sea; high steppes, however, comprise the bulk of Ka-
zakhstan's territory.126
berg ed., 1999) (noting that modern Kazakhstan was "founded on a reconstruction
of Kazak tradition and culture").
122 Discussing this region in terms of countries reflects a Eurocentric perspec-
tive. See GLEASON, supra note 120, at 5. Central Asia as a whole, on the other
hand, constitutes a natural unit. See RICHARD POMFRET, THE ECONOMIES OF
CENTRAL ASIA 5 (1995).
123 See AKINER, supra note 119, at 5 (noting that the physical environment
"plays a decisive role in the life of the modem Kazakh state" and that "the land
itself is seen as part of the national identity"); GLEASON, supra note 120, at 5 (sug-
gesting that a better "way to analyze the groups of people in Central Asia is to
conceive of them not as nations on their way to statehood but rather in terms of
their own natural history, which is connected to the physical features of Central
Asia"). Legal scholars have also noted the importance of geography to the devel-
opment of distinct legal cultures. See Bernhard Grossfeld, Geography and Law, 82
MICH. L. REV. 1510,1518-19 (1984) ("Any in-depth comparative research must take
[geography] into account.").
124 Kazakhstan is the largest country in Central Asia and the ninth largest
country in the world. See Shirin Akiner, Post-Soviet Central Asia: Past is Prologue, in
THE NEw STATES OF CENTRAL ASIA AND THEIR NEIGHBOURS 4, 5 (Peter Ferdinand ed.,
1994) (describing the ordinal size of Kazakhstan and noting that Kazakhstan en-
compasses an area of 2,717,300 square kilometers); Michael Mandelbaum, Intro-
duction, in CENTRAL ASIA AND THE WORLD: KAZAKHSTAN, UZBEKISTAN, TAJIKISTAN,
KYRGYZSTAN, AND TURKMENISTAN 1, 6 (Michael Mandelbaum ed., 1994) (noting
that the single country of Kazakhstan is larger than the entirety of Western
Europe); Ingvar Svanberg, The Kazak Nation, in CONTEMPORARY KAZAKS: CULTURAL
AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 121, at 1, 4-7 (commenting on the geography
and size of Kazakhstan as well as the importance of geography to the Kazakh
identity).
125 See GLEASON, supra note 120, at 26-27 (describing the geography of Central
Asia and emphasizing the important relationship between that geography and the
cultures of Central Asia); see also G.M. MIR, REGIONAL GEOGRAPHY OF CENTRAL
ASIA 15-44 (1993) (discussing the physical geography of Central Asia); Peter Sin-
nott, The Physical Geography of Soviet Central Asia and the Aral Sea Problem, in
GEOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVES ON SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA 74, 76-82 (Robert A. Lewis ed.,
1992) (same).
126 See NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE, KAZAKHSTAN: AN
ECONOMIC PROFILE 1 (1993) (describing the physical geography of Kazakhstan, in-
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Those interested in a thorough explication of Central Asian
history should avail themselves of Ren6 Grousset's The Empire of
the Steppes.127 In briefest summary, the origin of the modern Ka-
zakh people is unclear. 2s Nomadic peoples of differing ethnicities
and political allegiances inhabited the land that makes up modem
Kazakhstan for thousands of years, 9 sometimes spilling out as far
as Europe and China, sometimes contracting in response to invad-
ers from outside Central Asia.130 Arab invaders conquered much
of Kazakhstan in the eighth century, bringing with them the Is-
lamic religion. 3' By the late 1300s the area was peopled by Turkic
cluding its steppes). The immensity of the steppes must be experienced to be ap-
predated.
127 RENt GROUSSET, THE EMPIRE OF THE STEPPES: A HISrORY OF CENTRAL ASIA
(Naomi Walford trans., 1970).
125 See MARTHA BRILL OLcOTT, THE KAZAKHS 3 (2d ed. 1993) (noting a lack of
"agreement on how the Kazakh people were formed"); Peter Charanis, Foreavird
to THE Ei mIR OF THE STEPPES: A HORY OF CENTRAL ASIA, supra note 127, at v
(stating that the early history of Central Asia is shrouded in obscurity). One
problem is the lack of reliable primary material throughout the early periods. Se
OLcOTT, supra, at 3 (noting a lack of contemporary sources); see also JoHN R.
GARDINER-GARDEN, KTEsIAs ON EARLY CENTRAL ASIAN HISToRY AND ETHNOGMAPHY
(1987) (debating value of the writings of a Greek physician who accompanied the
Persian military invasions in Central Asia in 400 B.C.). This problem is particu-
larly acute with respect to the nonliterate nomads of Kazakhstan. See AmiR, su-
pra note 119, at 3-4.
129 See GEORGE J. DEMKo, THE RuSsIAN COLONIZATION OF KAzAKhsTAN 1896-
1916, at 22 (Thomas A. Sebeok ed., 1969) ("From the earliest period of recorded
history [nomadic peoples] roamed the desert and steppe north of the ancient
Emirates of Khiva and Bukhara.!).
130 Andre Frank refers to waves of migration or invasion occurring roughly
from 4300-4200 B.C., 3400-3200 B.C., 3000-2800 B.C., 1700-1500 B.C., 1200-900 B.C.,
500 B.C., 0 A.D., 500 A.D., 1000 A.D., and 1200-1500 A.D. ANDRE GUNDER FRANKZ,
THE CENTRAuTY OF CENTRAL ASiA 9-10 (1992). These waves of migration or inva-
sion involved civilizations such as the Hittite, the Hyksos, the Indo-Europeans,
the Phoenicians, the Arameans, the Dorians and possibly the Huns. Id. Military
leaders included Ghengis Khan and Timur. It is also believed that Central Asians
crossed the Bering Strait to settle the New World. Id. L.S. Stavrianos states that
"[t]he ancient, the classical, and the medieval periods of pre-1500 Eurasion history
... were heralded by major turning points primarily attributable to these nomadic
invasions." L.S. STAVRIANOS, THE WORLD TO 1500: A GLOBAL HIsTORY 7 (1970).
131 See RICHARD C. FOLTz, RELIGIONs OF THE SiLK ROAD: OVERLAND TRADE AND
CULTURAL EXCHANGE FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE FIFE1ENH CENTURY 56 (1999) (de-
scribing the effects of the Arab conquest); OLCOTr, supra note 128, at 5 (discussing
the Arabian conquest). Olcott notes that most Kazakhs did not embrace Islam
until the eleventh century, and even then they did so in a loose manner. OLcOrr,
supra note 128, at 18-19; see also AKINER, supra note 119, at 17 ("The religious world
of the Kazakh tribes was informed by two sets of beliefs: a substratum of animism
onto which was gradually grafted a veneer of Islam.").
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nomads organized largely by ruling Mongols, whose rule ended
with the victories of Timur.132 The indigenous Turkic people,
called Uzbeks, divided into two hordes: a nomadic horde to the
north (in what is now Kazakhstan) and a more sedentary group in
the south (in what is now Uzbekistan). The rivalry that developed
between the nomadic and sedentary hordes split the Uzbeks and
gave birth to the idea of a Kazakh people; hostilities with the
Uzbek Khanate coalesced the Kazakh nomads into one people and
lead to the formation of the Kazakh Khanate in the late 1400s.133
The Kazakh Khanate existed as a loose "political union" of nomads
from the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries. 34 At the end of the
eighteenth century, Russia began to acquire control of Kazakhstan.
The first stage of its acquisition involved absorption: Russia built
lines of fortresses in southward succession that resulted in huge
swaths of Kazakhstan coming under Russian control.135 The sec-
ond stage of Russia's acquisition involved military conquest. By
1864, Kazakhstan was no longer independent.136
132 See OLcorr, supra note 128, at 4-7. See generally BEATRICE FORBES MANZ,
THE RISE AND RULE OF TAMERLANE (1989) (providing a thorough discussion of
Timurlane).
133 See OLCOTT, supra note 128, at 7-9.
134 Id. at 9-10. By the sixteenth century, the nomadic clans and tribes that
made up the political union had coalesced into three organizational units usually
referred to as "Hordes." DEMKO, supra note 129, at 25; Akiner, supra note 120, at 9.
For a very brief history of Kazakhstan prior to the Russian invasion, see GAU ODA
TEALAKH, BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS AND AZERBAIJAN 41-42
(1992). In the eighteenth century, the three Hordes became virtually sovereign
Khanates of their own, although Kazakhs continued to think of themselves as one
people. OLCOTT, supra note 128, at 11. For an interesting discussion of the period,
see Alan Bodger, Change and Tradition in Eighteenth-Century Kazakhstan: The Dynas-
tic Factor, in CULTURAL CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN CENTRAL ASIA 344 (Shirin Aki-
ner ed., 1991). The import of this aspect of Kazakhstan's history is that the West-
em concept of nation-states never arose in Kazakhstan, nor did the consequent
political, bureaucratic, or cultural structures. See GLEASON, supra note 120, at 25-26
(discussing the multiple identities of persons in Central Asia); MARTHA BRILL
OLcOTr, CENTRAL ASIA'S NEW STATES: INDEPENDENCE, FOREIGN POLICY, AND
REGIONAL SECURITY 8 (1996) (stating that the concept of nation-states is not indige-
nous to Central Asia but also noting that it is a concept that now applies to the re-
gion).
135 See RICHARD A. PIERCE, RUSSIAN CENTRAL ASIA 1867-1917: A STUDY IN
COLONIAL RULE 18-21 (1960) (describing the envelopment of the Kazakh Steppe);
Seymour Becker, The Russian Conquest of Central Asia and Kazakhstan: Motives,
Methods, Consequences, in CENTRAL ASIA: ITS STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE AND FUTURE
PROSPECTS 21, 22 (Hafeez Malik ed., 1994) (same).
136 See H~lfne Carr~re d'Encausse, Systematic Conquest, 1865 to 1884, in
CENTRAL ASIA: 130 YEARS OF RUSSIAN DOMINANCE, A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 131,
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Even this thumbnail sketch of Kazakhstan's pre-Soviet history
shows the importance of that history on the modem Kazakh iden-
tity, distinguishing it from other cultures. Shirin Aldner states that
four factors, easily traced to pre-Soviet times, define the modem
Kazakh identity: connection to the land, nominal Islam, Turkic-
ness, and a nomadic heritage.137 Those who look for a foundation
for corrupt behavior also find much interest in this history. No-
madic life facilitates very fluid political institutions: if a family
dislikes a polity they simply move.13 s Lacking any coercive power,
leaders give gifts to entice followers.139 Some scholars consider gift
giving to be acceptable while other cultures consider it bribery.140
Indeed, after conducting an impressionistic study of gift giving
and bribery in Kazakhstan, Cynthia Wemer suggests that Ka-
zakhstani people would not support anticorruption legislation be-
cause it would infringe on their tradition of gift givingi 4' Nomadic
Kazakh culture also emphasized hospitality and etiquette. 42 Hos-
131 (Edward Allworth ed., 3d ed. 1994); Ralph S. Clem, The Frontier and Colonial-
ism in Russian and Soviet Central Asia, in GEoGRAPHIc PERspECrVEs ON SovIEr
CENTRAL ASIA, supra note 125, at 19, 28-33 (describing Russian conquest of Ka-
zakhstan).
137 AXINER, supra note 119, at 64-68.
13 See GLEASON, supra note 120, at 6 (noting that in Kazakhstan those dissatis-
fied with a ruler could "simply wander] off'. The rise to power of Ghengis
Khan was replete with, and in many ways was only accomplished through, the
numerous defections to and from the various nomadic groups across the steppes.
See THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE MONGOLS (Francis Woodman Cleaves ed. & trans.,
1982).
139 AniNER, supra note 119, at 16.
140 See Steven R. Salbu, Extraterritorial Restriction of Bribery: A Premature Evoca-
tion of the Normative Global Village, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 223, 234 (1999) (suggesting
that the gift giving behavior of many cultures would be considered bribery in
Western cultures); P. Steidlmeier, Gift Giving, Bribery and Corruption: Ethical Man-
agement of Business Relationships in China, 20 J. Bus. ETHICS 121, 124 (1999) (sug-
gesting that there is little difference between gift giving and bribery in China).
141 See Cynthia Werner, Gifts, Bribes, and Development in Post-Soviet Kazakslan,
59 HuiM. ORG. 11, 20 (2000). Werner, an anthropologist, conducted "haphazard"
interviews in the southeastern (Shymkent to Almaty) region of Kazakhstan. Id. at
16. Her descriptions of the form and structure of bribery in Kazakhstan are
uniquely invaluable to anyone studying corruption in Kazakhstan. This particu-
lar conclusion, however, is not borne out by the quantitative data from the whole
country as reported in this Article.
142 See AKINER, supra note 119, at 19. Werner lists ten different gifts, each with
a different name, that are required on different social occasions. Werner, supra
note 141, at 13. Gleason notes that the nomadic tradition of hospitality is even
more pronounced among the desert nomads. GLEAsoN, supra note 120, at 6. In
either case, most persons who have traveled through Kazakhstan will tell of the
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pitality has also been linked by some scholars to an acceptance of
what others label corrupt behavior.143
Tsarist Russia principally desired control of Central Asia to se-
cure its borders and to act as a buffer against British expansion
from India; 44 Russia ruled Kazakhstan with a relatively light
hand.145 The Soviet period, however, forced a great deal of change,
and a great deal of hardship, onto the Kazakh people. The Soviets
set about to make all Central Asians, including the nomadic Ka-
zakhs, part of the family of Soviet man. 46 Shirin Akiner describes
three prongs to the Soviet effort. In the first prong, the Soviets ei-
ther reformed or created new social institutions. The Soviets reor-
ganized law and property ownership, reformed law, emancipated
women, mechanized and industrialized production, introduced
grace and genuine hospitality of the people, even when the hosts themselves have
little to offer.
143 See Salbu, supra note 140, at 237-38; Alan Smart, Gifts, Bribes and Guanxi: A
Reconsideration of Bourdieu's Social Capital, 8 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 388, 389-400
(1993).
144 See Edward Allworth, Encounter, in CENTRAL ASIA: 130 YEARS OF RUSSIAN
DOMINANCE, A HIsTORICAL OvERvIEw, supra note 136, at 1, 53-59 (stating that Rus-
sia's motives included Kazakhstan's fertile agricultural land, religious coloniza-
tion, control of trade, and the desire to create a buffer between Russia and British
India). Interestingly, Russia's desire to conquer Central Asia as a whole was exac-
erbated by disruptions to Europe's supply of raw cotton that were caused by the
U.S. Civil War. See d'Encausse, supra note 136, at 131.
145 See Mandelbaum, supra note 124, at 3. Kazakhs did not, however, embrace
Russian rule; in 1916 discontent exploded into violent rebellion. See OLcoTr, supra
note 128, at 100-01 (describing the atmosphere that climaxed in the 1916 uprising).
The immediate cause of the 1916 rebellion was the forced conscription of Central
Asian men to supplement the Russian army, which at that point was in danger of
losing the First World War. Id. at 119-20. The Bolshevik revolution in Russia,
therefore, was welcomed by the Kazakhs, who took the opportunity to create an
autonomous government. Within two years, however, the Bolsheviks had
brought Kazakhstan firmly within Soviet control, where it remained until the dis-
solution of the Soviet Union. Id. at 129.
146 See GLEASON, supra note 120, at 48-51 (describing national self-
determination and how the Soviets applied it to Central Asia). Central Asia pre-
sented the Bolsheviks with a problem in that it was not composed of nation-states
that could simply be transformed into "socialist states." Id. at 48-49. Ironically,
the polities eventually created by the Soviets in Central Asia had little to do with
Central Asia itself and more to do with power struggles in Moscow. See Stephen
Blank, Soviet Reconquest of Central Asia, in CENTRAL ASIA: ITS STRATEGIC
IMPORTANCE AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 39, 55 (Hafeez Malik ed., 1994) (stating that
although "Stalin claimed that the delimitation made real nations and states feasi-
ble for the first time," the borders did not make cultural sense); Paul A. Goble,
Stalin Draws the Borders, CENT. ASIAN MONITOR, No. 2 1995, at 12, 12-13 (arguing
that Stalin drew the borders for the purpose of maintaining his own power).
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health care and mass education, formed the trappings of a national
identity, and created a vast bureaucracy.1 47 Secondly, the Soviets
collectivized and sedentarized the nomadic Kazakhs. The conse-
quences of this prong, in conjunction with Stalin's union-wide
purges of intelligentsia, cannot be overstated.
The cost of the collectivization campaign in terms of human
and animal losses was calamitous: out of a Kazakh popu-
lation of approximately 4,120,000 in 1930, some 1,750,000
had died from starvation, epidemics and executions by
1939 -over 40 per cent of the entire population (this is in
addition to deaths from natural causes); 200,000 fled into
neighboring countries and remained there (another 400,000
fled, but later returned) and 453,000 took refuge in neigh-
boring Soviet republics, also to remain there perma-
nently .... The livestock losses were equally shocking: out
of 6.5 million head of cattle in 1928, less than one million
were left in 1932; the numbers of sheep fell from 18.5 mil-
lion to 1.5 million during this same period; of horses from
3.5 million to well under half a million; and of camels from
one million to 63,000 (in 1935).148
The wiping out of the nomadic people and culture was soon
followed by the third prong, the "Virgin Lands" program, in which
tens of millions of hectares of steppe land-the traditional grazing
lands of the nomads -were cultivated and tens of thousands of
Europeans were brought into Kazakhstan to operate the farms.1 49
One result was that Kazakhstan became the only Central Asian
147 AKINER, supra note 119, at 4043.
148 Id. at 45-46. To place the death of forty percent of the Kazakh population
in perspective, the Khmer Rouge's killing of twenty percent of the Cambodian
population in a five-year period is called "one of this century's worst genocides."
Irene Langran, Cambodia in 1999, ASIAN SURV., Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 25,26.
149 See Diu HIRO, BTWEEN MARX AND MUHAMMAD: THE CHANGINcG FACE OF
CENTRAL ASIA 106-07 (1995) (describing the Virgin Land program and the influx of
European workers). Ingvar Svanberg states that "[diuring the Stalinist years of
the 1930s, [the Kazakhs] were almost annihilated; but the crushing final disinte-
gration of traditional Kazak[h] culture was undoubtedly wrought by Krushchev's
Virgin Soil Scheme of the 1950s." Svanberg, supra note 124, at3.
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country in which the nominal ethnic group does not constitute an
absolute majority of the population( °
Despite the privation inflicted on Kazakhstan by Soviet rule,
Kazakhstan became perhaps the most thoroughly Sovietized of the
republics.151 The suppression of its nomadic past, the influx of
large numbers of non-ethnic citizens, unrelenting propaganda,
pride in the accomplishments made during Soviet rule, and other
factors worked in concert to produce the most conservative repub-
lic in the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics.'5 2 Indeed, the nation-
alism that swept through the other republics during the latter years
of the Soviet Union barely surfaced in Kazakhstan,153 and even
150 The estimated population of Kazakhstan as of July 2001, is 16,731,303, of
which 53.4% are ethnic Kazakh. Central Intelligence Agency Factbook, supra note
45. Ethnic Russians constitute 30% of the population, Ukrainians 3.7%, Uzbeks
2.5%, Germans 2.4%, Uighurs 1.4%, and others-which would include neighbor-
ing Kyrgyz -constitute 6.6%. See id. (reporting estimates from 1999). Ethnic Rus-
sians and other non-Asians live throughout the country but tend to be concen-
trated in the north; ethnic Germans, deported by Stalin during the second World
War, tend to be concentrated in the northeast. GLEASON, supra note 120, at 51-52.
Available data shows an upward trend in the percentage of ethnic Kazakhs and a
downward trend in the percentage of ethnic Russians since 1959. Robert J. Kaiser,
Nations and Homelands in Soviet Central Asia, in GEOGRAPHIc PERSPECTIVES ON
SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA, supra note 125, at 279, 291 tbl. 11.3 (1992).
151 Shirin Akiner finds that, for "unfathomable reasons," the genocide of the
Kazakhs in the 1930s and the Virgin Land program do not impinge directly on the
modem Kazakh identity. AKINER, supra note 119, at 63. She hypothesizes that
possible reasons include the facts that few survivors were left to keep memories
alive, that Soviet propaganda convinced the survivors that the episodes contrib-
uted to the creation of a strong and modem Kazakhstan, or even that the events
were too horrible to be comprehended by the Kazakhs. Id. In any case, the events
inflicted by the Soviets did not interfere with the creation of a Soviet identity.
152 See id. at 48-50 (describing the process and the results); HIRO, supra note
149, at 108 (noting that the old village structure was replaced with a new socialist
social structure). The Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic was the last republic to
leave the Soviet Union, eight days after Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine announced
the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the effective end
of the Soviet Union on December 8,1991. See HIRO, supra note 149, at 120-21.
153 That is not to say that nationalism did not arise in Kazakhstan. In par-
ticular, concerns over testing of nuclear weapons in the Semipalitinsk region lead
to the formation of the Semipalatinsk-Nevada movement, which had nationalistic
overtones. See GLEASON, supra note 120, at 56 (describing the formation of the
movement). Kazakh intellectuals and students also explored the idea of a Kazakh
identity. A pivotal event in the nationalist movement in Kazakhstan occurred in
December of 1986, when the Soviet Central Committee announced the replace-
ment of Dinmukhamed Kunayev, an ethnic Kazakh, with Gennady Kolbin, an
ethnic Russian, as First Party Secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan.
Over ten thousand people, mostly ethnic Kazakh students, demonstrated in Al-
maty to protest the replacement of an ethnic Kazakh by an ethnic Russian; several
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then it was partly used as part of a subtle ploy by Nursultan
Nazarbaev, the last president of the Kazakh Socialist Republic, to
wrest control of local matters from Mikhail Gorbachev, the last
president of the Soviet Union.)5 4 Thus, the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the consequent unexpected and unwanted independ-
ence have been traumatic for Kazakhstan. 55 In addition to the
need for again rebuilding most social institutions and for navigat-
ing an international community to which Kazakhstan has never be-
fore been exposed,5 6 Kazakhstan borders two very powerful
neighbors that each claim part of its territory, 5' it faces potential
demonstrators were killed or wounded by police. The event is considered a
turning point in the formation of a Kazakh identity among the ethnic Kazakh.
AKINER, supra note 119, at 55-56 (stating that the demonstration was a turning
point in the formation of a Kazakh identity); HIRO, supra note 149, at 113 (de-
scribing the demonstration as a watershed event in Kazakhstan's history). Inter-
estingly, Nursultan Nazarbaev, Kazakhstan's current president, worked against
Kunayev's interests at this time. Nazarbaev replaced Kolbin as First Secretary of
Kazakhstan. See GLEASON, supra note 120, at 56.
154 See MIKHAiL ALEXANDROV, UNEASY ALLIANcE: RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA
AND KAZAKHSrAN IN THE PosT-SovIET ERA, 1992-1997, at 1-55 (1999) (describing the
struggle between Gorbachev and Nazarbaev and the use of nationalism).
155 See AXINER, supra note 119, at 62 (noting that the collapse of the Soviet
Union called all assumptions of modem Kazakhstan into question); GLEASO.:, sU-
pra note 120, at 2-3 ("The collapse of the USSR and the coming of independence
swept through the lives of Central Asia's citizens" with the force of "powerful
storm winds ... aris[ing] suddenly and swiftly and sweep[ing] through the estab-
lished order, leaving everyday life forever rearranged... [I]ndividuals are left to
pick up their lives, to sort out the consequences on an individual level as best they
can."); OLcOTr, supra note 134, at 3-4 (describing the abruptness and difficulty of
independence and noting that "few states in the world have had as little advance
warning prior to independence as did the five new states of Central Asia").
156 The western concept of nationhood is not indigenous to Central Asia. See
DEmKO, supra note 129, at 26 ("Political organization of a nation-state type was not
common to the Kazakhs. Their organizational units were loosely defined and
usually lacking in authority except at the lowest levels."). In particular, the con-
cept of nationhood based on ethnicity or language is not indigenous to the region.
See Graham E. Fuller, The New Geopolitical Order, in THE NEW GEOFOLrncs OF
CENTRAL ASIA AND rrs BORDERLANDS 19, 20 (Ali Banuazizi & Myron Weiner eds.,
1994) ("For the Central Asian states the very concept of Uzbek, Turkoman, Ka-
zakh, Kyrgyz or Tajik as the basis of statehood was entirely new early, under
Leninist policies .... '. Not everyone believes that the imposition of western
concepts of nationhood are feasible in the region. See, e.g., Victor Ya. Porkhomov-
sky, Historical Origins of Interethnic Conflicts in Central Asia and Transcntcasia, in
CENTRAL ASIA AND TRANSC.AUCASIA: ETMNICITY AND CoWFucr 1, 16 (Vitaly V.
Naumikin ed., 1994) ("[Tihe 'eastern way' of formation of the state system differs
from the European one ... it is clear that a sharp transition from the 'Eastern' type
to 'European" cannot but cause ethnic tensions and conflicts.").
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ethnic unrest, 58 and its economic infrastructure is in shambles.'5 9
Nursultan Nazarbaev, now President of the Republic of Ka-
zakhstan, has guided Kazakhstan firmly through this traumatic pe-
riod, and in the process, amassed power to his person rather than
to his office.160
The Soviet and post-Soviet period obviously define modem
Kazakhstan and are of critical importance in distinguishing Ka-
zakhstan from the West. Those looking for evidence that corrup-
tion is accepted in Kazakhstan, however, will also find clues in this
history. The inadequacies of the Soviet system resulted in the
creation of an underground parallel economy in Kazakhstan,
which in turn used bribery to avoid persecution by state authori-
ties.161 Social networks and contacts became more important than
the state means of creating and enforcing relationships 62 and gift
157 Ironically, just as the physical geography of Kazakhstan played a critical
role in shaping the cultures that arose there, so too today does the political geog-
raphy play a determinative role in Kazakhstan's political life. The proximity of
Russia to the north and China to the east, both of whom claim land now held by
Kazakhstan, as well as its great distance from any potential European ally, impose
politically difficult demands on Kazakhstan and also place a premium on the per-
sonal relationships and skills of its President, Nursultan Nazarbaev. See HIRO, su-
pra note 149, at 106-29 (describing Kazakhstan's geographic dilemma and the de-
mands of China and Russia); OLcoTr, supra note 134, at 62-70 (discussing
Kazakhstan's geographic situation and stating that "Kazakhstan's survival as an
independent nation require[s] Russia's tolerance of Kazakh statehood.").
158 See OLcoTr, supra note 134, at 58 (noting that ethnic balancing in Ka-
zakhstan is almost impossible); see also infra note 214 (discussing ethic divisions in
Kazakhstan).
159 The development of Kazakhstan's economic infrastructure was severely
distorted by the skewed economic decision-making process of the Soviet Union,
by the artificial interconnectedness of the Soviet republics, and by the intentional
placing during Soviet times of massive industries far from both suppliers and
consumers. See POMFREr, supra note 122, at 36 (describing the distortion of Central
Asian economies during Soviet times).
160 See GLEASON, supra note 120, at 83-90 (noting the role of Nazarbaev in
modem Kazakhstan); HIRO, supra note 149, at 126 (stating that Nazarbaev has cre-
ated a cult of personality in Kazakhstan rather than a political office); OLCOIr, su-
pra note 134, at 83 (stating that Nazarbaev personally is more important than the
office of President).
161 See HIRO, supra note 149, at 110 (describing this process in Kazakhstan).
Richard Pomfret describes this phenomenon across all of Central Asia as the crea-
tion of a corrupt neo-feudal society beneath the official society. PoMFREr, supra
note 122, at 32-33.
162 See Odgaard & Simonsen, supra note 121, at 27-30 (describing the need
among Kazaskhstani during the Soviet times for strong social networks).
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giving assumed an especially prominent role1 63 Post-Soviet Ka-
zakhstan experiences turbulence, and power is vested in persons
rather than in the political process. Western scholars have identi-
fied each of these factors as contributing to corruption and some
scholars even suggest to an acceptance of corrupt behavior 64
Given one hundred and thirty years of domination by a Euro-
pean power, it may be tempting to consider Kazakhstan too west-
ernized to satisfy the criteria of distinction from Western culture as
set out in this Article. Such is not the case. Kazakhstan's cultural
context could scarcely be more different than that of the West: Ka-
zakhstan has a nomadic past, which was forcibly replaced by a
communist culture, which itself collapsed leaving an uncertain
present. These differences between Kazakhstan and the West have
been amplified by its many years of isolation. 65 As Michael Man-
delbaum notes:
Of all the parts of the former Soviet Union, Central Asia is
the one where the presence of Western institutions and val-
ues is the thinnest. It is the one most distant from the West
both geographically and culturally. The new states have no
experience of democracy and almost none with market
economies. All parts of the former Soviet Union-the Bal-
163 See Cynthia Ann Werner, The Dynamics of Feasting and Gift Exchange in Ru-
ral Kazakstan, in CONTiEpORARY KAZAiS: CULTURAL AND SOCIAL PER PEcIVES, su-
pra note 121, at 47,49.
164 Keith Henderson attributes corruption in modem Kazakhstan to these
factors. Keith E. Henderson, Halfway Home and a Long Way to Go: Russian and Ka-
zakh Roads to Sectoral and Political Corruption, 8 DENOKATiZATSiYA 481, 489-94
(2000). Even one Russian scholar draws a connection between these factors and
acceptance of corruption with respect to Kazakhstan. See ALE(mDROV, supra note
154, at 5-8 (suggesting that during the Soviet times corrupt behavior became the
norm in Kazakhstan).
165 At one time Central Asia played a significant role in the world; until trade
by sea became predominant, Central Asia contained the major route for trade
between East Asia and Europe, and also encompassed major routes for trade
among Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia. See Beatrice F. Manz, Historic
Background, in CENTRAL ASIA IN HISTORICAL PEFSPECrIVE 4,4 (Beatrice F. Manz ed.,
1994) (Central Asia was "an important urban and agricultural center and a nexus
for long distance trade. The main east-west trade route, the Silk Road, here inter-
sected the northern and southern routes connecting the Middle East to India and
to the northern forest-steppe region!). Transport by ship brought an end to land
commerce across Central Asia; geography and then Soviet politics combined to
isolate Central Asia from the rest of the world. See Svanberg, supra note 124, at 3
(describing that isolation).
2001]
47
Nichols: The Fit between Changes to the International Corruption Regime an
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
tic, the Slavic states, the Caucasus, and Central Asia-have
embarked, at least according to the rhetoric of those who
now govern them, on the path to Western political and eco-
nomic practices. Central Asia is the region for which that
path will be longest and hardest.1 66
In short, Kazakhstani culture and institutions differ markedly
from those in the West. Moreover, the history and present condi-
tions of Kazakhstan would lead some scholars to suggest that cor-
ruption may be accepted in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan, therefore, is
a promising country from which to gather empirical information
regarding indigenous attitudes toward corruption.
3.1.2. Kazakhi Law
The cultural distinctiveness of Kazakhstan exists with respect
to law as well. As mentioned earlier, Islam did not establish deep
roots among the nomadic Kazakhs.167 Thus, while traces of the
fiqh and Shari'a of Islam'68 can be found in indigenous Kazakh
law, Islam does not constitute a significant part of Kazakhstan's le-
gal heritage.169 Mongol law, on the other hand, had a tremendous
influence on Kazakhi law. Valentin Riasanovsky, who has under-
taken comparative analyses of all of the major indigenous laws of
Central Asia and Siberia, has found several portions of Kazakh law
that were taken directly from the Great Yasa (law) of the Mon-
gols,170 and has also illuminated other portions of Kazakh law on
166 Mandelbaum, supra note 124, at 5. Akiner also stresses that despite super-
ficial similarities "[t]he political culture of Central Asia is very different from that
of the West" Akiner, supra note 124, at 18.
167 See OLCOTr, supra note 128, at 19 (notig that "the pastoral nomads (the Ka-
zakh masses and most of the Kazakh nobility) had only the sketchiest knowledge
of Muslim tenets and practices").
168 Martha Brill Olcott argues that by the end of the seventeenth century Ka-
zakh law evidenced some influence by the Shari'a. Id. at 19.
169 See HIRO, supra note 149, at 109 (noting that in modem Kazakhstan in-
digenous law plays a much greater role than the Shari'a).
170 For brief discussions of the Yasa and other customary law of the Mongols,
see Saul Levmore, Rethinking Comparative Law: Variety and Uniformity in Ancient
and Modem Tort Law, 61 TuL. L. REv. 235, 280-85 (1986); Saul Levmore, Waiting for
Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution and Incentive Structure of the Law of Affirmative Ob-
ligations, 72 VA. L. REV. 879, 924-28 (1986).
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which the Yasa had a significant effect 71 The other major source
of law was Kazakh custom.172
The most complete surviving record of Kazakh law is the Jhety
Jharga -a compilation of laws ordered by Khan Tauke in the 1600s.
The Jhety Jharga was kept and transmitted orally until the 1820s,
when Mikhail Speransky recorded it as part of the Russian effort to
promulgate laws in the conquered regions of Central Asia.173
Khan Tauke's code is fairly short-shorter even than the Code
of Hammurabi, which predates Khan Tauke's code by several
thousand years 4  The bulk of the rules govern behavior that
could be considered criminal or immoral, such as murder, regicide,
incest, suicide, theft and insulting one's parents. The Code con-
tains several hints that it was not intended to supplant relation-
ships among families or communities. For example, "[i]ncest is
punishable by death; this is substituted by the sentence of the fam-
fly, since such crimes cannot be submitted for the consideration of
outsiders." 75 A woman who killed her husband was to be put to
death unless the relatives of her husband forgave her 76 A son
who insulted his parents was seated on a black cow and beaten by
171 See VALENTIN A. RIAsANovsKY, CUSTOMARY LAW OF THE NOMADIC TRIBES OF
SIBERIA 21-24 (1965) (discussing Mongol influence on Kazakh law). Among other
indicia are the great number of crimes punishable by death and the payment of
fines in nines of cattle, horses, sheep, or camels. The penalty for adultery was al-
most identical to that contained in the Great Yasa-a husband who caught his
wife committing adultery was allowed to kill his wife on the spot-which was
unlike the penalty contained in the other Central Asian laws. Id. In fact, Raisa-
novsky opines that indigenous Kazakh law was more similar to Mongol law than
any other law in the region. Id. at 21. Moreover, Kazakh law retained the severe
nature of the Mongol law it experienced before its independence, and "did not
come under... the later tendency of [Mongol] law to become milder." Id. at 21.
172 See id. at 20-21 (describing influence of Kazakh custom on indigenous Ka-
zakh law). Some of the more macabre evidences of custom were the means of car-
rying out death penalties, which included trampling by horses and freezing to
death in water. Id. at 20.
173 OLcoTr, supra note 128, at15.
174 The Code of Hammurabi was promulgated in Babylon in around 2250
B.C. See THE CODE oFHAi,%vMRABI (Robert Francis Harper trans., 1904).
17 Khan Tauke's Code art. 12.
176 Khan Tauke's Code art. 4. In the non-community-oriented laws of the
West, forgiveness by the relatives of a victim is meaningless. Interestingly, in
Khan Tauke's code, a husband who killed his wife could pay a fine to avoid
death-an option that was not available to wives who killed their husbands. Sce
Khan Tauke's Code art. 4 (husband can escape death penalty by paying 100
horses, 2 servants, 2 camels and 2 suits of armor to his wife's family).
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members of the community.177 A daughter who insulted her par-
ents faced a potentially more hazardous punishment: she was
bound and delivered to her mother for her mother to punish as the
mother saw fit.178 Nothing within the surviving sections of the
Jhety Jarga deals with issues of corruption or bribery.
The Russian scholars who followed Speransky also collected
and memorialized other traditional laws, which included some
commercial laws. These laws also do not deal with corruption or
bribery.
In short, indigenous Kazakh law is primarily concerned with
community and social order. The law reflects the importance to
Kazakh culture of the centrality of family and community. The
vitality of indigenous law is best evidenced by failed Soviet at-
tempts to eradicate its use. In 1928, the Supreme Soviet of the So-
viet Union ratified the Decree about the struggle against crimes
based on customs. 7 9 The Decree prohibited many of the practices
that were required or provided for in Kazakh law. In Kazakhstan,
there were so many violations of the Decree that the Soviets had to
set up special courts that dealt only with violations of the Decree.180
These special courts continued to be active well into the 1960s.
3.2. Most Respondents Have Experience With Corruption
Kazakhstan is distinct. Most Kazakhstani have experience with
corruption. At least two sources support this observation. The
first is Kazakhstan's place in Transparency International's Corrup-
tion Perception Index. The Corruption Perception Index ranks
countries in terms of the perceived amount of corruption that ex-
ists in that country. In the 2001 index, which compared ninety
countries, Kazakhstan ranked seventy-first.18  Moreover, Ka-
177 Khan Tauke's Code art 16.
178 Id.
17 THOMAS G. WINNER, THE ORAL ART AND LITERATURE OF THE KAZAKHS or
RUSSIAN CENTRAL ASIA 137-38 (1958). The Decree was submitted in 1924 but not
ratified for four years.
180 See id. at 138.
181 Transparency International, supra note 118. The Corruption Perception
Index is explained at great length by its creator in Johann Graf Lambsdorff, Cor-
ruption in Comparative Perception, in ECONOMICS OF CORRUPTION, supra note 1, at 81,
87-97.
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zakhstan scored 2.7 out of a possible 10, with 10 representing no
corruption and zero representing absolute corruption.j62
The other source indicating that most Kazakhstani have experi-
ence with corruption is the survey discussed in this Article. The
survey did not directly ask respondents if they have paid bribes. 83
Instead, the survey asked general questions about the necessity of
bribefy in general. One question asked whether respondents
agreed with the statement: "bribery is the practical necessity for
quick resolution of business issues." A great majority of respon-
dents responded to this question in the affirmative; over seventy-
three percent feel that bribery is necessary to resolve a business is-
sue. Clearly, at least with respect to business matters, people who
live in Kazakhstan feel that bribery is part of the environment.
Do you agree with the statement that bribenj is the practical necessity
for quick resolution of business issues?
Freg. Percent
Absolutely agree 232 33%
Agree 283 40.5
Don't agree 146 21
Absolutely not 39 5.5
Total 700 100%
Respondents also believe that bribery is necessary to resolve
political issues. In this case, however, such a large number of re-
spondents (17%) indicate that they are not sure that the percentage
182 Transparency International, supra note 118. Transparency International's
evaluation of Kazakhstan is borne out by the anecdotal reports from Werner and
Henderson. Werner reports that most of the Kazahhstani people she spoke with
were familiar with bribery in Kazakhstan. Werner, supra note 141, at 16. Werner
is able to report, for example, on standardized prices for certain types of bribes.
See id. at 18 (reporting that a forged document stating that a man was exempted
from military duty costs U.S. $500 and a forged document stating that a man
served military duty costs U.S. $1,500). Henderson tells a darker story, describing
corruption as endemic in Kazakhstan. Henderson, supra note 164, at 494-96.
183 The questionnaire did not ask whether the respondent had paid bribes
due to concerns that directly examining respondents, behaviors would elicit de-
fensive reactions and responses. See ROBERT M. GROVES & MIRK P. COuPER,
NONRESPONSE IN HOUSEHOLD INTERVIEW SURVEYS 224-25 (1993) (stating that an in-
terviewer's perceived intentions may affect the likelihood of response). In conver-
sations, Kazakhstani generally state that they have paid bribes.
20011
51
Nichols: The Fit between Changes to the International Corruption Regime an
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
that agrees with the statement "bribery is the practical necessity for
quick resolution of political issues" does not quite constitute an ab-
solute majority. Nonetheless, of those with an opinion the majority
(49%) agree while fewer (34%) disagree.
Do you agree with the statement that bribery is the practical necessity
for quick resolution of political issues?
Freg. Percent
Absolutely agree 96 14%
Agree 248 35
Don't agree 185 26
Absolutely not 55 8
Not sure 116 17
Total 700 100%
The differences between these two sets of responses indicate a
more subtle attitude toward corruption in Kazakhstan than simply
a feeling that corruption exists. Two aspects of the second set of
responses are noteworthy. First, more respondents (73.5%) believe
that bribery is necessary when business interacts with government
than when politicians interact with each other (in which case 49%
believe bribery necessary). Clearly, Kazakhstani differentiate be-
tween the two types of interactions.184 Second, a large number of
respondents (17%) are unsure with respect to political issues. This
group of respondents very much highlights the lack of participa-
tion by Kazakhstani in the political process in Kazakhstan.1 85 The
large number also indicates a willingness among respondents to
admit to a lack of knowledge rather than fabricating answers sim-
ply to please the questioner.
Kazakhstan clearly satisfies the criteria for a fruitful place in
which to study attitudes toward and perceptions of corruption:
Kazakhstan is culturally distinct from and is relatively isolated
184 While this may seem obvious in retrospect, the differentiation seems to
have escaped much of the legal commentary, which speaks only of corruption in
general rather than parsing corruption with respect to different sorts of interac-
tions. Of course, some legal literature does differentiate between different types
of corruption. See, e.g., Dakolias & Thachuk, supra note 36, at 353 (concentrating
on corruption in the judiciary).
185 See OLCorr, supra note 134, at 84 (noting President Nazarbaev's domestic
policies that limit the development of Western style democratic institutions).
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from the West, and the amount of corruption that appears to occur
in Kazakhstan is not trivial. One method of ascertaining indige-
nous attitudes is through a quantitative survey.
4. THE SURVEY
This survey was comprised of seventy-six questionsEs divided
into eight parts.8 7  An English translation of the survey is ap-
pended to this Artide.SS
186 There is a real and legitimate question, which the Author acknowledges,
as to whether non-standardized interviews would have yielded a more meaning-
ful understanding of Kazakhstani attitudes about corruption. Se generally Paul
Beatty, Understanding the Standardized/Non-Standardized Interviewing Controrwrsy,
11 J. OF CIAL STAT. 147, 147-60 (1995) (describing and contrasting the standard-
ized survey technique with nonstandardized interviews). Corruption is a par-
ticularly complex issue; anthropologist Clifford Geertz argues persuasively for
non-standardized interviews (ethnography, in anthropological terms):
[E]thnography is thick description. What the ethnographer is in fact
faced with-except when I he is pursuing the more automatized rou-
tines of data collection-is a multiplicity of complex conceptual struc-
tures, many of them superimposed upon or knotted into one another,
which are at once strange, irregular, and inexplicit, and which he must
contrive somehow first to grasp and then to render.
Clifford Geertz, Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive 7heory of Culture, in THE
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES: SELECTED ESSAYS 3, 9-10 (1973).
Surveys in emerging economies present daunting logistical problems. 5c,
SIEGFRIED PAUSEWANG, METHODS AND CONCEPTS OF SOCIAL RESEARCH IN A RuRAL
DEVELOPING SOCIETY 106 (1973) (discussing the difficulty of administering a survey
in a developing country). Moreover, when few surveys have been administered
in a country, the survey designer-particularly if Western-cannot rely on types
of questions or models of surveys that have been tested in previous surveys. S-e
Mark A. Tessler, Measuring Abstract Concepts in Tunisia, in SURVEY REsEARCH I
AFRICA: ITS APPUCATIONS AND LIITs 141, 141-42 (William M. O'Barr et al. eds.,
1973) (discussing difficulty of designing a survey in areas where not many sur-
veys have been administered and models have not been tested). Indeed, the
Author of this study has preferred the nonstandardized interview methodology in
other studies of attitudes toward and use of law in Kazakhstan. Se Nichols, siupra
note 41, at 1263-64 (describing methodology).
The Author acknowledges these and other issues regarding surveys. This
Article is no place for a defense of surveys; for general discussions of the benefits
of surveys see ROGER SAPSFORD, SURVEY RESEARCH 1-10 (1999); Beatty, supra. Nor
is this survey offered as a definitive explanation of all things concerned with cor-
ruption; instead it is intended to provide critical empirical insights from a usually
ignored perspective into a very important global issue. 5ce PAUL S. LEvY &
STANLEY LEMESHOW, SAMPLING OF POPULATIONS: MMEHODS AND APPLICATIONS 3 (2d
ed. 1991) (stating that surveys are "'snapshots' of a population at a singlepoint in
time" and that they describe rather than explain). Moreover, even those who ad-
vocate the use of anthropological approaches in social research acknowledge that
in some circumstances, such as cross-population studies, the survey method is
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The survey was conducted in Kazakhstan in April and May of
1998. The survey was administered by Sange Research 89 in both
rural and urban locations 90 in every area of Kazakhstan.191 Seven
hundred and one surveys were completed. In addition, the author
of this paper conducted interviews throughout Kazakhstan.192
more accurate than the nonstandardized interview. See Eleanor R. Gerber, The
View From Anthropology: Ethnography and the Cognitive Interview, in COGNITION AND
SURVEY RESEARCH 217,219 (Monroe G. Sirken et al. eds., 1999) (stating that ethnog-
raphy is not always as accurate as survey); see also LEVY & LEMESHOW, supra, at 1
(noting that a large scale survey is more feasible than large scale ethnography);
SAPSFORD, supra, at 5 (noting that surveys have the advantage of asking precisely
the question that the researcher wants answered over an entire population).
'B7 The eight parts are labeled: 1) General Type Problems, 2) Questions Re-
garding Government Corruption in the Business Sphere, 3) In Your Opinion,
Which of The Following May or May Not Harm the Society in General, 4) Give
Your Opinion About the Following Statements, 5) Questions About Changes in
Legislation, 6) Questions About the System of State Management, 7) Giver Short
Answers to the Following, and 8) General Information. The awkwardness and
apparent leading nature of some of these headings is due to the translation from
Russian.
188 See infra app. I. The Russian version is on file with the Author.
189 Sange is a Kazakhstani group headquartered in Almaty. A local company
was used because they far better understand the local context than does the
Author or any Western survey company and also because they had access to and
representatives in every area of Kazakhstan. See Michael F. Schober, Making Sense
of Questions: An Interactional Approach, in COGNITION AND SURVEY RESEARCH, stipra
note 186, at 77, 90 (stating that respondents need to make sense of questions and
will put them into a context). Sange was chosen from approximately one dozen
possible groups based on the recommendations of Kazakhstani scholars, Western
advisors, and companies that had worked in Kazakhstan. Sange's clients include
large Western consumer product companies that need to understand consumer
preferences and attitudes in Kazakhstan.
190 See Thomas S. Weisner, Studying Rural-Urban Ties: A Matched Network
Sample from Kenya, in SURVEY RESEARCH IN AFRICA: ITS APPLICATIONS AND LIMITS,
supra note 186, at 122, 122-23 (emphasizing the importance of including rural re-
spondents in surveys in developing countries).
191 Kazakhstan is administratively divided into fourteen units (called oblystar,
singular oblysy), and three cities. See Central Intelligence Agency Factbook, supra
note 45 (listing the administrative units of Kazakhstan as the cities of Almaty,
Astana, and Bayqongyr, and the oblystar of Almaty, Aqmola, Aqtobe, Atyrau,
Batys Qazaqstan, Mangghystau, Ongtustik, Qazaqstan, Pavlodar, Qaraghandy,
Qostanay, Qyzylorda, Shyghys Qazaqstan, Soltustik Qazaqstan, and Zhambyl).
The data used in this survey, however, is divided by geographic area rather than
by administrative oblysy.
192 See PAUSEWANG, supra note 186, at 108-10 (suggesting that ethnographic
supplements are very useful in conjunction with surveys in developing countries);
Gerber, supra note 186, at 218 (suggesting that with most surveys nonstandardized
interviews provide valuable complements).
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The questions in the survey were modeled on a survey con-
ducted in Sierra Leone by Sahr John Kpundeh in 199293 Eventu-
ally this will allow for comparisons between the two studies: that
comparison, however, is not undertaken in this Article. The ques-
tions were modified to fit conditions in Kazakhstan, and some
questions were added. In order to mitigate bias, a variety of ques-
tion forms were used (asking for agreement or disagreement, ask-
ing for opinion, and so forth) and questions were asked in the af-
firmative and in the negative. Sange Research translated the
questions into Russian and also changed some questions, either so
that they made sense in Russian or so that they fit conditions in
Kazakhstan.194 The Russian version was translated back into Eng-
lish for the use of this paper.195
5. THE FINDINGS: INDIGENOUS ATTTUDES TOWARD
CORRUPTION IN KAZAKHSTAN
Robert Mattes and Cherrel Africa suggest that attitudes toward
corruption can be divided into four categories: an absolute
evaluation of corruption (that is, do people think corruption is
good or bad), a relative regime evaluation (that is, do people think
that there is more or less corruption now than in the past), the
public salience of corruption (that is, is corruption a meaningful
problem compared to other societal issues), and support for anti-
corruption efforts (that is, are people willing to support efforts to
decrease corruption).196 This Article uses Mattes and Africa's
scheme for parsing the results of the survey in Kazakhstan.
5.1. Absolute Evaluation of Corruption
In absolute terms, Kazakhstani perceive a great deal of bribery
in their country. Eighty-three percent of the respondents agree
193 SAHR JOHN KPUNDEH, POTICS AND CORRUPTION IN AFRiCA: A CASE STUDY
oF SiERRALEoNE 101,108-14 (1995).
194 Sange's contribution in this respect was critical and should make the re-
sponses more meaningful. Numerous studies have shown that the words that are
used in a survey affect the respondent's abilities to answer questions. RCGIR
TOURANGEAU Er AL., THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SuRvEY REFONSE 59-60 (2000) (discussing
the importance of the words in a survey). Sange's local knowledge helped make
the survey more accessible to respondents.
19 See infra app. I. The resulting English translation seems somewhat awk-
ward in places but is closer to what respondents saw.
19% Mattes & Africa, supra note 9, at 1-5.
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with the statement that the majority of government officials take
bribes.
Give your opinion about the following: The majorihy of government
officials accept bribes.
Freg. Percent
Completely Agree 211 30%
Agree 372 53
Don't Agree 107 15
Absolutely Don't Agree 10 1
otal 700 100%
Throughout Kazakhstan, the issue of bribery arose repeatedly
in interviews. Businesspeople referred to bribery as a requisite for
virtually any action that required government approval. Other
people spoke of bribery in more general term-as a part of obtain-
ing housing, interacting with courts, acquiring diplomas or other
credentials, or obtaining documents. 97 Some businesspersons had
strategies for dealing with bribe requests, although most found it
more expedient to pay the bribe and then complain bitterly among
themselves.19 Persons outside of business also had strategies for
dealing with bribe requests, such as simply waiting out the bu-
reaucrat, dealing with family or other relations in government po-
sitions, or using unofficial alternatives to the bureaucracy. 199
197 According to most students with whom the Author spoke, the going rate
for a passing grade in a university class is U.S. $100. The Author spoke with
many academics who stated that they did not sell grades but acknowledged the
practice as widespread.
193 Thomas Donaldson observed the same phenomenon in India; when he
engaged in extensive discussions of bribery with Indian businesspersons in India
he found that while most admitted to having paid bribes, all expressed outrage
and disgust at the practice. DONALDSON & DUNFEE, supra note 52, at 226.
199 Precedents exist for disengagement from state institutions when those in-
stitutions are corrupt. In response to the corruption of the Tsarist and Bolshevik
police and judiciary, for example, Russian peasant mir sought justice in their own
samosud and avoided the official court system. Mark Galeotti, Criminal Russia: the
Traditions Behind the Headlines, 44 HIST. TODAY, Aug. 1994, at 12. The Author has
spoken to many persons in Russia and Kazakhstan who presently use alternative
forums for dispute resolution, including ethnic organizations sometimes referred
to as mafia.
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The fact that 83% of respondents agree that most government
officials in Kazakhstan accept bribes should be of concern to those
interested in a stable Kazakhstan. Most development theorists
consider the perception of corruption to be a cause of instability.,
Interestingly, however, while several of the persons interviewed
found their government to be less than fully legitimate, very few
suggested that an alternative government should be implemented.
A majority of respondents also believe that judges accept
bribes. This question was written in the negative as part of the
survey strategy to mix question types. Fifty-five percent of the re-
spondents believe that judges accept bribes, as opposed to only
15% who believe that they do not. In interviews, it appeared that
the smaller majority as well as the 30% who are not sure results
from a lack of connection and interaction with the judiciary.
Do you agree with the statenment that judges accept bribes seldonly?
Freg. Percent
Absolutely agree 26 4%
Agree 74 11
Don't agree 288 41
Absolutely not 101 1
Not sure 212 30
Total 701 100%
These responses also should give concern to those interested in
a stable Kazakhstan. As Susan Rose-Ackerman points out, "A ba-
sic condition for corruption control is a viable legal framework that
enforces the law without political favoritism or arbitrariness."M1
Clearly, many of the respondents do not agree that that require-
ment is met Indeed, in interviews, many Kazakhstani were dis-
missive of the courts although some expressed sympathy for an
underpaid and undertrained system.
With respect to a simple comparison of government and busi-
ness, most people believe that government officials are more cor-
rupt than are businesspeople. Sixty-seven percent of respon-
200 See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing structural and social
instability caused by corruption).
201 Susan Rose-Ackerman, The Role of lte World Bank in Controlling Corruption,
29 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 93,106 (1997).
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dents -more than two-thirds -agree that dishonesty is more wide-
spread in politics than in business.
Give your opinion about the following: Dishonesty is more wide-
spread in politics than in the business sphere.
Freq. Percent
Completely Agree 139 20%
Agree 330 4
Don't Agree 217 31
Absolutely Don't Agree 13
Total 699 100%
The perception of the businessperson in Kazakhstan (as in any
of the more remote former republics) is complex and worthy of its
own study. This Article is not the place for such a study. Briefly,
perceptions of businesspersons are sometimes contradictory be-
cause of the symbolic role that the businessperson held during the
Cold War. The Soviet system characterized businesspersons as
ruthless, self-centered, and exploitative. The market system, which
rhetorically has replaced the socialist system, lionizes the busi-
nessperson for many of the same reasons. "Cowboy capitalism"
has indeed produced some miscreants, but the vast majority of
persons in Kazakhstan who would be identified as businessper-
sons are honest and straightforward in their dealings.202 The result
of these conflicting images of businesspersons is a connotation as-
sociated with the term "businessperson" that sometimes eludes
Westerners. Even given this contradictory image of businessper-
sons, however, Kazakhstani perceive businesspersons to be less
corrupt than politicians.
In terms of an absolute evaluation of corruption, Kazakhstani
find their government to be corrupt. Kazakhstani overwhelmingly
believe that both the political government and the judiciary are
corrupt. Moreover, Kazakhstani also tend to perceive politics as
more corrupt than business.
202 See POMFRET, supra note 122, at 76 (describing the "wild west" nature of
Kazakhstan's economy).
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5.2. Relative Regime Evaluation
Only one question asked about relative levels of corruption
(other questions asked about changes in other conditions in Ka-
zakhstan). As part of the strategy of mixing question types to
mitigate bias, this question appears in the negative. Nonetheless,
at a minimum, the responses show that people believe-over-
whelmingly-that levels of corruption have not changed. Only
8.5% of the respondents agree that corruption has declined in Ka-
zakhstan.
Give your opinion about the following: CorrLption in this country
has significantly declined.
Freg. Percent
Completely Agree 10 1.5%
Agree 48 7
Don't Agree 415 59
bsolutely Don't Agree 227 32.5
total 700 100%
In interviews, many Kazakhstani indicated their belief that cor-
ruption has actually increased in the last decade. Several persons
suggested that a combination of privatization and the collapse of
the basic economic infrastructure had allowed organized crime to
insinuate itself into government (an observation that was made
throughout Kazakhstan). Others responded that the exploitation
of the Tengiz oilfields during the last few years of the Soviet period
and the accompanying inflow of large amounts of hard currency
had conditioned top officials to bribe seeking and that as economic
conditions deteriorated lower-level officials emulated upper-level
officials. A minority of ethnic Russians castigated ethnic Kazakhs
in government positions. It should be noted that a sizeable per-
centage indicated that corruption was present during the Soviet
times, although a number of those persons indicated that corrup-
tion was more manageable during that period.
5.3. Public Salience of Corruption
When asked to choose from a list of problems facing Ka-
zakhstan, respondents do not in the aggregate choose corruption as
the most significant problem the country faces. Given the severity
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of Kazakhstan's situation, this result should not be a surprise. Ka-
zakhstan's economy, which was a fairly artificial Soviet construct
to begin with, was severely disrupted by the abrupt disconnection
from the former Soviet Union.203 Anyone who has traveled
throughout Kazakhstan has heard hundreds of stories from dozens
of professionals -doctors, surgeons, professors, clerks -who have
not been paid in months or years.204 Nonetheless, even though cor-
ruption is not considered the worst problem facing Kazakhstan, it
is still considered a very serious problem facing the country. Cor-
ruption and organized crime virtually tie as the second most
pressing problems.
203 Ali Banuazizi & Myron Weiner, Introduction, in THE NEW GEOPOLITICS OF
CENTRAL ASIA AND ITS BORDERLANDS 1, 7 (Ali Banuazizi & Myron Weiner eds.,
1994).
The economies of these states were made into adjuncts of the Soviet
economy. Primarily producers of raw materials for the Russians, these
economies were warped by Soviet domination, cut off from opportuni-
ties for independent development, and unable to engage in free trade
with their immediate neighbours or others beyond the Soviet borders.
Id.
As one Kazakh politician notes: "'Now we look for those huge warehouses,
previously closed even to the Kazakhs themselves, and wonder what they were
for?'" TEALAKH, supra note 134, at 59 (quoting an unnamed politician). Numerical
figures from the former Soviet republics are notoriously unreliable, but for an ex-
cellent description of the conditions of the Kazakhstani economy, see POMFRET,
supra note 122, at 75-97.
204 See OLCorr, supra note 134, at 67 (discussing wage arrears in Kazakhstan).
Karen Odgaard and Jens Simonsen examine the impact that this has had on aca-
demics and note that those who should now be at the peak of their earning po-
tential are the hardest hit, the younger scholars can implement other earning
strategies (such as leaving academia) and the older scholars are venerated as a
source of accurate information on pre-Soviet Kazakh culture. Odgaard & Simon-
sen, supra note 121, at 37-40. This problem and the problem of unpaid backwages
are not, of course, unique to Kazakhstan.
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Which social problem do you believe is the most important?
Freg. Percent
Ethnical diversity of the population 51 7.25%
Corruption 102 14.50
Control over economy by foreign
organizations and investors 74 10.50
Frequent government reshuffles 44 6.25
Economic decline 356 51.00
Organized Crime 74 10.50
Total 701 100%
Which social problem do you believe is the second most important?
Freq. Percent
Ethnical diversity of the population 33 4.75%
Corruption 144 20.50
Control over economy by foreign
organizations and investors 93 13.25
Frequent government reshuffles 64 9.25
Economic decline 185 26.50
Organized Crime 180 25.75
Total 699 100%
Even though corruption may not be considered the single most
serious issue in Kazakhstan, almost all of the respondents feel that
corruption harms Kazakhstan. Indeed, the answers to this ques-
tion are quite dramatic. In terms of harm, when simply asked if
corruption is harmful, 93% of the people asked believe that cor-
ruption harms Kazakhstan; 64% believe that corruption does a lot
of harm.
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HoW does bribery harm Kazakhstan?
Freg. Percent
A lot of harm 452 64%
Enough harm 200 29
Some harm 39 6
No harm 9 1
rotal 700 100%
This set of responses is compelling. Almost all Kazakhstani
find corruption to be harmful. Those who argue that antagonism
toward corruption is a Western construct based on Western ideals
will find no support in Kazakhstan. As compelling as this set of
responses is, however, it is important to refine the inquiry by ask-
ing about corrupt behaviors by specific actors.
When asked about specific actors, respondents also find that
corruption is harmful. Ninety-one percent respond that a state
employee who accepts bribes harms Kazakhstan.
In your opinion, which of the following may or may not harm the so-
ciety in general?
State employee who accepts bribe from local entrepreneur?
Freq. Percent
A lot of harm to society 249 36%
Some harm 386 55
No harm 66 9
otal 1701 100%
Clearly, Kazakhstani find that government officials who abuse
their office by accepting bribes damage Kazakhstan-these re-
sponses support the arguments regarding systemic and social
damage inflicted by corrupt bureaucrats.205 Conversely, however,
respondents also believe that a private entrepreneur who pays
bribes causes harm to Kazakhstan. Blame for the damage caused
by corruption seems to be shared between both the bribe giver and
the bribe taker.
205 See supra notes 29-30 (discussing theories of systemic damage done to the
bureaucracy and the corrosion of society by corruption).
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In your opinion, w0hich of the following nunj or nmy not harm the so-
ciety in general?
Entrepreneur who gives bribes to ensure preferential treatment dur-
ing contract bidding?
Freg. Percent
A lot of harm to society 246 35%
Some harm 358 51
No harm 95 14
[Total 699 100%]
One suggested rationale for corruption is that everyone in the
community benefits from the capital accumulated by the corrupt
leader.205 Respondents did not accept this theoretical rationale;
82% of the respondents believe such behavior to be harmful to so-
ciety.
In your opinion, which of the following may or nay not harm the so-
ciety in general?
Local "boss"/government official who accepts a bribe, but does a lot of
good for the communij?
Freg. Percent
A lot of harm to society 159 23%
Some harm 416 59
No harm 125 18
total 1_700_ 1 100%
Another question regarding specific actors yields interesting
responses. In Kazakhstan, and throughout Central Asia-indeed,
throughout much of the world, traffic police accept small bribes to
overlook minor (and large bribes to overlook major) infractions.' 7
206 See Ernest Harsch, Accumulators and Democrats: Calwknging State Compton
in Africa, 31 J. MODERN APR. STUD. 31, 36 (1993) (referring to corruption as a "cen-
tral" means of capital accumulation in Africa).
27 See POMFRBT, supra note 122, at 51 (describing bribe seeking by police in
Central Asia); Henderson, supra note 164, at 494 (describing solicitation of bribes
by police in Kazakhstan). Bribe seeking by police is so common in certain parts of
the world that Robert Pelton's extremely useful guidebook for traveling in diffi-
cult places gives very detailed instructions on how to pay bribes to policemen as
20011
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Several Western scholars have suggested that this is an acceptable
means of paying officials who otherwise are paid very little.208 The
majority of respondents in Kazakhstan, however, consider this be-
havior harmful, albeit by smaller percentages than the previously
examined behavior.
In your opinion, which of the following may or may not harm the so-
ciefy in general?
Bribing a traffic cop?
Freq. Percent
A lot of harm to society 83 12%
Some harm 377 54
No harm 239 34
total 699 100%
The antagonism toward bribe taking traffic police is interesting
for at least two reasons. First, rather than appreciating a short cut
around bureaucracy, most Kazakhstani appreciate the corrosive ef-
fects of a bribe taking culture among law enforcement officers.
Second, the results highlight the importance of taking a dynamic
rather than static approach to corruption. In the short run, it may
be convenient to escape a traffic ticket. Over time, however, as po-
lice come to expect income from those whom they stop for traffic
violations they will stop more and more people, often on fabricated
charges.209 Indeed, anyone who has traveled in Central Asia can
tell numerous stories of fines paid to traffic police for infractions
such as dirty headlights or unsafe turns.210
In short, Kazakhstani find corruption in general to be very
harmful. When specific actors and specific behaviors are identi-
fied, the percentage finding harm declines slightly, but it is still a
very large majority of the respondents. Even behaviors that some
well as guidance on the normal size of payments. ROBERT YOUNG PELTON, TilE
WORLD'S MOST DANGEROUS PLACES 87-91 (4th ed. 2000).
208 See supra note 7 and accompanying text; see also Steven R. Salbu, A Delicate
Balance: Legislation, Institutional Change, and Transnational Bribeny, 33 CORNELL INT'L
LJ. 657 (2000) (arguing that small bribes are a means of paying civil servants).
209 See supra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing the escalation of de-
mands by bribe taking officials).
210 The Author's own observation is that this particular behavior has im-
proved substantially in Almaty in the last two years.
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theorists might predict would be considered acceptable in a coun-
try such as Kazakhstan are considered very harmful.
5.4. Anticorruption Efforts
Another way of looking at indigenous attitudes toward cor-
ruption is to ask whether people would like laws and law en-
forcement changed to control or eliminate corruption. When asked
a general question about how important the government should
consider the fight against corruption the vast majority of respon-
dents, 96%, responded that fighting corruption should be a high
government priority.
H0o important should the government consider thefigzt against cor-
ruption?
Freg. Percent
Fop priority 392 56%
Significant 282 4C
Secondary 27 4
total 701 1 0o%
When asked more specific questions, a majority again supports
combating corruption, although the percentages are smaller. Sev-
enty-eight percent, for example, support the creation of a special
agency dedicated to fighting corruption.
Should there be a special law enforcement agency dedicated to fight-
ing corruption?
Freg. Percent
Completely Agree 273 39%
Agree 273 39
Don't Agree 110 16
Absolutely Don't Agree 43 6
Total 699 100%
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As discussed in Section 6 of this Article, this response is espe-
cially interesting for those persons involved with constructing anti-
corruption regimes in Kazakhstan.211
Similarly, a law that would require political candidates to dis-
close income and assets also receives support from a majority, 76%,
of respondents.
Should all persons running for elected office be required by law to de-
clare their personal income and savings?
Freg. Percent
Completely Agree 224 32%
Agree 310 44
Don't Agree 134 19
bsolutely Don't Agree 32 5
otal 700 100%
This response also is interesting in the context of international
efforts to combat corruption. The Inter-American Convention
Against Corruption, for example, requires signatories to make it a
crime for a government official to possess or acquire assets that the
official "cannot reasonably explain in relation to his lawful earn-
ings during the performance of his functions." 212 Rather than be-
ing perceived as imperialism, this change in the international re-
gime would apparently be welcomed in Kazakhstan.
In short, Kazakhstani strongly support reforms aimed at elimi-
nating corruption. Respondents suggest that fighting corruption
should be a high government priority and they support specific
measures such as an independent agency and disclosure of sources
of income. This information has an obvious relevance to those who
are effectuating reform at the local level.
211 See infra notes 262-264 and accompanying text.
212 Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, supra note 85, art. 9; see
Low, supra note 85, at 247-49 (discussing the requirement); Zedalis, supra note 85,
at 55 (discussing the treaty). Illicit enrichment provisions exist in other anticor-
ruption legislation. See, e.g., Prevention of Corruption Act § 5(1)(e) (1988) (India)
(preventing corruption).
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5.5. Differences Among Respondent Groups
It is dear that as a whole, Kazakhstani respondents do not ac-
cept or embrace corruption and in fact find it harmful. Similarly,
as a whole most Kazakhstani respondents welcome measures that
would combat corruption. It is imperative, however, to refine the
examination of responses by sorting respondents into relevant
groups. Refinement is needed for several reasons. One very im-
portant question for those effectuating changes in the local regime
is whether there are any structurally critical groups-such as the
wealthy, the very poor, or the well educated-who will be par-
ticularly affected by a given change or who hold radically different
perspectives about corruption. It is also theoretically and prag-
matically interesting to ask if there are any subgroups that accept
and embrace corruption. Concerns about moral, legal, or economic
imperialism do not necessarily apply only to a nation as a whole.M3
The following sections of this Article sort respondents by eth-
nicity and religion, rural or urban settlement, level of education
and income, gender, and public or private employment214 Even
when sorted by these characteristics, the rejection of corruption
remains consistent across all categories, indicating the robustness
of the claim that corruption is not accepted or embraced in Ka-
zakhstani culture and mitigating concerns about imperialism.
5.5.1. Ethnicity and Religion
Many people consider ethnic divisions to be the most serious
issue facing post-Soviet Kazakhstan.21 5 Whereas the concept of na-
23 Thomas Donaldson, for example, vigorously argues that foreign aid pro-
grams and structural adjustment requirements must be evaluated not in terms of
what they accomplish for the country as a whole but instead in terms of the im-
pact that the programs have on the poorest and most vulnerable groups in the
country. Thomas Donaldson, The Ethics of Conditionality in International Debt, 20
MIfLLENNIUM: J. INT'L STUD. 155 (1991).
214 The following sections do not reproduce all of the findings that indicate
statistically significant differences. The Author concludes that differences among
groups are minimal. In the interest of a full disclosure of the findings, all statisti-
cally significant differences (using a confidence interval of 0.05) that are not re-
ported in the following sections are reproduced in Appendix II. Readers are en-
couraged to use this information in evaluating the Author's conclusions regarding
the lack of meaningful differences when respondents are sorted by a variety of
salient characteristics.
215 See HiRO, supra note 149, at 118-19 (discussing the tension between ethnic
Russians and ethnic Kazakhs in the northern portions of the country); OLcorr, su-
pra note 134, at 61 (noting that ethnicity affects all aspects of Kazakhstan);
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tionhood is not indigenous to Central Asia, identification with an
ethnic group very much is part of Central Asian culture.21 6 Ethnic
issues are particularly acute in Kazakhstan because no ethnic
group has an absolute majority in the country.217
Sorting respondents by ethnicity, however, yields surprisingly
few differences among answer sets; only three of the sixteen ques-
tions discussed in this Article show statistically significant differ-
ences.218 Interestingly, two of these differences arise in the answers
to questions concerning anticorruption efforts in Kazakhstan.219
Most ethnic Kazakhs support anticorruption efforts. The support
by Kazakhs for such efforts, however, is less than support by other
large major ethnic groups. In particular, ethnic Russian support
for such efforts is measurably greater.
POMFRET, supra note 122, at 77 (noting the significance of the ethnicity issue in Ka-
zakhstan). Recent legal scholarship reflects a similar general concern over possi-
ble consequences of ethnic divisions. See Ibrahim J. Gassama, Transnational Criti-
cal Race Scholarship: Transcending Ethnic and National Chauvinism in the Era of
Globalization, 5 MIcH. J. RACE & L. 133 (1999); David M. Kresock, "Ethnic Cleansing"
in the Balkans: The Legal Foundations of Foreign Intervention, 27 CORNELL INT'L LJ.
203 (1994); Steven R. Ratner, Does International Law Matter in Preventing Ethnic
Conflict?, 32 N.Y.U. J. INTL L. & PoL. 591 (2000); see also Elena Bonner, Nationalism,
Ethnic Strife and Human Rights, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 769 (1995) (discussing, from
a social activist's rather than legal scholar's point of view, the relationship be-
tween ethnic division and human rights law in the former Soviet Union).
216 See GLEASON, supra note 120, at 5-6 (warning that it would be "a Eurocen-
tric mistake to conceive of these peoples and groups as nations" and discussing
the importance of ethnic identification).
217 See supra note 150 (describing the demographics of the country).
218 Using a confidence interval of 0.05.
219 The other question that shows a significant difference among answer sets
is the question asking whether an entrepreneur who gives a bribe to ensure pref-
erential treatment during contract bidding harms society. See infra app. 11, tbl. Al.
Kazakh respondents, who belong to the largest ethnic group, have the lowest per-
centage finding that the described behavior causes a lot of harm to society (30% as
compared to 40% among ethnic Russian respondents and 52% among ethnic
German respondents). The percentage of Kazakhs finding no harm to society
(15%) is also twice that of the ethnic Russian respondents (7%). At only 15%,
however, that percentage does not indicate that ethnic Kazakhs in general find
this behavior harmless.
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How important should the government consider the fight against cor-
ruption? 2o
Similarly, support by ethnic Kazakhs for a special agency to
combat corruption is less than that of ethnic Russians.
Should there be a special law enforcement agency dedicated to fight-
ing corruption ?2n
These answers do not indicate that ethnic Kazakhs do not sup-
port anticorruption efforts. The great majority do. Given, how-
ever, that ethnic Kazakhs and ethnic Russians constitute the two
largest and most influential ethnic groups, any person attempting
to implement reform in the Republic of Kazakhstan would benefit
from an awareness of these slight differences.
Sorting respondents by religion also yielded few significant dif-
ferences, again only three of the sixteen questions.= ' Interestingly,
220 See also infra app. II, tbl. A2 (displaying the entire table including ethnic
Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, German, Ukrainian, and others).
221 See also infra app. 1I, tbl. A3 (displaying the entire table including ethnic
Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, German, Ukrainian, and others).
222 One question that showed significant differences in answers deals with
relative regime evaluation: atheists (44%) absolutely don't agree more frequently
with the statement that corruption has declined in Kazakhstan than do Muslims
(27%) or Christians (35%). See infra app. I, tbL A4. At least 90%'o of all three
Kazakh Russian
Top priority 51% 68%
Significant 44 31
Secondary 5 1
Total 100% 100%
(n) (370) (196)
Kazakh Russian
Completely Agree 36% 46%
Agree 39 41
Don't Agree 17 10
Absolutely Don't Agree 8 3
Total 100% 100%
(n) (368) (196)
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one question that shows different answers deals with anticorrup-
tion efforts. When asked how important the government should
consider the fight against corruption, a much higher percentage of
both Christian respondents and atheist respondents than of Mus-
lim respondents answer that the fight should be given top priority,
and a higher percentage of Muslim respondents answer that the
fight should be given secondary status.
How important should the government consider the fight against cor-
ruption?
Religion
TotalU9 4 0 -4
Top priority 49% 65% 50% 40% 63% 56%
Significant 45 33 50 60 36 40
Secondary 6 2 0 0 1 4
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(n) (359) (180) (4) (20) (135) (698)
Pearson chi2(8) = 24.7766 Pr = 0.002
Although a few questions yield statistically significant differ-
ences among response groups when respondents are sorted by
ethnicity or religion, in the aggregate it would be difficult to argue
that real differences exist. Interviews in Kazakhstan shed no light
on why people of different ethnicities or religions do not have dif-
ferent attitudes towards corruption. The lack of differences,
nonetheless, is important in itself for at least three reasons. First,
the uniformity of responses when sorted by ethnicity and religion
highlights the robustness of the rejection of corruption across Ka-
zakhstan. Second, the fact that corruption is rejected by all ethnic
and religious groups mitigates concerns that anticorruption re-
gimes constitute some form of imperialism forced on a subgroup in
groups, however, generally disagree with this statement. The second question
that shows differences among groups asks whether an entrepreneur who pays a
bribe harms society. Again, atheists (43%) more frequently find a lot of harm than
do Muslims (30%) or Christians (37%), although again the great majority of each
group find the behavior harmful. See infra app. II, tbl. A5.
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Kazakhstan. Third, although there are differences of which advi-
sors should be aware, the fact that all ethnic and religious groups
support anticorruption efforts supports the legitimacy of such ef-
forts if they are undertaken in Kazakhstan. From a nonlegal per-
spective, perhaps the most important conclusion to be drawn from
this set of responses is that ethnic and religious stereotypes are not
empirically supported with respect to corruption.
5.5.2. Type of Settlenzent (Urban or Rural)
Rural life is different than urban life in Kazakhstan. During the
Soviet period, rural dwellers tended to be ethnic Kazakhs; Ka-
zakhstani scholars now view these people as a source of primary
information on Kazakh tradition and culture 2 Following the So-
viet period, a large percentage of the rural population emigrated to
cities, creating an even greater distinction between those who
choose to stay in rural settlements and those who choose to live in
urban settlements.224
Nonetheless, sorting respondents by type of settlement does
not produce many significant differences between answer sets.
Rural respondents (19%) are more likely than urban respondents
(11%) to agree with the statement that judges seldom accept
bribes. 225 Interviews yielded little insight into this difference. One
possibility is that because judges in the rural areas are more closely
integrated into the community (as is everyone else), judges have
less opportunity to either solicit or accept bribes.=2 This could be
of use to those who structure anticorruption measures.2m 7
Differences also occur with respect to support for anticorrup-
tion efforts. These differences, however, are more a matter of de-
2BOdgaard & Simonsen, supra note 121, at 23-24.
224 See Richard H. Rowland, Urban Population Trends in Kazakhstan During the
1990s, 40 Posr-SovIEr GEOGRAPHY & EcoN. 519 (1999) (describing the trends).
225 See infra app. II, tbl. A6. Whereas rural respondents are more trusting of
judges than are urban respondents, rural respondents are more critical of gov-
ernment in general When asked whether government is more corrupt than busi-
ness, a larger percentage of rural (73%) than urban respondents (63%) agree that it
is. See infra app. II, tbL A7.
226 The Author observed a similar phenomenon in the African country of
Senegal. In Senegal, while many people expressed a grave concern about corrup-
tion, corruption did not play a visible role in their daily life-possibly because the
low-level government officials with whom they have daily contact are also mem-
bers of their families, villages, and other social groups.
227 See infra notes 263-264 and accompanying text.
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gree than of actual support for anticorruption measures. Rural re-
spondents are more likely to completely support the creation of a
special agency to combat corruption, although roughly the same
percentage of rural (79%) and urban (77%) respondents support
the creation of such an agency.228 Similarly, rural respondents are
more likely to support laws that require a candidate for office to
disclose her income and assets, although again most urban re-
spondents also support such a requirement.229
When respondents are sorted by type of settlement, differences
exist with respect to a handful of questions. These few differences,
however, do not indicate meaningful differences between rural
and urban respondents. The responses to all of the questions in the
aggregate clearly indicate that both rural and urban respondents
reject corruption and support measures to combat corruption in
Kazakhstan.
5.5.3. Education and Income
Education and income are often used to separate people into
categories. With respect to corruption, however, sorting respon-
dents by education and income does not yield many statistically
significantly different sets of answers.
People with different levels of education often do perceive the
world differently. 230 One might expect, therefore, that the level of
education might provide dues as to how a respondent will answer
questions regarding corruption. Such, however, is not the case.
The results are fairly consistent across all levels of education, and
respondents at every level of education generally do not accept
corruption. What differences do exist are interesting in their in-
consistency.231 Less educated respondents, for example, are more
likely to find a lot of harm to society in the act of a state employee
228 See infra app. II, tbl. A7(b).
229 See infra app. II, tbl. A8(a).
230 See Beverly Elmyra Johnson, Learning in School: Facilitating the Child's
Emerging Construction of Self, 112 EDUc. 439,439-41 (1992) (discussing the effect of
education on how people perceive themselves and the world).
231 In addition to the differences discussed in the text, respondents with less
education are slightly more likely to disagree with the statement that corruption
in Kazakhstan has declined. See infta app. I, tbl. A8(b).
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accepting a bribe.232 The same group, however, is less likely to find
harm to be caused by an entrepreneur paying a bribe.P
Income234 is no better a predictor than any other quality of a re-
spondent Majorities in all income groups find harm in bribery
and in other ways do not accept corruption. Nonetheless, when re-
spondents are sorted on the basis of income a few statistically sig-
nificant differences do appear. With respect to these few cases, in
general it is those with the lower incomes who are less tolerant of
bribery. Indeed, in some cases the differences in responses march
in observable steps from lower incomes through the higher in-
comes.
Interestingly, of the four sets of responses that present statisti-
cally significant differences among groups sorted by income, three
occur with respect to questions about specific actors when evalu-
ating the public salience of corruption.2 35 Those with lower in-
comes, for example, find a state employee who accepts bribes to be
more harmful than do those with higher incomes.
232 See infra app. II, tbl. A9. A great majority of respondents at each level of
education find this behavior harmful.
33 See infra app. II, tbl. A10. Again, a majority of respondents at each level of
education finds the behavior harmful.
234 Income reporting in surveys generally presents problems. See Jeffrey C.
Moore et al, Income Reporting in Surveys: Cognitive Issues and Measurement Error, in
CoGNmoN AND SURVEY RESEARCH, supra note 186, at 155,156-59 (discussing prob-
lems with income reporting in surveys, including the facts that the definition of
income is understood differently by different people, many people do not know
their income, many people do not care what their income is, and many people do
a poor job of reconstructing their income). In Central Asia the reporting of income
is made more difficult by the facts that many people supplement their primary job
with other jobs, that some income is paid in kind rather than in currency, that
many people have jobs that in principle pay a salary but for which they may in
fact not have been paid for several months or even years, and most especially that
because so many people wish to avoid high taxes they are often reluctant to dis-
cuss their own income. Indeed, there was a high nonresponse rate for questions
about income.
235 The fourth occurs with respect to the question asking whether all persons
running for elected office should be required to declare their personal income and
savings. Although a majority of respondents at each income level supports this
proposal, those with less income are more likely to support it than those with
higher incomes. Indeed, 11% of the respondents in the highest income group ab-
solutely disagreed with the suggestion, almost three times as many as any other
income group. See infra app. II, tbl. All.
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In your opinion, which of the following may or may not harm the so-
ciety in general?
State employee who accepts bribe from local entrepreneur?
Income (in tenge)236
o do C , C) c3N 6- 1 Total
Lot of 42% 66% 49% 32% 30% 41% 30% 18% 36%
harm
Some 50 31 42 62 58 44 59 76 55
harm I I II
Nohm 8 3 9 6 12 15 11 6 9harm
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(n) (36) (38) (78) (164) (200) (85) (27) (71) (699)
Pearson chi2(14) = 48.4866 Pr = 0.000
Respondents also find a local boss who accepts a bribe but does
good to be harmful.
236 The exchange rate at the time that the survey was conducted was about
seventy-five tenge for one U.S. dolar.
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Local "boss"/government official who accepts a bribe, but does a lot of
good for the community?
Income in tenge)
M 0)
M a~ o-'0 C) oCD M 6 c a 8 ) > Total
0:: C) DM C-M-D I 1-, 0¢C) CD~ M'-C L Dr-
Lotof 19% 37% 29% 23% 26% 13% 19% 13% 23%
harm
Someham 50 50 62 64 56 67 70 56 59harm
hr 31 13 9 13 18 20 11 31 18harm
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(n) (36) (38) (78) (163)1(200) (85) (27) (71) (698)
Pearson chi2(14) = 33.4892 Pr = 0.002
Those surveyed even find bribing a traffic officer to be harmful.
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In your opinion, which of the following may or may not harm the so-
ciety in general?
Bribing a traffic cop?
Income in tenge)
0 c C, 6 , 6 C71 C)Total
Lot ofhar 30% 29% 12% 12% 12% 2% 0% 7% 12%harm
Some 56 58 56 57 48 61 56 52 54
harm
Nohr 14 13 32 31 40 37 44 41 34harmII
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(n) (36) (38) (77) (164) (200) (84) (27) (71) (697)
Pearson chi2(14) = 48.2695 Pr =0.000
The last set of responses is particularly interesting not only for
the firmness with which respondents in the lower income groups
find such conduct harmful, but also for the responses of the higher
income groups. Whereas almost one-third of the respondents in
the lowest income group stated that bribing traffic police causes a
great deal of harm to society, not a single respondent in the highest
income group assigned that level of harm to that behavior. Indeed,
44% of the respondents in the highest income group stated that this
behavior causes no harm to society. Of all of the responses given
in this survey, this constitutes the greatest percentage that did not
find a corrupt behavior to be harmful.
5.5.4. Gender
The roles of men and women differ in traditional Central Asian
society.237 Indeed, the roles assigned to men and women differ in
237 See GLEASON, supra note 120, at 38 ("Personal life is family life in Central
Asian societies: Property is communal, palov (the preferred Central Asian dish) is
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modem Kazakhstan. Russian society also continues to treat
people of different genders differently 23 9
Given the different roles assigned to different genders, one
might expect gender to influence respondents' answers to ques-
tions regarding corruption. That is not the case. Gender proved a
surprisingly useless indicator of perceptions of corruption in this
study. With respect to the questions regarding absolute evalua-
tions, relative evaluations, public saliency and support for anticor-
ruption laws, there are no statistically significant differences in the
answers when the answers are sorted by the gender of the respon-
dent.
5.5.5. Government Employees
With respect to corruption, government employees constitute a
critical subgroup. Government employees are most likely to be in
a position to demand bribes. Moreover, any reforms will require
the cooperation of government employees. It is very important,
therefore, to closely scrutinize the answers of government employ-
ees.
Sorting respondents by government employment yields sur-
prising results. Although not all of the questions yield statistically
significant differences, quite a few do. In each case where there is a
shared, elders are given deference without question, and women are subordi-
nated."). Certain schools of legal thought, while not assigning women to a subor-
dinate role, suggest that men and women have been conditioned to or assigned
different roles in different cultures and therefore perceive or interact with the
world differently. See EusE BOULDING, CULTURES OF PEACE: TiH HIDDEN SIDE OF
HISTORY 107-22 (2000) (discussing the relationship between feminist legal theory
and global social movements); CATHERINE EscHLE, GLOBAL DE.OCKRAcY, SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS, AND FEmNsM (2001) (same).
2n Pauline Loung Jones and Erika Wisenthal have written several unpub-
lished studies on this issue, which the Author has on file.
239 See Eva Busza & Jeffrey Hahn, Aromen and Politics in Russia: The Yaroslavl'
Study, 16 WOMEN & PoL. 55, 78 (1996) (concluding that gender accounts for the
differences in the political role and behavior of men and women in the former So-
viet Union); Satish P. Deshpande et al, Perceptions of Proper Ethical Conduct of Male
and Female Russian Managers, 24 J. Bus. ETIcs 179,181 (2000) (finding that women
managers consider a broader range of behaviors to be unethical than do men
managers); Robin Goodwin & Tatiana Emelyanova, 77e Perestroia of the Family?
Gender and Occupational Differences in Family Values in Modem Day Russia, 32 SEx
ROLES: A JOURNAL OF RESEARCH 337, 338-48 (1995) (finding that the greater open-
ness in discussing inequalities between men and women has been accompanied
by a more regressive harkening back to "traditional" gender roles).
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difference, government employees are harsher in their attitudes
toward corruption.
This particular set of responses must be caveated. Two hun-
dred and sixty respondents (out of seven hundred and one) did not
indicate whether they worked in the government or the private
sector. When asked in interviews why they would not answer a
question about their employment, many people said that they
could not. Many people in Kazakhstan (and throughout all of the
former Soviet Union) work out of necessity both in the private and
in the public sector.240 For those few who do have only one job, it
is sometimes unclear, following the haphazard privatization that
has occurred in Kazakhstan,241 whether they work in the private or
public sector. Thus, both the smaller sample and the questionable
decision by respondents to place themselves in one category or an-
other must be taken into consideration when evaluating these sets
of responses. Nonetheless, if one assumes that those who place
themselves in the government employee category have more expe-
rience in government than those who place themselves in the pri-
vate employment category, the results are of great interest.
The majority of those who place themselves in the government
category agree that bribery is necessary to resolve business issues,
but it is a smaller majority (66%, with 28% absolutely agreeing)
than among respondents who place themselves in the private em-
ployment category (79%, with 38% absolutely agreeing).
240 See Scheppele, supra note 7, at 514-18 (describing the need of public em-
ployees to also work in the private sector).
241 See Nichols, supra note 64, at 312-20 (describing privatization in Ka-
zakhstan).
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Do you agree with the statenent that briben is a practical necessihj
for quick resolution of business issues?
Occu ation
Gov't Private Sector Total242
Absolutely agree 28% 38% 32%
Agree 38 41 39
Don't agree 26 17 22
Absolutely not 8 4 7
Total 100% 100% 100%
(n) (276) (165) (441)
Pearson chi2(3) = 9.6799 Pr = 0.021
Three possible explanations exist for this difference. The first is
simply that government officials are either attempting to cover up
their own misfeasance and malfeasance or they are answering
questions in the manner they expect the interviewer to desire.243
The second possibility is that government respondents fall victim
to what Messick and Bazerman identify as the "Self-Serving Fair-
ness Bias."244  When reporting or evaluating their own actions,
people tend to give themselves credit for their efforts as well as for
their actions and sometimes justify or rationalize their actions on
bases that others might not accept 2 45
A third possibility is that perhaps the government officials are
correct and that the resolution of business issues does not require
bribery as often as persons outside of government believe. Indeed,
a number of government officials with whom the Author spoke
pointed out that not every interaction between government and
business involved bribe requests. These people, therefore, could
242 Totals for this section are slightly different than country-wide totals be-
cause 260 out of 701 respondents are not included.
243 See supra note 183 and accompanying text (discussing bias in answers re-
garding attitudes).
244 David M. Messick & Max H. Bazerman, Ethical Leadership and the Psydhol-
ogy of Decision Making, SLOAN MGMiT. REv., Winter 1996, at 9,18.
245 Id. at 18-19. Messick and Bazerman use the example of an executive who
turns down an offer of a large bonus in exchange for "misrepresent[ing] the finan-
cial well-being of her firm," and who thereafter feels that the firm owes her for her
moral heroism whereas others simply would credit her with following the rules.
Id.
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simply be reporting what they see in their own sphere of the gov-
ernment.
Given the responses of government employees to other ques-
tions, none of these explanations is satisfactory. Rather than per-
ceiving corruption to be a manageable problem, government em-
ployees are more likely than others to find bribery harmful and are
more likely than private sector employees to support efforts to re-
form corruption. Ultimately, the responses to this question point
to the need for even more empirical research into the attitudes to-
ward corruption in Kazakhstan.
With respect to the public salience of bribery, when there are
differences among responses those who identify themselves as
government employees are more likely to find that bribery causes
harm to society. When asked whether an official who takes a bribe
but does good for the community harms society, 86% of govern-
ment workers responded that the behavior causes harm, compared
to 73%246 of private sector employees.247 When asked whether
bribing traffic police causes harm to society, again more respon-
dents who identify themselves as working for the government
found that it did (71% compared with 59% of private sector em-
ployees).248
With respect to support for combating corruption, government
employees assign a much higher priority to these efforts in general.
While large majorities of both groups state that the government
should undertake such efforts, 61% of the respondents who iden-
tify themselves as government employees state that this fight
should be given top priority, as opposed to 48% of private sector
employees.
246 Still, it should be noted, a large majority.
247 See infra app. II, tbl. A12.
248 See infra app. II, tbl. A13.
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How important should the government consider the fight against cor-
ruption?
Occu pation
Gov't Private Sector Total
Top priority 61% 48% 56%
Significant 36 44 39
Secondary 3 8 5
Total 100% 100% 100%
(n) (276) (165) (441)
When asked the more specific question of whether persons
running for office should be required to disclose their income, gov-
ernment employees again support such a requirement by a larger
majority (78%) than do private sector employees (67%).
Should all persons running for elected office be required biy law to de-
clare their personal income and savings?
Occu ation
Gov't Private TotalSector
Completely Agree 33% 26% 30%
Agree 45 41 44
Don't Agree 20 24 22
Absolutely Don't Agree 2 9 4
Total 100% 100% 100%
(n) (276) (165) (441)
These results seem counterintuitive. Goverment employees
are the very persons engaged in public sector corruption, and yet
they are more likely to find the behavior harmful and are more
likely to support reform efforts.
One possible explanation for this disparity is that respondents
who are government officials are simply trying to provide answers
that they think the surveyor wants to hear or that they think fits
into the general conception rather than answering in accordance
with their own attitudes and practices. Discussions with govern-
ment officials, however, tend to suggest another explanation.
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Government officials with whom the Author spoke tended to
fall into one of three groups: high-ranking government officials
with a great degree of discretionary power,249 low-level function-
aries with some control over a public good,250 and bureaucrats with
limited public contact.251 The first group, of course, is relatively
small. It is also the group that spoke most favorably to the Author
about bribery. 2 2 Members of this group openly spoke of accepting
bribes. Some members of this group spoke of bribes as part of the
way that business is conducted in Kazakhstan. Other members of
this group spoke somewhat contemptuously of the proclivity for
Western businesses to offer bribes and expressed satisfaction that
they were in a position to benefit from this Western behavior.
Members of the second group rarely spoke to the Author about
corruption, except when they were hassling him or soliciting
bribes.253 This group, also, cannot constitute the majority of gov-
ernment officials.
A majority probably falls into the third group, many of whom
discussed corruption and bribery with the Author. Many of these
bureaucrats are deeply committed to building viable institutions in
Kazakhstan, most are well educated, and most would like to per-
form the job they have taken. These people may have positions of
rank but no power over a business's daily life, such as an econo-
mist in a ministerial office, or they may have positions without
rank and also without power over a business's daily life, such as a
mailroom messenger or a chai lady. Even though these people do
not have the type of authority that can be abused in exchange for a
bribe, they are in dose proximity to those that do. They witness
decisions being taken or being changed for no convincing reasons;
they witness some people being moved to the head of the line; they
witness some people waiting months or years for approvals while
others get them in hours; and they witness their own reform sug-
249 For example, a minister.
250 For example, a police officer or the clerk who issues permits to travel to
restricted areas.
251 For example, secretaries, assistants, and managers.
252 The Author emphasizes that he did not speak to large numbers of high-
ranking government officials.
253 The Author did spend an evening with a high-ranking police officer in a
southern oblys, during which the police officer ostentatiously exhibited his wealth
and hinted at his relationships with organized crime. One interview, however,
hardly constitutes an indictment of police in Kazakhstan.
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gestions to those above and their orders to those below being ig-
nored or subverted. Conversations with these government em-
ployees and the responses of persons who identify themselves as
government employees indicate their concern and frustration with
the effects of what they have witnessed and their desire to change
the system in which they work.
6. IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS
These findings do not represent the indigenous attitudes of the
entire world; they represent only attitudes in the Republic of Ka-
zakhstan. Nonetheless, these findings amply demonstrate the
value of empirical knowledge, both to those who construct legal
regimes and those who construct legal theories.
First, however, and most obviously, these findings strongly
suggest that, contrary to the predictions of some Western scholars,
corruption is not accepted in Kazakhstan.2 Respondents in Ka-
zakhstan find corruption-in general and with reference to specific
acts-extremely harmful to their society and their country.
Moreover, respondents overwhelmingly support proposed anticor-
ruption actions, again both in general and with reference to specific
actions.
The fact that no subgroup within Kazakhstan differentiates it-
self significantly from other groups or from the general findings
highlights the robustness of Kazakhstani rejection of corruption.
Groups described as problematically separate in Kazakhstan are
essentially indistinguishable with respect to attitudes about cor-
ruption. Indeed, the profound degree to which all segments of Ka-
zakhstani society reject corruption lends support to ethicists such
as Donaldson and Dunfee who suggest condemnation of bribery as
a global norm255 or anticorruption advocates such as Fritz Hei-
mann, who suggest condemnation of bribery as a global value.;u s
The findings of the survey also have specific value with respect
to those who are involved in the creation or effectuation of legal
regimes, particularly in Kazakhstan, and those who consider from
a theoretical perspective the change in the global corruption re-
gimes.
254 See supra notes 7, 33, 140, 161-164 (setting out arguments that corruption
might be accepted in Kazakhstan or countries similar to Kazakhstan).
255 See DONALDSON & DUNFEE, supra note 52, at 228.
256 HEImANN, supra note 38, at 2.
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6.1. Corruption as a Structural Component That Must be Taken Into
Account
Almost all of the literature on legal change suggests that per-
sons effectuating changes to legal regimes must take the local cul-
ture and attitudes into account.257 A specific discussion of how the
findings reported in this Article should be taken into account by
those effectuating change in Kazakhstan would require specific
plans for change. If and when Kazakhstan undertakes a compre-
hensive scheme to manage corrupt political behavior, the country
would be well served by reference to the attitudes discussed in this
Article. In the meantime, however, three general observations can
be made.
First, Kazakhstani respondents perceive corruption to be thor-
oughly intertwined with the current political system. This percep-
tion applies to both the bureaucracy and the judicial system. Those
attempting to effectuate legal change in Kazakhstan must under-
stand and must work with this perception. A project to promote
the "rule of law" in Kazakhstan, for example, would likely fail un-
less it took into account the fact that most Kazakhstani believe that
most judges regularly accept bribes.2% Similarly, efforts to change
the enforcement of contract law are likely to founder unless those
promoting such efforts take into account the fact that the majority
of Kazakhstani believe that bribery is necessary to resolve business
disputes.25 9
While those effectuating change in Kazakhstan must take into
account the perception that corruption is embedded in the system,
the perceptions of the behaviors of different actors could be used
257 See supra note 72 for a discussion of this literature.
258 The Rule of Law Unit of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe, for example, has undertaken projects to create a National Human Rights
Institution and to train prison guards in Kazakhstan. See Organization for Secu-
rity and Co-operation in Europe, Annual Report 2000 on OSCE Activities, at
http://www.osce.org/docs/english/misc/anrepOOe_activ.htm (last visited Nov.
5, 2001).
259 See Nichols, supra note 57, at 293-95 (discussing the reform of contract law
in emerging economies). Given the deep mistrust of courts in Kazakhstan, one
possibility might be to create a private and transparent system of dispute resolu-
tion. Another possibility would be to create a simple system of commercial rela-
tionships that is enforceable by the parties themselves without recourse to courts.
See Black & Kraakman, supra note 58, at 1911 (suggesting a "self-enforcing" body
of law for corporate governance in Russia). Alternatively, measures could be
taken to increase trust in courts prior to the undertaking of measures to change
the methods of enforcing contracts.
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creatively. For example, the fact that most respondents believe that
politicians are more corrupt than businesspersons suggests that
businesspersons rather than politicians could be used as the agents
of change or could be used to promote change.26 0 Patrick Primeaux
laments the fact that business is perhaps the most influential
shaper of values in the West,2 61 but in the case of Kazakhstan busi-
ness it might be considered a positive influence on ethical behav-
ior. 262
Second, the responses indicate strong negative feelings toward
corruption. These negative feelings exist not just with respect to
corruption in general but also with respect to specific behaviors. A
failure to deal proactively with possible corruption could render
reform efforts illegitimate in the eyes of Kazakhstani citizens.263
For example, technical legal advisors who work closely with cor-
rupt local officials on the theory that because that official was do-
ing good for the community they too would be accepted would
probably be in fact rejected and discounted by the local resi-
dents.264 Privatization agencies, for example, that overlook self-
dealing by local officials on the grounds that it is part of the proc-
ess of transferring assets to the private domain now must consider
the cost to the system in terms of mistrust and ill will.
260 Creative use of social artifacts has already been used in the privatization
process. For example, one of the most popular television soap operas in Ka-
zakhstan was created to promote privatization in the nascent market economy.
See Nichols, supra note 41, at 1274 n.161 (describing the soap opera).
261 Primeaux, supra note 48, at 221 (discussing the role of business in defining
values and noting that he finds "the sense of mystery, wonder and awe missing').
262 A businessman in Poland who is tired of corrupt demands and who be-
lieves that most businesspeople would prefer to conduct themselves in a noncor-
rupt manner has instituted a program called "Manus Puris," whereby companies
adopt internal codes forbidding the taking or offering of bribes and then publicize
their participation in this program so that they can work with other "clean
handed" companies. See John Reed, Curbing Corruption: A Virtue Out of Corprate
Vice, FiN. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2001, at 13.
2m The failure of reform efforts in Eastern Europe to deal with corruption is
considered one of the primary reasons that large numbers of Eastern Europeans
have not embraced market reforms. See Cheryl IV. Gray & William W. Jarosz, Lo
and the Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment: 7e Experience fronz Central and East-
ern Europe, 33 COLurM. J. TRANSNAT'LL. 1, 28 (1995).
2L4 The Author has observed aid agencies working with less than transparent
government officials in a number of regions, including Central Asia and has at
times heard the explanation that the local residents consider the corrupt official to
be acceptable because that official does good things for the local residents.
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Third, the findings reported in this Article do suggest specific
action with respect to the creation of local legal regimes to deal
with corruption. For example, a large majority of respondents fa-
vor the creation of a special agency to combat corruption. Central
Asian countries, including Kazakhstan, respect and in some ways
seek to imitate the economic tigers of Asia.265 Hong Kong, which is
one of those tigers, has had a great deal of success with an inde-
pendent anticorruption agency.266 These findings indicate that
such an agency would have popular support from Kazakhstani
citizens and that its creation would lend legitimacy to the govern-
ment.267
Similarly, rural respondents indicate more trust in judges than
do urban respondents. One possible explanation for this difference
is that because judges in the rural areas are more closely integrated
into the community (as is everyone else), judges have less oppor-
tunity to either solicit or accept bribes.268 This could be of use to
those who structure anticorruption measures; the strength of local
knowledge and networks has been used successfully in other con-
texts. 269
M See OLCOrr, supra note 134, at 15; POMPR-r, supra note 122, at 76. The
Author has heard countless references to Southeast Asia in his discussions with
Central Asian government officials.
266 That agency, the Independent Commission Against Corruption, is cred-
ited with greatly reducing incidents of corruption in Hong Kong, with publicizing
corruption reforms, and with changing public expectations of government offi-
cials' conduct. See Barbara Crutchfield George, Kathleen A. Lacey & Jutta Bir-
mele, On the Threshold of the Adoption of Global Antibribery Legislation: A Critical
Analysis of Current Domestic and International Efforts Toward the Reduction of Business
Corruption, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 43-44 (1999) (describing the work and
successes of the Commission); Rose-Ackerman, supra note 201, at 106-07 (describ-
ing the work of the Commission and noting that it is considered one of the most
successful anticorruption agencies in the world). See generally Max J. Skidmore,
Promise and Peril in Combatting Corruption: Hong Kong's ICAC, 547 ANNALs AM.
ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 118, 122 (1996) (describing the Commission). The Com-
mission has several programs to assist other countries in the development of anti-
corruption agencies. See George, supra, at 43-44 (describing these programs).
267 Agencies in Korea have also enjoyed popular success. See supra note 94
(discussing action in Korea); see also Rajagopal, supra note 54, at 507 (discussing
the need for local action to combat corruption).
268 See supra note 226 and accompanying text (describing the finding and pos-
sible explanations for the difference).
269 One of the more successful microenterprise lending institutions uses local
relationships to make provision of credit to the poor viable. Grameen Bank, in
Bangladesh, operates on a village level. Potential borrowers form groups, which
monitor one another and perform other administrative functions. Loans are made
only to one or two group members at a time; loans to other group members are
[22:4
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6.2. Theories of Regime Change
The findings described in this Article also have bearing on each
of the three theories used to explain the change in the global cor-
ruption regime. The first and least satisfying theory suggests that
the global regime change results from the actions of a hegemonistic
United States.27 Kazakhstan has not signed any treaty or other
international instrument dealing with corruption. If it were to do
so, however, the abhorrence of corruption found by this survey
among Kazakhstani would support an argument that no he-
gemonistic persuasion was necessary and that the desire to em-
brace the international regime arose from within. In other words,
the findings do not support theories based in realism.2n
A concern raised by this theory for the international regime
change-indeed a concern raised by each of the three theories-is
that of moral imperialism. The findings discussed in this Article
mitigate such concern with respect to Kazakhstan. Kazakhstani
categorically reject corruption and find it harmful. In conversa-
not given until the first loans are paid back or until a record of timely payments is
established. Members who have already received loans cannot obtain new loans
until all group members have paid back the first loans. See JAYANTA KumIA RAY,
To CHASE A MmACLE A STUDY OF THE GRAiEN BANK OF BANGLADESH 19-23 (1937)
(describing the operation of Grameen Bank); Mahabub Hossain, T7 Gramcen
Bank: Its Origins, Organization and Managenent Style, in THE GRA.EEN BANI:
POvERTY RE=EF IN BANGLADESH 9, 12 (Abu N.M. Wahid ed., 1993) (same); Philip
M. Nichols, Swapping Debt for Development: A Theoretical Application of Swaps to the
Creation of Microenterprise Lending Institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa, 27 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 43, 66-77 (1994) (same). Grameen Bank has a repayment rate of
98%, as compared to a commercial default rate of 70 to 90% in Bangladesh. Nich-
ols, supra, at 67. Observers credit Grameen Bank's success to its use of local
knowledge and relationships. See Garry Christensen, 77te Limits to Infornal Finan-
cial Intermediation, 21 WORLD DEV. 721, 722 (1993) (noting that the use of people
with local relationships overcomes limits as to knowledge); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Peer
Monitoring and Credit Markets, 4 WORLD BANK EcoN. REv. 351, 352 (1990) (discuss-
ing exploitation of local knowledge by Grameen Bank); Jacob Yaron, INMwt Mxlaes
Rural Finance Institutions Successftl?, 9 WORLD BANK RES. O&SERVER 49, 55 (1994)
(attributing Grameen Bank's success to the use of local relationships).
270 See supra note 98 and accompanying text (describing the theory based on
realism). The argument that the United States is a global hegemon capable of
forcing its will on countries such as Kazakhstan is weak on its face; the demands
of Russia and China have a far greater impact on Kazakhstan than do those of the
United States. Nonetheless, that is the realist argument.
271 It should be noted, of course, that the findings do not contradict the realist
theory. The fact that the local population would support anticorruption laws does
not necessarily mean that the actual enactment of such laws does not occur at the
insistence of a hegemon.
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tions, respondents frequently mentioned that corruption degrades
Kazakhstani society. If anything, Kazakhstani would probably
perceive the willingness of Western countries to overlook bribery
by their large companies of Kazakhstani government officials as a
form of imperialism. 272
The second theoretical explanation for the global regime
change suggests that as the discussion of corruption changed from
a moral discussion to an economic discussion an international anti-
corruption regime became more palatable. 273 The findings provide
limited support for this theory: the respondents clearly under-
stand that corruption causes economic harm to Kazakhstan. But, if
corruption were actually transformed from a moral issue to an
economic issue in the minds of the Kazakhstani, then one would
expect to find differences between the answer sets of the wealthy
and the poor, the well educated and thd less educated, and possi-
bly between rural and urban respondents. Those fractures do not
exist with respect to corruption. Again, the findings ultimately do
not support this theory.274
To the extent that the theory of transformation retains vitality,
it raises a concern of economic imperialism-that the change in the
global regime actually constitutes the imposition of Western no-
tions of accountability and transparency in economic decision-
making by government bodies. The findings mitigate concerns of
economic imperialism. Kazakhstani respondents demonstrate sig-
nificant support for transparency and accountability. When asked
directly whether they support particular reform measures, the
overwhelming majority indicate support. Respondents by a large
margin support disclosure of the income and assets of bureaucrats;
272 The survey discussed in this Article did not directly measure attitudes to-
ward the global regime change. In conversations throughout Kazakhstan, many
people were unaware of that change. The Author of this Article has had many
interesting conversations with people in Africa and in Southeast Asia in which the
person from that region laid the blame for endemic corruption squarely on West-
ern companies that offered large bribes to local officials. Very few Kazakhstani
with whom the Author spoke made similar accusations (except with respect to oil
companies); most placed the blame on venal officials. Interestingly, the group
most likely to mention Western companies' proclivity for offering bribes were
government officials.
M See supra notes 104-105 and accompanying text (discussing this theory).
274 And again, the findings do not explicitly invalidate the theory. The trans-
formation of corruption into a purely economic issue could occur without differ-
ences among the responses of different socio-economic groups.
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this includes the responses of those bureaucrats themselves.
Claims of imperialism, therefore, are dubious.
The third theory suggests that the global regime change is a re-
action to corruption scandals and an awareness of the damage
done by corruption.2r- Kazakhstan is not a party to any global an-
ticorruption regime. Nonetheless, the findings provide general
support for this theory. Respondents dearly perceive a great deal
of corruption in Kazakhstan, they dearly find that corruption
harmful, and they dearly support reform of the existing system.
Because Kazakhstan does not have a viable democracy or other
means for general partidpation, 76 Kazakhstani citizens cannot
channel their feelings about corruption into meaningful change. If
such means were available, the findings suggest that Kazakhstani
citizens would cause Kazakhstan to participate in the global anti-
corruption efforts. As it stands, the findings suggest that Ka-
zakhstani respondents would consider the global anticorruption
efforts to be legitimate.
7. CONCLUSION
As the global community takes up corruption as an issue for re-
form, it is critical that the attitudes and perceptions of local com-
munities be taken into consideration. An empirical understanding
is necessary to effectuate the changes to law and policy demanded
by the change in the international regime. Moreover, as a theoreti-
cal matter, an understanding of other attitudes and perceptions is
necessary to deal with issues of imperialism, economic efficiency
and allocation, and institutional choice. Most interesting is the
need for an empirical evaluation of the anecdotal but very persis-
tent notion that corruption is embraced and accepted by some
cultures-that it is a normal way of doing business in some cul-
tures.
The survey discussed in this Article examines the attitudes of a
culture that is quite distinct from that of the West and in which
corruption occurs on a regular basis. Examining responses along
four lines -absolute regime evaluation, relative regime evaluation,
public salience, and support for reforms aimed at corruption-re-
veals that Kazakhstani respondents do not accept or embrace cor-
2-1 See supra notes 111-113 (discussing this theory).
276 See Henderson, supra note 164, at 497-98 (discussing the weak democratic
institutions of Kazakhstan).
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ruption and in fact find it an extremely harmful behavior which
their government should combat. These findings are particularly
interesting because they include behaviors that some Western
scholars would predict to be acceptable in a culture such as Ka-
zakhstan and because they include reform measures that are advo-
cated in the global arena. Most interesting is the fact that respon-
dents cannot meaningfully be distinguished by gender, education,
income level, ethnicity, religion, or place of settlement. The rejec-
tion of corruption cuts across each of these groups, suggesting that
it forms a very basic part of the Kazakhstani culture.
This survey does not prove that corruption is not accepted or
embraced by any culture in the world, it only indicates that cor-
ruption is not accepted or embraced in Kazakhstan. The close fit,
however, between global attitudes toward corruption and those
held in the relatively isolated country of Kazakhstan may provide
insights into the global regime change. These findings suggest that
the global regime change is not simply the theoretical musings of
the policymaking elite but instead reflects the attitudes of those
who live each day with corruption.
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APPENDIX I
TRANSLATION OF SURVEY
Unit 1. General type problems
1. Which social problem do you believe is the most important?
1. Ethnic diversity of population
2. Corruption
3. Control over economy by foreign organizations and
investors
4. Frequent government reshuffles
5. Economic decline
6. Organized Crime
2. Which social problem do you believe is of the second impor-
tance?
1. Ethnic diversity of population
2. Corruption
3. Control over economy by foreign organizations and
investors
4. Frequent government reshuffles
5. Economic decline
6. Organized Crime
3. What is your current position on the social and economic lad-
der? (10 = the best, 1 = the worst)
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
4. What was your position on the social and economic ladder 5
years ago? (10 = the best, 1 = the worst)
10
91
Nichols: The Fit between Changes to the International Corruption Regime an
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
954 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. [22:4
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
5. In the best case scenario, what will be your position on the so-
cial and economic ladder in 5 years? (10 the best, 1 = the
worst)
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
6. In regards to personal happiness and overall satisfaction,
would you consider the situation improved, worsened, or un-
changed compared to last year?
1. Became better
2. Approximately the same
3. Became worse
7. Where does Kazakhstan stand on the socioeconomic ladder at
the present time? (1 = the worst situation, 10 = the best situa-
tion)
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
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3
2
1
8. Where was Kazakhstan on the socioeconomic ladder 5 years
ago? (1= the worst situation, 10= the best situation)
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
9. Where will Kazakhstan be standing on the socioeconomic lad-
der in 5 years? (1= the worst situation, 10= the best situation)
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Unit 2. Questions regarding governnent corniption in the business
spiere
1. How do you interpret the word "corruption"?
1. Participation of government officials in commercial
ventures
2. Acceptance of monetary rewards for services rendered
3. Acceptance of birthday and other gifts
4. Assisting relatives in their business activities
2001]
93
Nichols: The Fit between Changes to the International Corruption Regime an
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
5. Assisting relatives in meeting influential people
6. Helping relatives in getting a job/getting into schools
7. Criminal use of authority
8. Embezzlement
9. Infiltration of government by organized crime
10. Other
11. Don't Know
2. How does bribery harm Kazakhstan?
1. A lot of harm
2. Enough harm
3. Some harm
4. No harm
3. Do you agree with the statement that bribery is the practical
necessity for quick resolution of business issues?
1. Absolutely agree
2. Agree
3. Don't agree
4. Absolutely not
5. No pressure
6. Don't work
4. How do you respond to the statement that bribery is a practical
necessity for getting things done quickly in politics?
1. Absolutely agree
2. Agree
3. Don't agree
4. Absolutely not
5. Not sure
5. How do you respond to the statement that judges rarely accept
bribes?
1. Absolutely agree
2. Agree
3. Don't agree
4. Absolutely not
5. Not sure
6. Which profession or group of people do you think is the most
corrupt in this country?
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1. Entrepreneurs
2. Banking/Financial Institution Employees
3. Politicians
4. Police
5. Judiciary
6. Government Officials
7. Customs/Revenue Service Employees
8. Institutions of Higher Education
9. Mass Media
10. Foreign Entrepreneurs
11. Other
7. How much priority do you think the government should place
on fighting corruption?
1. High priority
2. Some priority
3. No priority
8. How much pressure do you feel personally within your places
of work to engage in what you perceive to be less corruption?
1. A lot of pressure
2. A fair amount of pressure
3. A little pressure
4. No pressure at all
9. How much pressure do you feel to tolerate the corruption of
others within your place of work?
1. A lot of pressure
2. A fair amount of pressure
3. A little pressure
4. No pressure at all
Unit 3. In your opinion, Which of the following may or may not harn
the society in general?
1. State employee who accepts bribe from local entrepreneur?
1. A lot of harm to society
Z Some harm
3. No harm
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2. State employee who gives a job to his relative even though he
[relative] is not qualified for it?
1. A lot of harm to society
2. Some harm
3. No harm
3. Foreign entrepreneur who bribes government employee to get
an approval of his projects?
1. A lot of harm to society
2. Some harm
3. No harm
4. Bribing a traffic cop?
1. A lot of harm to society
2. Some harm
3. No harm
5. Local "boss"/ government official who accepts a bribe, but does
a lot of good for the community?
1. A lot of harm to society
2. Some harm
3. No harm
6. Entrepreneur who gives bribes to ensure preferential treatment
during contract bidding?
1. A lot of harm to society
2. Some harm
3. No harm
Unit 4. Give your opinion about the following statements
1. Dishonesty is more widespread in politics than in the business
sphere.
1. Completely agree
2. Agree
3. Don't agree
4. Absolutely don't agree
2. Corruption in this country has significantly declined.
[77.4
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1. Completely agree
2. Agree
3. Don't agree
4. Absolutely don't agree
3. Corruption in politics is widespread more in the cities than in
the countryside.
1. Completely agree
2. Agree
3. Don't agree
4. Absolutely don't agree
4. Nothing can be done to eradicate corruption in this country.
1. Completely agree
2. Agree
3. Don't agree
4. Absolutely don't agree
5. The majority of government officials accept bribes.
1. Completely agree
2. Agree
3. Don't agree
4. Absolutely don't agree
6. In this country, there are 2 interpretations of the law-one for
the rich people, other for poor.
1. Completely agree
2. Agree
3. Don't agree
4. Absolutely don't agree
Unit 5. Questions about tMe clanges in legislation
1. Should Kazakhstan copy legislation from economically devel-
oped countries rather than create its own legislation based on
its own historical experience?
1. Completely agree
2. Agree
3. Don't agree
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4. Absolutely don't agree
2. Should all persons running for elected office be required by law
to declare their personal income and savings?
1. Completely agree
2. Agree
3. Don't agree
4. Absolutely don't agree
3. Should there be a special law enforcement agency dedicated to
fighting corruption?
1. Completely agree
2. Agree
3. Don't agree
4. Absolutely don't agree
Unit 6. Questions about the system of state management
1. How much do you trust the legal judiciary system in this
country?
1. Fully trust
2. Trust with caution
3. Don't really trust
4. Totally distrust
2. How much do you trust those politicians who occupy elective
offices or run for the elections?
1. Fully trust
2. Trust with caution
3. Don't really trust
4. Totally distrust
3. How much do you trust the opinion that radio and TV report
the news fully, precisely, and objectively?
1. Fully trust
2. Trust with caution
3. Don't really trust
4. Totally distrust
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4. How much do you trust the opinion that printed press report
the news fully, precisely, and objectively?
1. Fully trust
2. Trust with caution
3. Don't really trust
4. Totally distrust
Unit Z Give short answers to the following
1. In your opinion, what is going to happen with the corruption
in Kazakhstan in the near future?
1. Will increase
2. Will stay the same
3. Will decrease
4. Will disappear
5. Disagree that it exists
2. Why do you think so?
3. What should the state employee do if he becomes aware that a
high-ranking official accepts a bribe from the entrepreneur?
1. Disregard this fact
2. Report to his immediate supervisor
3. Report to the law enforcement institution
4. Other
4. Why do you think so?
5. Can a single person do something to fight against corruption?
1. Of course, yes
2. Yes, but too much trouble
3. Rather not
4. No, it's hopeless
6. Why do you think so?
7. Do you feel it is necessary to help your relatives?
1. Yes
2. Yes, but only immediate relatives
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3. No (skip to question 9)
8. What kind of help for your relatives do you consider possible?
I. a. To close relatives, getting into schools (post-secondary):
1.Yes
2.No
b. To close relatives, help in paying for the education:
1.Yes
2.No
c. To close relatives, help to find a job:
1.Yes
2.No
d. To close relatives, help in the realization of commercial
projects:
1.Yes
2.No
e. To close relatives, help in meeting influential people:
1.Yes
2.No
f. To close relatives, help with business advices:
1.Yes
2.No
g. To close relatives, monetary support
1.Yes
2.No
II. a. To relatives, getting into schools (post-secondary):
1.Yes
2.No
b. To relatives, help in paying for the education:
1.Yes
2.No
c. To relatives, help to find a job:
1.Yes
2.No
d. To relatives, help in the realization of commercial proj-
ects:
1.Yes
2.No
e. To relatives, help in meeting influential people:
1.Yes
2.No
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f. To relatives, help with business advices:
1.Yes
2.No
g. To relatives, monetary support
1.Yes
2.No
9. According to which principle do you think that people get se-
lected for the positions of authority?
1. Preferential treatment of relatives
2. Preferential treatment of fellow countrymen
3. Personal devotion
4. Level of education
5. Level of professionalism
6. Other
Unit 8. General Information
1. Gender
1. Male
2. Female
2. Age
3. Education
1. Incomplete secondary
2. Complete secondary
3. Incomplete higher education
4. Diploma of higher education
4. Ethnicity
1. Kazakh
2. Russian
3. Uzbek
4. Kirgyz
5. Uigur
5. Present marital status
1. Not married
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2. Married
3. Married but live separately
4. Common marriage
5. Divorced
6. Widowed
6. Religion
1. Muslim
2. Christian
3. Jewish
4. Other
5. Atheist (skip to question 8)
7. The importance of religion for you:
1. Very important
2. Moderately important
3. Little importance
4. Not important
8. Occupation
1. State employee
2. Student
3. Manager of enterprise
4. Businessman
5. Entrepreneur
6. Non-working retired person (including handicapped)
7. Unemployed
8. House keeper
9. Worker
9. Your main occupation-according to the place (governmental
state of private sector)
1. Government
2. Private business
10. How long have you worked at your present job?
11. How many people are under your supervision?
1. 0
2. 1-3
3. 4-7
[22:4
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4. 8-15
5. More than 15
12. Do you have any relatives or friends who are high-ranking
government officials?
1. Yes, I have one or several friends
2. Yes, I have one or several relatives
3. No, I have no friends or relatives there
13. Do you consider yourself wealthy, medium income, or a poor
person?
1. Wealthy
2. Medium income
3. Poor
14. What is the approximate income of your family last month?
1. No income
2. Under 2000 tenge
3. 2000-3999 tenge
4. 4000-7999 tenge
5. 8000-15,999 tenge
6. 16,000-31,999 tenge
7. More than 32,000 tenge
8. Refuse to answer
15. Type of settlement
1. City
2. Village
16. Region (oblast)
1. Almaty
2. Karaganda
3. South Kazakhstan
4. North Kazakhstan
5. West Kazakhstan
6. Akmola
7. East Kazakhstan
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APPENDIX II
TABLES
Table Al
In your opinion, which of the following may or may not harm
the society in general?
Entrepreneur who gives bribes to ensure preferential treatment
during contract bidding?
Ethnicity
Ca . ) Total
x lo of h 0
Alotof harm 30% 40% 43% 50% 52% 32% 45% 35%
to society
Some harm 55 53 43 50 38 38 39 51
No harm 15 7 14 0 10 30 16 14
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(n) (369) (196) (14) (2) (29) (37) (51) (698)
Pearson chi2 (12) = 28.7171 Pr = 0.004
Table A2
How important should the government consider the fight
against corru tion?
Ethnicit
-. - " Total
N i ,D ' -
0
Top priority 51% 68% 43% 50% 45% 45% 61% 56%
Significant 44 31 50 50 55 50 35 40
Secondary 5 1 7 0 0 5 4 4
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(n) 1(370) 2(196) (14) (2) 1(29) (38) (51
Pearson chi2(12) = 25.9898 Pr = 0.011
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Table A3
Should there be a special law enforcement agency dedicated to
fighting coru tion?
Ethnicity
d C1 0
N 1. - Total
Completely 36% 46% 14% 0% 45% 26% 43, 39%
Agree
Agree 39 41 36 50 24 50 31 39
Don'tAgree 17 10 29 0 31 16 20 6
Absolutely 6
Don't Agree 8 3 21 50 0 8 6
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%" 100% 100% 100% 100%
(n) (368) (196) (14) (2) (29) (38) (51) (698)
Pearson chi2(18) = 41.7328 Pr = 0.001
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Table A4
Give your opinion about the following:
country has siirnificantlv declined.
Corruption in this
Religion
oTotal
Completely Agree 2% 0% 25% 5% 1% 1.5%
Agree 8 6 0 0 5 7
Don't Agree 63 59 50 60 50 59
Absolutely Don't 27 35 25 35 44 32.5
Agree
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(n) (358) (180) (4) (20) (135) (697)
Pearson chi2(12) = 37.9045 Pr = 0.000
Table A5
In your opinion, which of the following may or may not harm
the society in general?
Entrepreneur who gives bribes to ensure preferential treatment
during contract bidding?
Religion ,
STotal
U 0
A lot of harm 30% 37% 50% 55% 43% 35%
Some harm 54 51 25 25 48 51
No harm 16 12 25 20 9 14
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(n) (358) (179) (4) (20) (135) (696)
Pearson chi2(8) = 16.3600 Pr = 0.038
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Table A6
Do you agree with the statement that judges accept bribes sel-
doml r?
Pearson chi2(4) = 13.6906 Pr = 0.008
Table A 7(a)
Give your opinion about the following- Dishonesty is more
widespread in politics than in the business sphere.
Type of Settlement
City Village Total
Completely agree 19% 21% 20%
Agree 44 52 47
Don't agree 35 26 31
Absolutely don't agree 2 1 2
Total 100% 100% 100%
(n) '(385) (308) (693)
Pearson chi2(3) = 7.9068 Pr = 0.048
Table A 7(b)
Should there be a special law enforcement agency dedicated to
fi ghting corruption?
Tpe of Settlement
city Village Total
Completely Agree 34% 44% 39%
Agree 43 35 39
Don't Agree 16 16 16
Absolutely Don't Agree 7 5 6
Total 100% 100% 100%
(n) (384) (308) (692)
Pearson chi2(3) = 9.0659 Pr = 0.028
Type of Settlement
City Village Total
Absolutely agree 3% 5% 4%
Agree 8 14 11
Don't agree 46 35 41
Absolutely not 14 14 14
Not sure 29 32 30
Total 100% 100% 100%
(n) (386) (308) (694)
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Table A8(a)
Should all persons running for elected office be required by law
to declare their personal income and savings?
Type of Settlement
City Village Total
Completely Agree 36% 27% 32%
Agree 38 52 44
Don't Agree 20 18 19
Absolutely Don't Agree 6 3 5
Total 100% 100% 100%
(n) (385) (308) (693)
Pearson chi2(3) = 16.6919 Pr = 0.001
Table A8(b)
Give your opinion about the following:
country has sie-nificanflv declined.
Corruption in this
Education
C4 0 4- 0
Aee 6 7 3 8 7.0J
Don't Agree 73 54 58 63 59.0
Absolutely Don't 21 3 37 27 3.5
AboueyDnt21 38 37 27 32.5
Agree
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(n) (62) (270) (120) (229) 0/1
Pearson chi2(9) = 19.3054 Pr - 0.023
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Table A9
In your opinion, which of the following may or may not harm
the society in general?
State employee who accepts bribe from local entrepreneur?
Education
00 0 00
8U 0 oU Total
A lot of harmn to 53% 37% 33% 30% 36%societyI
Some harm 45 54 57 58 55
No harm 2 9 10 12 9
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(n) (62) (271) (120) (229) (682)
Pearson chi2(6) = 14.2004 Pr = 0.027
Table AlO
In your opinion, which of the following may or may not harm
the society in general?
Entrepreneur who gives bribes to ensure preferential treatment
during contract bidding?
Education
W s-.
CZ 0 -~ 0
W ca o Total
0 0 0 to =1t I
U) U)~~z U~z
Alot of harm to 39% 34% 28% 35%
society
Some harm 34 48 52 60 51
No harm 21 13 14 12 14
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%" 100%
(n) (62) (271) (120) (227) (680)
Pearson chi2(6) = 16.6262 Pr = 0.011
2001]
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Table All
Should all persons running for elected office be required by law
to declare their personal income and savings?
Income (in tenge)
0 m c' S Total
z.4 c* C'JO ,:v t C0T- TCO
Completely 67% 43% 35% 29% 30% 35% 19% 21% 32%
Agree
Agree 30 54 53 51 44 37 44 32 44
Don't Agree 3 3 11 17 22 26 26 30 19
Abso'y Don't 0 0 1 3 4 2 11 17 5
AgreeII II
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(n) (36) (37) (78) (164)1(200) (85) (27) (71) (698)
Pearson chi2(21) = 82.7518 Pr =0.000
Table A12
In your opinion, which of the following may or may not harm
the society in general?
Local "boss"/ government official who accepts a bribe, but does
a lot of rood for the community?
Pearson chi2 (2) = 15.5184 Pr = 0.000
Occupation
Gov't Private Total
Sector
Alotof harm 25% 15% 21%
Some harm 61 58 60
No harm 14 27 19
Total 100% 100% 100%
(n) (276) (165) (441)
[22:4
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Table A13
In your opinion, which of the following may or may not harm
the society in general?
Bribing a traffic cot,?
Pearson chi2(2) = 8.9420 Pr = 0.011
Occu ation
Gov't Private Total
Sector
A lot of harm to 14% 7% 12%
society
Some harm 57 52 55
No harm 29 41 33
Total 100% 100% 100%
(n) (275) (164) (439)
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